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ABSTRACT 
The reports issued after investigations into some recent and major corporate failures highlight 
that behavioural issues on the part of company directors are a significant contributory factor 
to those failures.  The events which led to the corporate failures in companies such as the 
Maxwell Group, BCCI, Enron, WorldCom, Lehman Brothers and RBS illustrate that 
inappropriate actions and decisions were taken by the directors and these contributed to the 
failures.  This suggests that behavioural issues constitute risks in the corporate governance 
process as they have the potential to contribute to the occurrence of failures; risk being 
understood to mean the potential for an undesirable, unexpected and unwanted negative 
outcome.  In any attempt to prevent corporate failures attributable to behavioural issues, the 
risks associated with the concept of behaviour need to be identified and managed sufficiently.  
The occurrence of major corporate failures has often led to discussions in government and 
business circles regarding the issues that contributed to the failures and avenues for 
preventing similar occurrences in the future.  In relation to addressing behavioural issues, it is 
important to ascertain what constitutes behaviour and ensure that these constituent elements 
are engaged with in the course of developing preventive mechanisms for such corporate 
failures.  A meaningful solution to the problems of behavioural risks in corporate governance 
can only be achieved if there is a clear understanding of how the elements which contribute to 
behaviour do so, as well as the development of mechanisms which take cognisance of the 
risks accruing from these constituent elements. 
This thesis examines behavioural risks in corporate governance, and seeks to ascertain what 
constitutes behaviour.  It finds upon an examination and analysis of literature that 
“personality” and “situations” are elements which contribute to behaviour.  Consideration of 
risk management mechanisms in corporate governance indicates that the personality aspect of 
behavioural risks has remained largely unidentified.  The thesis then focuses on the 
personality of company directors as a significant contributory factor to their behaviour, and 
therefore also constituting potential behavioural risks in relation to corporate governance.  A 
question then arises as to how behavioural risks and personality risks in particular have been 
managed in corporate governance.  Taking cognisance of the processes involved in risk 
identification and risk management, it is found that personality risks have not been identified 
by any corporate governance mechanisms, and which means, therefore, that these risks have 
not been managed effectively under any of the existing corporate governance mechanisms, 
xv 
 
such as the Turnbull Guidance, UK Corporate Governance Code, UK Companies Act, and 
EU Company Law Directives.   This also indicates that behavioural risks have been 
insufficiently managed because there cannot be an effective behavioural risk management 
process without an effective personality risk management process.   
Considering the negative economic and social impact of corporate failures in relation to 
public listed companies, which includes capital and job losses, loss of confidence in 
capitalism, reduced markets for goods and services; and the justification for the State to 
intervene in order to safeguard society from the occurrence and consequences of these 
failures, this thesis suggests a hybrid regulatory model as an approach to managing 
personality risks in corporate governance and as part of the corporate governance process.  
Building upon relevant corporate and regulatory theories; and incorporating current realities 
as they relate to the regulation of companies, such as the popularity and flexibility of self-
regulation; the thesis proposes a model with suggested provisions which are aimed at 
contributing to an effective outcome as regards personality risk management.  The 
fundamental requirements of an effective risk management process are discussed and 
engaged with in the process of developing a conceptual framework for personality risk 
management from which the approach and provisions in the suggested model are drawn.  The 
hybrid model consists of hard law provisions in the areas where they are deemed most 
essential in order to create effectiveness and soft law provisions in the areas in which it is 
thought that flexibility is necessary and would not negate the overall aims of the model.     
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CHAPTER ONE  
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
BACKGROUND 
Corporate governance as a concept has become increasingly prominent due to the occurrence 
of high profile corporate failures.
1
  Some of these failures resulted in negative consequences 
such as capital and job losses which affected the economic and social welfare of society.
2
  It 
became important, therefore, to increase the focus on corporate governance because it is 
recognised as a mechanism which contributes to the prevention of corporate failures.
3
  From 
the era of the major corporate failures in the United Kingdom (UK) around the early 1990s to 
the corporate scandals in the United States (US) a decade later, efforts have been made by 
governments and business communities to improve corporate governance mechanisms in 
order to help prevent corporate failures.
4
  Reforms have taken the shape of promulgating 
principles of best practice in the UK and statutory intervention in the US.
5
  In the UK in 
particular, committees have been set up to examine corporate governance issues and develop 
mechanisms geared towards increasing the effectiveness of corporate governance.
6
  An 
examination of high profile corporate failures which have occurred in the last two decades 
                                                          
1
 The report issued by The Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (The Cadbury Report) 
in 1992 highlighted that corporate governance became a prominent issue on the public agenda in the United 
Kingdom following concerns over the BCCI and Maxwell Group corporate failures. See M.B. Hemraj, 
‘Preventing Corporate Failure: The Cadbury Committee’s Corporate Governance Report’ (2003) 10(2) Journal 
of Financial Crime 141-145.  In the United States, the Enron failure drew enormous attention to corporate 
governance issues; see the numerous articles relating to the scandal at 
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/toc/02_04/B3767enron.htm (accessed 15th June 2012). 
2
 See R. Wearing, Cases in Corporate Governance (London: Sage Publications 2005).  Some corporate failures 
could result in positive outcomes such as the promotion of competition and innovation, as well as the 
provision of learning opportunities which could enhance the potential for success in other endeavours, see 
A.M. Knott & H.E. Posen, ‘Is Failure Good?’ (2005) 26(7) Strategic Management Journal 617-641; see also B. 
Kriegesmann, T. Kley & M.G. Schwering, ‘Creative Errors and Heroic Failures: Capturing their Innovative 
Potential’ (2005) 26(3) Journal of Business Strategy 57-63.  However, the corporate failures which result in 
mostly negative outcomes are worrisome, particularly when they are preventable. 
3
 See The Cadbury Report, (note 1) para 1.9. 
4
 For instance, the first UK corporate governance code was promulgated by The Cadbury Committee in 1992, 
whilst the Enron failure in the US, as well as that of WorldCom which occurred shortly after, necessitated the 
promulgation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002. 
5
 Ibid. 
6
 Examples include the Cadbury (1992), Greenbury (1995), Hampel (1998) and Turnbull (1999 & 2005) 
committees and reports; see I.W. Jones & M.G. Pollitt, ‘Understanding How Issues in Corporate Governance 
Develop: Cadbury Report to Higgs Review’ (2004) 12(2) Corporate Governance: An International Review 162-
171. 
2 
 
illustrates that inappropriate behaviour by company directors contributed to some of these 
failures.
7
  Companies are essentially managed by corporate officers, company directors being 
the principal officers provided for under the law.
8
  Therefore, management functions in 
companies are usually undertaken or authorised by company directors and managing 
companies effectively in order to prevent corporate failures is their responsibility.    
Corporate failures can occur for a number of reasons,
9
 but of particular concern in this thesis 
are those failures in which a contributory component is the inappropriate behaviour of 
company directors.  Despite the numerous corporate governance reforms that have taken 
place, corporate failures attributable to behavioural issues are still occurring.  In the reports 
that followed investigations after the 2008/2009 financial crisis, it was clearly identified that 
the behaviour of company directors is a problem in corporate governance.
10
  These reports 
acknowledged, as had been evident in some of the corporate failures of previous years, that 
behavioural issues associated with company directors were a major contributory element in 
some recent corporate failures and the resulting financial crisis.
11
  Behavioural issues can, 
therefore, be viewed as risks to the corporate governance process, and these risks are 
significant because they have the potential to result in corporate failures.
12
  Questions then 
                                                          
7
 Some of these corporate failures are examined in detail in chapter four.  The issues which contributed to the 
failures in companies such as Maxwell Group, Enron, WorldCom, BCCI, were related in one way or another to 
the behaviour of company directors.  See Wearing, (note 2).    
8
 The UK Companies Act 2006 in s 20 provides for the adoption of a Model Articles of Association for private 
limited companies and public companies, and the Model Articles specifies in Art 3 that subject to the Articles 
of Association, the directors are responsible for the management of the company.  Art 5 specifies that 
company directors may delegate their powers and duties. 
9
 For instance the OECD highlighted various reasons for the recent corporate failures and financial crisis, 
including corporate risk management and board behaviour, see OECD Observer No 273, June 2009; see also G. 
Kirkpatrick, ‘The Corporate Governance Lessons from the Financial Crisis’ (2009 OECD Financial Market Trends; 
see also The Turner Review: A Regulatory Response to the Global Banking Crisis, March 2009, at 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/turner_review.pdf  (accessed 15th June 2012).   
10
 See Annex 4 of the Walker Review of Corporate Governance in UK Banks and Other Financial Industry 
Entities: Final Recommendations, 26th November 2009 at s 1.10, p 26 where reference is made, in relation to 
the causes of the financial crisis, to the fact that even though there were material deficiencies in financial 
regulation and prudential oversight, there were also material deficiencies in the effectiveness and oversight of 
company boards.  The effectiveness and oversight of company directors are issues which are connected with 
their behaviour.  The Institute of Chartered Secretaries and Administrators (ICSA) in their report in 2009 
highlighted that the effectiveness of corporate governance systems is undermined by inappropriate 
boardroom behaviours.  The OECD Steering Group on Corporate Governance also issued a report on the 
financial crisis in 2009, and one of the aspects identified as needing urgent attention was the performance of 
company directors, an issue which relates to their behaviour.  These reports and others are discussed in more 
detail in chapter four. 
11
 Ibid. 
12
 Ibid, these reports identify behavioural issues as a contributory element to the corporate failures which led 
to the financial crisis.  The meaning ascribed to “corporate failures” is as discussed in the section on 
definitions.  Risk as a concept is generally understood as the possibility or potential of a negative outcome, and 
corporate failure can be described as one.  Detailed discussions on risk are undertaken in chapter three.  
3 
 
arise as to whether existing corporate governance mechanisms have taken cognisance of the 
significance of behavioural risks; whether there are processes in place to manage such risks, 
and how effective these mechanisms are in relation to these risks?  In answering these 
questions, it becomes pertinent to investigate what contributes to the creation and continued 
existence of behavioural risks, as that would be the starting point in managing such risks.  An 
analysis of literature indicates that two components, personality and situations, are vital 
elements in relation to behaviour.
13
  Therefore, if a corporate governance system does not 
include mechanisms which identify these components of behavioural risks, and there are no 
processes in place to sufficiently manage the risks which accrue from each of the components 
and which in turn make up the totality of what behavioural risks entail, then a gap exists in 
relation to those unmanaged risks and the system is flawed to that extent.   
THE AIMS OF THE RESEARCH 
The purposes of this thesis are, firstly, to ascertain whether and how behavioural issues 
contribute risks to the effective operation of corporate governance processes and how these 
risks are identified and managed.  In so doing, the thesis seeks to identify the elements which 
constitute behaviour, as those would be essential in the determination of whether behavioural 
risks are being managed effectively.  Personality and situations are identified as the major 
elements of behaviour and the thesis then particularly investigates and focuses on personality 
as a significant contributory element to behaviour, and seeks to ascertain whether personality 
risks are effectively managed in corporate governance.   Upon the examination of risk 
management mechanisms in corporate governance, it is found that personality risks are not 
identified and managed.  This situation is argued to contribute to the insufficient and 
ineffective management of behavioural risks in corporate governance.  Arguments are 
presented regarding the need to manage personality risks, highlighting the existence and 
negative implications of these risks as evidenced by the corporate failures which have 
occurred as a result of behavioural issues.   
                                                          
13
 See D. Schultz & S.E. Schultz, Theories of Personality (5
th
 ed., Pacific Grove, CT: Books/Cole Publishing 1994) 
195; see also D.C. Funder, ‘Personality, Situations and Person-Situation Interactions’ in O.P. John, R. W. Robins 
& L.A. Pervin (eds.), Handbook of Personality Theory and Research (New York: The Guilford Press  2008) 568-
581; In some of the examples of corporate failures discussed in chapter four, such as Maxwell Group, 
WorldCom and RBS, there were indications that the personality of the corporate officers were inappropriate 
and thus contributed to their inappropriate behaviour.  Chapter five discusses personality and behaviour in 
detail. 
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Secondly, this thesis aims to determine what should be achieved as regards the effective 
management of personality risks and makes suggestions in a conceptual framework of 
approaches which can be adopted towards attaining this goal.  Considering corporate and 
regulatory theories, and taking cognisance of the role of the State in the management of 
public listed companies, arguments are made for the adoption of a regulatory model to be 
utilised in the management of personality risks and in turn behavioural risks associated with 
company directors.  There are also suggestions for provisions to be included in this model.  
This thesis contributes to the literature by addressing the issue of personality risks in 
corporate governance, highlighting the significance of personality risks and the linkage 
between personality and behaviour as far as corporate governance risks are concerned, 
illustrating that corporate governance mechanisms have largely ignored the personality aspect 
of behavioural risks, presenting a conceptual framework for personality risk management, 
arguing for statutory intervention in the management of behavioural risks, and developing a 
regulatory model for that purpose.  All of the above contributions are aimed at improving the 
effectiveness of corporate governance by increasing knowledge and offering solutions which 
could influence policy in an area which might otherwise remain ignored despite its 
significance, and ultimately contribute towards a reduction in corporate failures attributable 
to behavioural issues.    
The main proposition which this thesis seeks to address is ascertaining whether behavioural 
issues are risk contributors to the corporate governance process, and, if behavioural risks and 
personality risks in particular are routinely identified and managed effectively by existing 
corporate governance mechanisms, and if not, to ascertain an effective means of doing so, 
particularly in relation to company directors.  In order to address the main proposition, the 
following sub-questions are considered and addressed:  
 Are corporate failures attributable to the behaviour of company directors? 
 Does the behaviour of company directors constitute risk in the corporate governance 
process? 
 What constitutes behavioural risk?  
 Is behavioural risk properly identified considering all it entails? 
 Is behavioural risk effectively managed in corporate governance? 
 Is personality a significant aspect of behaviour and what is the linkage? 
 What constitutes personality and personality risk? 
 Is personality risk effectively managed in corporate governance? 
 Why is it important to manage personality risk? 
 How can personality risk be managed effectively? 
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 Which approaches/mechanisms would meet the criteria for effectiveness?  
 Why is a regulatory framework a good option for managing personality risks 
associated with company directors and how would it work? 
JUSTIFICATION FOR THE RESEARCH 
The recurrence of corporate failures apparently attributable to behavioural issues is such that 
there should be concerted efforts towards understanding the reasons for these failures, as this 
is a foundational step in the quest to find a meaningful solution to the problems associated 
with those issues.  The enhancement of knowledge regarding personality risks and its impact 
on behavioural risks would contribute to an in-depth awareness of the problems which can 
arise in cases where personality risks are unmanaged. This knowledge also aids the 
development of effective risk management mechanisms in that regard.  Considering the 
processes which are involved in risk management, developing a conceptual framework for 
personality risk management would afford detailed insight into the issues involved in the 
process and from which beneficial knowledge can be drawn in relation to developing 
effective risk management models.  Flowing from an understanding of the underlying issues 
in relation to personality risks and behavioural risks, and taking cognisance of relevant 
factors, developing a personality risk management model for company directors is one means 
of contributing to the efforts being made to help in the prevention of corporate failures.  
These efforts are particularly justified considering the negative consequences of corporate 
failures such as economic and social losses, loss of lives and property, financial crisis, credit 
crunch and recession.
14
   
SCOPE OF THE RESEARCH 
This thesis focuses on behavioural risks as they relate to company directors.  This is because 
company directors are the most identifiable set of corporate officers as their role is provided 
for under the law and the management of the company is particularly their responsibility.
15
  A 
company may elect not to have any other corporate officers other than directors, and the 
directors would end up as the only persons who are involved in the management of the 
company.  There is, therefore, better clarity in focusing on company directors as the corporate 
officers primarily recognised by law under Article 3 of the Model Articles of Association 
provided for by section 20 of the UK Companies Act 2006.  
                                                          
14
 The examples of corporate failures discussed in chapter four highlights these significant losses. 
15
 See The UK Companies Act and Model Articles, (note 8). 
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The thesis also restricts its analysis and solutions to public listed companies.  This is because, 
as highlighted earlier, corporate governance became an issue predominantly as a result of 
failures in public listed companies, as these failures had negative impacts on society.  
Essentially, the quest to improve corporate governance originates from the desire to improve 
the management of companies on behalf of their shareholders and stakeholders who are 
usually absent from the management function.  As much as privately held companies can 
benefit from corporate governance reforms which promote effective governance of 
companies generally, the focus of corporate governance mechanisms has largely been on 
public listed companies, one of the reasons being the separation of ownership from control.
16
  
Corporate governance codes also usually operate under the auspices of stock exchanges, 
which supports the fact that code provisions are focused primarily on publicly traded 
companies.
17
  Therefore, the issues which necessitated the arguments and discussions in this 
research originate and relate to public listed companies, and so the solutions that are 
suggested here are also focused on such companies.   
Again, the justification to develop mechanisms which would help prevent corporate failures 
is higher when the failures in question have adverse effects on society as a whole, which is 
the case when publicly traded companies fail.  Some private companies no doubt impact on 
the wider society as well in terms of their activities, but nevertheless, their shares are not 
publicly traded and losses are usually restricted to the private owners save as it relates to the 
services which the company rendered to the public.  Public listed companies offer their shares 
to the public, and so society has a broader interest in these companies as numerous people 
could invest in the companies and losses from their failures would affect more people.  This 
thesis focuses on risk as it relates to corporate governance.  It is acknowledged that the term 
“risk” might be interpreted in varying ways in different contexts, but the context in which it is 
utilised here is as discussed in chapter three, section 3.2.  Risks have been viewed in 
corporate governance as events or issues which impact on the achievement of corporate 
                                                          
16
 See para 3.1 of the Cadbury Committee Code 1992, which states that the code is directed to the boards of 
directors of all listed companies, even though all other companies are encouraged to meet its requirements.  
The UK Corporate Governance Code 2010 also states in its preamble that corporate governance is concerned 
with what the board of directors do and how they set the values of the company.  The new code also states 
that it is applicable to listed companies.  There is usually a separation of ownership from control in listed 
companies as shareholders may change over time and directors are appointed to manage the affairs of the 
company, see J.W. Salacuse, ‘Corporate Governance in the New Century (2004) 25(3) Company Lawyer 69-83 
at 70; see also W. Bratton, ‘Berle and Means Reconsidered at the Century’s Turn’ (2001) Spring Edition The 
Journal of Corporation Law 753-762.  
17
 See for instance para 9.8.6 of the UK Listing Rules, which requires listed companies to report on whether or 
not they have complied with the Combined Code. 
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objectives.  It is in this context that personality risks and behavioural risks are understood and 
analysed.   
The jurisdiction of focus in this thesis is the UK.  The thesis is concerned with UK corporate 
governance processes.  In some cases, examples have been drawn from other jurisdictions 
with the aim of illustrating how widespread an issue is or to examine how an issue has been 
approached in another location.  However, due to time and space constraints, as well as for 
the sake of familiarity, the major corporate governance mechanisms and corporate laws 
which are analysed in this research are those which are operational in the UK, and the 
solutions proffered here also adopt the UK corporate and regulatory foundations as the basis 
for their development.     
OVERVIEW OF THE THESIS 
This thesis is structured as follows: 
Chapter One contains this introductory section, as well as the section which discusses the 
methodology adopted in the thesis.  It also contains a section which defines the significant 
terms used in the thesis and explains their meaning in the context of the research.   
Chapter Two is a review of the literature which forms the foundational and theoretical basis 
for the research.  It contains discussions on literature relating to corporate theories, corporate 
governance, company directors, corporate failures, personality and behaviour, corporate risk 
management, and regulatory theories.  This literature highlights the relevant developments in 
those areas and provides an understanding of the issues from which the research questions 
emerge.  The chapter also provides an underlying basis for the arguments that emerge in the 
thesis and presents the perspectives from which solutions to the problems identified in the 
thesis are drawn. 
Chapter Three examines the concept of risk and situates risk in the context of corporate 
governance.  This chapter starts by presenting different definitions of risk and highlights the 
importance of risk management.  It goes on to discuss how risk has been approached in 
corporate governance terms, beginning with the Turnbull Guidance which was issued by the 
Turnbull Committee after examining internal control and risk management practices in 
companies.  The chapter also evaluates how personality risk and behavioural risk has been 
addressed by other corporate governance mechanisms such as the UK Corporate Governance 
Code, Company Law provisions, EU Regulations, and Financial Services Authority (FSA) 
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Approved Persons Regime which is applicable to companies operating in the financial 
services sector.  Based on these discussions, arguments are made that personality risk should 
constitute a distinct and significant risk category.  The chapter then highlights the lacuna in 
the risk management process as it relates to corporate governance by illustrating that 
personality risk has not been explicitly identified or provided for under existing corporate 
governance mechanisms.  It is also argued that behavioural risks have been managed mostly 
from a “situational” perspective, as contrasted with a “person centred” perspective, and that 
ignoring the personality aspect of behavioural risks contributes to overall ineffectiveness in 
the management of behavioural risks as well as all other corporate risks. 
Chapter Four discusses investigations into high profile corporate failures and the 
investigative reports issued after such failures with the aim of highlighting that behavioural 
issues have been recognised as a significant problem in corporate governance.  For a practical 
perspective, and to situate the problem in the context of real experiences, the chapter then 
discusses some examples of corporate failures, highlighting specific behavioural issues which 
were contributory elements to those failures and illustrating the effects of the failures.  There 
are discussions on personality and behavioural issues, indicating the linkage between these 
concepts as evident in the reports and examples of corporate failures.  Arguments are then 
made regarding the negative impact of corporate failures and the need, as well as the 
justification, to seek solutions to the problem of personality risks.  This chapter particularly 
illustrates the significance of personality and behaviour in relation to corporate failures and 
provides the foundation for the next chapter which seeks to establish a detailed understanding 
of personality and its impact on behaviour. 
Chapter Five considers psychological literature and examines personality and its impact on 
behaviour.  The chapter explains the meaning of personality; discusses the most widely 
accepted means of personality classification and identification, the Five-Factor Model and the 
NEO PI-R; examines the personality dimensions and their relationship to corporate 
governance in terms of leadership and performance roles; and presents arguments regarding 
the personality dimensions best suited to corporate governance.  In discussing the different 
dimensions of personality and their potential behavioural tendencies, as well as the impact of 
personality on behaviour, this chapter emphasises the risks which emanate from personality 
issues and the importance and necessity of personality risk management.  
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Chapter Six presents a conceptual framework for personality risk management.  The chapter 
begins with a discussion on what should be achieved in the management of personality risks.  
It then proceeds by discussing possible approaches to achieve this aim.  There follows a 
discussion of the indicators of effectiveness as far as the risk management process is 
concerned.  The chapter then argues that regulatory intervention in the form of a hybrid 
mechanism is an effective approach towards personality risk management.  In order to 
provide a foundation for understanding why this approach is considered appropriate, there is 
a discussion of corporate and regulatory theories.  Flowing from this, there follows a 
discussion of and justification for the particular regulatory approach adopted in the model, 
indicating its desirability, necessity, modality and acceptability.  The chapter concludes with 
a discussion on the aims of the proposed model and the reasons why the approach taken 
achieves those aims. 
Chapter Seven presents the regulatory model suggested as a means of engaging with the 
problems of personality risks and behavioural risks, a mechanism designed to manage 
personality risks in corporate governance.  The chapter starts with a review of existing 
mechanisms and assesses the extent to which they are deficient in managing personality risks.  
There follows a more detailed discussion of the possible approaches to achieving the aims of 
the model, with indications as to the limitations in each approach.  The chapter then discusses 
justifications for the hybrid regulatory approach from the perspective of regulatory theories, 
current trends and cost issues.  There follows an illustration of the hybrid framework and the 
processes it entails.  The chapter then goes on to discuss the model in detail, starting with its 
applicability, timing, procedure, monitoring, external authority and recommended provisions.  
There is a discussion of how the provisions of the model compare with the provisions relating 
to personality risk in the present UK corporate governance framework, particularly the FSA 
Approved Persons Regime and the Companies Act 2006.  This is to further highlight the 
necessity for the model in the light of limitations and inadequacies of other existing 
mechanisms.  There is also a discussion on the practical importation of the model into the UK 
corporate governance framework, as well as other considerations in relation to the model 
such as the most appropriate personality dimensions recommended for corporate governance, 
data protection and privacy implications and regulatory impact assessment issues.  Finally, 
there is a presentation of a skeletal framework of what the model might appear like in the 
case that a new statutory instrument is sought, and this framework is presented as a means of 
contextualising the provisions suggested for inclusion in the model. 
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Chapter Eight concludes the thesis by presenting an overview of the core arguments and 
advances it has achieved.  It also makes recommendations for further studies and 
development. 
 
CORE ARGUMENTS IN THE THESIS 
The major arguments in this thesis are as follows: 
1) Corporate failures can occur as a result of, or be significantly contributed towards by 
behavioural issues relating to company directors, and therefore behavioural issues 
constitute risks to be addressed by corporate governance processes and mechanisms. 
2) Personality is identified as an element in relation to behaviour and so behaviour 
cannot be adequately understood without an understanding of personality. 
3) The relationship between personality and behaviour implies that personality risks 
contribute to behavioural risks, and so the management of behavioural risks will be 
insufficient if personality risks are not managed. 
4) Corporate governance risk management processes as evidenced from the Turnbull 
Guidance and other relevant laws and regulations have failed to adequately identify 
personality risk as a distinct risk category, and there is no mechanism in place to 
specifically manage personality risks.  
5) Personality risks, and in turn behavioural risks, are considered to be a problematic 
area in corporate governance as evidenced from investigations and reports on 
corporate failures.  Practical examples as highlighted by the specific behaviour of 
company directors in the corporate failures discussed in the thesis also illustrate how 
behaviour can contribute to failures and how personality can impact on behaviour.   
6) Evidence from psychological literature indicates that personality is a significant 
element in the constitution of behaviour; and that even in varying situations, outcomes 
still depend mostly on personality dimensions.  This means that an individual’s 
behaviour is largely dependent on his/her personality.   
7) Personality dimensions are identifiable based on the prevalence of occurrence of 
particular traits, and these can be measured using some established methods in 
psychology.  Likewise, there is evidence that certain personality dimensions are better 
suited to corporate governance. 
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8) In order to manage personality risks effectively, a conceptual framework would entail 
examining all the factors which would enable the achievement of the desired aim.  In 
designing an appropriate mechanism, regard must be hard to corporate theories as 
they provide the basis for understanding how companies exist and function.  Regard 
must also be had to regulatory theories as they provide the underlying foundation 
upon which regulatory interventions rest.      
9) Considering corporate theories, the State can intervene in the governance of 
companies in order to enhance the effective functioning of markets and in the interests 
of the public.  Regulatory intervention in the management of personality risks is 
argued as justifiable because its aim is to help protect society from corporate failures. 
10) A regulatory model comprising hard law provisions in the areas in which they would 
prove most effective and soft law provisions in the areas in which flexibility is 
required is argued to be an effective means of managing personality risks.   
In conclusion, these core arguments give an indication as to the questions which prompted 
the investigations in this thesis and the critical findings which developed these questions, as 
well as the basis upon which the solutions suggested for the perceived problem are drawn.  
The chapters are developed in accordance with these core arguments and they expand on the 
issues highlighted.  Personality risk is significant as it contributes to overall behavioural risks 
in corporate governance, and could also affect the management of all other corporate risks 
because the ability to engage in risk management tasks is also dependent on the personality of 
the individuals involved in the risk management process.  It is argued that the advancements 
in knowledge regarding personality risks and the regulatory model suggested in this thesis 
should influence policy interventions in this area of corporate governance, as the effective 
management of personality risks is one potential means of safeguarding society from 
corporate failures.  
1.2 METHODOLOGY 
RESEARCH PARADIGM 
This thesis utilises various approaches due to the nature of the research problem and the 
suggested solutions.  It is doctrinal and qualitative to the extent that the process adopted is 
one which selects existing legal doctrines and regulations, as well as relevant literature which 
is most applicable to the research problem and analyses them in relation to the manner in 
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which they influence the problem and the extent to which they have provided and can provide 
solutions to the problem.
18
  It employs traditional doctrinal research methodology in law by 
identifying and analysing relevant legislation, cases and secondary legal materials; as well as 
adopting the research methodology in the social sciences which develops from a review of 
relevant literature.  This research qualifies as qualitative to the extent that it identifies a 
problem which has social implications, and develops arguments aimed at influencing policy 
and law reform in relation to the research problem.
19
  It is applied research as it investigates a 
situation, identifies a problem and aims to use the information derived to enhance a better 
understanding of the problem and influence policy considerations.
20
  It is also descriptive, 
correlational and explanatory in the manner in which the research problem is approached, 
because it describes an existing situation, identifies a correlation between aspects of the 
problem and seeks to proffer explanations regarding the problem.
21
  The thesis adopts an 
unstructured qualitative approach as its fundamental aim is to ascertain and describe the 
existence and nature of a problem; analyse perspectives and attitudes surrounding it; employ 
qualitative variables in conceptualising the problem and proffered solutions; and its analysis 
is aimed at establishing the variation in the problem without necessarily quantifying it.
22
   
RESEARCH METHODS 
The research methods adopted here are as follows: 
An introductory narrative is given to provide a background to the problem which led to the 
research, the aims of the research, the scope and the justification for undertaking the research.  
These sections highlight the existence and impact of the problem, and provide a basis for 
understanding the solutions suggested.  There is also an overview of the thesis, highlighting 
the structure and contents of each chapter, as well as a presentation of the core arguments in 
the thesis as an indication of the crux of the research.  The introductory chapter also contains 
a section which explains the research methodology adopted, and a section which provides 
working definitions of the significant terms used in the thesis, as a means of enabling a clear 
                                                          
18
 See I. Dobinson & F. Johns, ‘Qualitative Legal Research’ in M. McConville & W.H. Chui, Research Methods for 
Law  (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press 2007) 40. 
19
 See Dobinson & Johns, ibid. 
20
 See C. Dawson, Practical Research Methods (New Delhi: UBS Publishers’ Distributors 2002); see also C. R. 
Kothari, Research Methodology: Methods and Techniques (New Delhi: Wiley Eastern Limited 1985); see also R. 
Kumar, Research Methodology: A Step-by-Step Guide for Beginners (3
rd
 ed., London: Sage Publications 2011) 
10. 
21
 See Kumar, ibid 11. 
22
 See Kumar, ibid 13. 
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understanding of the context of the thesis as a whole and situating its arguments.  It is 
arguable that terms may be ascribed different meanings in different situations, so the section 
on definition helps to present the exact meaning of the terms used in this thesis.   
A literature review is conducted to provide a foundation for understanding the issues engaged 
with in the thesis.  An analysis of relevant literature enables an overview of the academic and 
policy origins, as well as contemporary approaches, to the perceived problem addressed by 
the thesis and the issues surrounding it.  It also highlights the gaps which exist in corporate 
governance literature and policy in relation to the problem.  The review is undertaken in a 
thematic manner, to enable a clearer understanding of each set of issues.  These issues flow 
from the fundamental theories and basis upon which the problem arises to all the other issues 
which surround or impact on the problem and possible solutions.  In the literature review, 
each theme leads into the next and graduates to the specific basis upon which the research 
question is formed and the solutions suggested.  In relation to choice of literature, the aim 
was to highlight and analyse those pieces of literature which contribute to an adequate 
understanding of the issues raised in each section. 
In the subsequent chapters, the issues which emanate from the research questions are 
analysed, with discussions on the meaning of the terms in question, how they relate to the 
problem, why they are an important aspect of the problem, and how they influence the 
solutions to the problem.  The issues are discussed in this manner so as to enable a clearer 
understanding of the context in which they arise in the thesis and how they relate to the 
research problem.  For example, the terms “risk” and “personality” are defined according to 
relevant literature and the context in which they are used is made evident in the analysis.    
Theoretical analysis was conducted on the underlying aspects of the thesis such as the origin 
and existence of companies, meaning of corporate governance, risk management and 
regulation.  This was done by reviewing the relevant literature on those subjects.  The aim 
was to establish a foundation upon which conceptual arguments could emerge surrounding 
the crux of the thesis.   
The theoretical framework for the thesis is centred on the meaning and import of companies, 
corporate governance, corporate boards, corporate failure, risk and regulation.  The 
conceptual framework is centred on the impact of behaviour on corporate failure, what 
constitutes behaviour, whether behavioural risks are identified and managed effectively, and 
if and how regulation can contribute to managing these risks.  The establishment of a 
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theoretical framework by an analysis of relevant literature and observations regarding current 
trends in corporate governance serves as a guideline and enables the development of the 
conceptual framework which encompasses the research problem and solutions.  
Reports of government established bodies and non-governmental groups on the issues which 
led to corporate failures were analysed with the aim of highlighting the extent to which the 
research problem has been viewed in those circles and to illustrate current attitudes towards 
the problem.  Court cases and judgments arising out of corporate failures were also 
highlighted in order to evidence the seriousness of the problem and the judicial view taken of 
it.  The court verdicts also indicate the practical aspects of the research problem and societal 
attitudes towards the problem.  The current attitude towards the research problem forms a 
basis for arguments in support of the existence and impact of the problem and the necessity of 
the solutions suggested in the thesis.  As the UK is part of the European Union (EU), the 
approaches to the research problem as viewed from an EU perspective are also analysed.  
The examples of cases of corporate failures are used primarily in this thesis to explain the 
practical impact of behaviour as a contributory element in corporate failures.  The high 
profile cases which occurred in the UK, US and Australia are selected because the reports of 
the failures are publicly available as they had huge negative impacts on society and were 
investigated in detail.  Also, these cases illustrate the issue of corporate failures in public 
listed companies and this thesis focuses on such companies and argues for statutory 
regulatory intervention based on the effect of such failures on society.  These cases, therefore, 
constitute direct examples of the problem in question.  Again, these cases all occurred in 
jurisdictions with similar corporate law origins and foundation.  These jurisdictions follow 
the philosophical underpinnings of the contractual theory of corporations and the free market 
ideology.  This similarity is evident in the wording of the UK Companies Act (section 7 & 8), 
the Delaware General Corporations Law (section 101, 107 & 109) and the Australian 
Companies Act (section 17, 19, 22 & 23).  The examples of corporate failures used are, 
therefore, relevant in highlighting the problems of personality risks and providing a basis for 
understanding the solutions suggested in the thesis.  Adopting examples from jurisdictions 
outside the UK was also thought to be relevant and informative because corporate 
governance is increasingly a global phenomenon; and an increasing number of companies 
have cross listings in different jurisdictions.  Therefore, even though the focus of the thesis is 
the UK, the examples used illustrate that issues of personality are indeed universal as rightly 
noted in the psychological literature. 
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Personality is essentially a psychological and physiological construct which has been 
predominantly researched in the field of psychology; therefore an in-depth analysis was 
conducted on relevant psychological literature in order to enable a clear understanding of the 
term “personality” and its impact on behaviour.  The thesis aims to provide the linkage 
between personality and behaviour, and so there was an analysis of a body of literature in the 
discipline of psychology which establishes the relationship between these concepts.  
Behavioural issues are psychological and have been studied in that discipline, therefore, the 
foundational theories as well as contemporary thinking regarding behaviour and the factors 
which influence behaviour was obtained by analysing relevant literature in that field.  This 
was also done to highlight the other variables which impact on behaviour, such as situations, 
and to analyse the dominance or not of one or the other, in an attempt to highlight the level of 
impact of each component on behaviour.   
In developing the regulatory model for personality risk management, corporate theories, 
regulatory theories and risk management theories, as well as existing mechanisms were 
examined and discussed with a bid to highlighting arguments in favour and against a 
regulatory regime as suggested in the thesis.  Based on existing models of regulation as a 
frame, an example of what the model might entail in terms of provisions was drawn up.  The 
applicability of the model in the present UK corporate governance framework is also 
examined with a view to situating the model in the immediate infrastructure, considering the 
impact of change and its economic implications.  This is aimed at making the model an 
attractive and immediately available mechanism and highlighting its compatibility with 
existing regimes as well as areas of differences, in order to show more clarity as to the added 
value of the model. 
In terms of accessing literature, searches were made in legal, social sciences and psychology 
databases, selecting literature which appeared to be seminal works, authoritative journal 
articles and books relevant to the research issues.  In conducting the searches, key words, 
phrases and terms were developed from the major themes in the thesis, such as “causes of 
corporate failure”, “behaviour”, “personality”, “personality and behaviour”, “company 
agents”, “company directors”, “corporate officers”, “corporate governance”, “risk”, “risk 
management”, “corporate failure”, “regulating companies”, “corporate theories”, and were 
used both singly and in conjunction with the secondary themes in the thesis to enable an 
identification of relevant literature.  The items of literature which are then selected are the 
ones which enable an adequate understanding of the perspectives being proffered in the 
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thesis, and without which the arguments and the developments in the thesis would be 
incoherent. 
Government databases in the UK and the EU were also searched in order to obtain reports 
and current regulations on the relevant issues in the thesis.  The internet was searched for 
current and contemporary debates, information and materials on the issues.  This information 
was then reviewed with a focus on relevance, authenticity and authoritativeness.  Literature, 
regulations and policy developments were then analysed in the light of the research issues.  
The suggestions outlined in the thesis are based on highlighted limitations in existing 
frameworks, and takes cognisance of fundamental corporate and regulatory theories, the 
general idea being to build on a firm and established foundation.  The thesis finishes with a 
conclusion which highlights the import of the thesis as a whole, reiterating its major 
arguments and advances.   This section also highlights areas in which the findings of the 
thesis can prove useful and suggests areas of further research with the aim of aiding 
continuity in the expansion of knowledge and development of other aspects which might 
correlate with the research problem and the solutions offered.    
1.3 DEFINITIONAL ISSUES 
This section provides clarification as to the meaning ascribed to the major terms used in the 
thesis so as to aid an understanding of the context in which they are utilised. 
PERSONALITY: This refers to that innate aspect of individuality which has an impact on 
behaviour and is as explained in chapter five. 
RISK: This means the potential of an event or circumstance resulting in a negative outcome, 
and is as explained in chapter three. 
BEHAVIOUR: This refers to actions and decisions taken in the corporate governance process 
by company directors. 
COMPANY DIRECTORS: This refers to the persons saddled with the responsibility of 
company management as specified under Article 3 of the Model Articles and the UK 
Companies Act 2006.   
COMPANY AGENTS: This is used to refer to company directors in relation to the agency 
relationship existing between the company directors and the company as represented by its 
shareholders. 
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COMPANY: In accordance with the provisions of the UK Companies Act 2006, a company 
is one which is formed and registered under the provisions of the Act.  This thesis is 
particularly focused on public listed companies. 
CORPORATE FAILURE: This term refers to both an outright collapse of a company in 
terms of insolvency, as well as a collapse of systems of corporate governance within the 
company such as non-compliance with rules and regulations and non-attainment of corporate 
goals. 
REGULATION: This refers to rules and recommendations designed to control the conduct of 
the regulated, and include both statutory and non-statutory provisions. 
SIGNIFICANT: This is as defined ordinarily to connote a situation that is meaningful and 
likely to have an effect. 
RISK MANAGEMENT: This is as explained in chapter three in relation to the identification 
and mitigation of risks. 
SOFT LAW: This refers to flexible and non-mandatory regulation. 
HARD LAW: This refers to mandatory and prescriptive regulation. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
A REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Chapter one provided the background for an understanding of the origin of the issues 
discussed in this thesis.  It also outlined the major arguments made in the thesis in relation to 
the problem of personality and behavioural risk in corporate governance, and the solutions 
suggested for addressing the problem.  To further enhance an understanding of the problem 
and solutions, this chapter reviews the relevant literature in the areas which form the 
foundational basis for the thesis, and from which theoretical and conceptual arguments are 
drawn.  The review highlights and discusses relevant literature in the areas of corporate 
theory, corporate governance, corporate boards and directors, corporate failures, personality 
and behaviour, corporate risk and risk management, and regulation.   
2.2 CORPORATE THEORIES          
The origin, existence and functionality of companies can be explained by corporate 
theories.
23
  An adequate understanding of the issues regarding the formation, management 
and operations of companies cannot be achieved without knowledge of relevant corporate 
theories.  Engaging with different corporate theories provides the basis for a broad 
understanding of what companies are and enables an identification of the theories which 
underpin various perspectives on corporate governance.
24
  Understanding the philosophical 
underpinnings of corporate theories also aids the advancement of arguments for and against 
the utility of those theories, and provides a platform for the analysis of problems and 
solutions in relation to the functioning of companies based on those theories.  Particularly, in 
order to appreciate the problem highlighted in the thesis and understand the rationale behind 
the solutions suggested, as well as assess the suitability and effectiveness of these solutions, it 
is important to ascertain what companies are, how they are viewed, and enable an 
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understanding of how and why they function the way they do.  A discussion of corporate 
theories is therefore essential to achieving these aims.   
Coase’s theory of the firm ascribes the reason for the existence of the firm to the fact that an 
entrepreneur cannot own all the factors of production, and were these factors to be sought 
outside the architecture of a firm, the entrepreneur would need to engage in a series of 
contracts which would invariably result in high transaction costs.
25
 Therefore, where the 
contract between the entrepreneur and the factors of production is on-going, in order to 
minimize the transaction costs of the economic activity, there is a preference for a single 
long-term contract in which the entrepreneur assumes a hierarchical role and obtains the 
cooperation of the other factors of production subject to remuneration.
26
 Coase’s theory is 
one which is rooted in the notion that the different factors of production have property rights 
which they exercise contractually as constituents within the firm.
27
 He argued that firms 
provided an avenue for the entrepreneur to utilise direct authority in effecting exchanges in 
cases where the cost of so doing in the markets was higher.  The firm is therefore set up to 
maximise the economic welfare of the constituents.  
Alchian & Demsetz
28
 refine Coase’s theory to the extent that they highlight the voluntariness 
of the contract between the constituents of the firm and suggest that the firm is actually a 
portal for team production.  They also emphasize the need for monitoring the constituents of 
the firm in order to deter the shirking of responsibilities within the team.  Whereas Coase 
argued that the firm exists to achieve the allocation of resources by authority and direction, 
Alchian & Demsetz view the firm as a mechanism which originates and exists based on joint 
efforts.  They define the firm as a contractual organisation of inputs in which there exist (i) 
joint input production (ii) several input owners (iii) one party who is common to all the 
contracts (iv) the common party having rights to renegotiate the contract of an input 
independent of other contracts (v) the common party holding the residual claim (vi) the 
common party having the right to sell his residual status.  However, in agreement with Coase, 
Alchian & Demsetz view the firm essentially from an economic and contractual perspective.  
Therefore, the firm exists to meet economic ends. 
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Jensen & Meckling
29
 explain that the firm is in itself a mere legal fiction and simply serves as 
a nexus for contracting relationships.
30
  They argue that the firm is characterized by divisible 
residual claims on the assets and cash flows of the organisation which can be sold without the 
permission of other contracting individuals. They acknowledge that their definition of the 
firm has minimal substantive content but rather emphasises the contractual nature of the 
firm.
31
 They also highlight that there are problems of agency and monitoring costs for these 
contracts which exist in the firm irrespective of the form of the contracts.  Berle & Means
32
 
had highlighted the agency problems which resulted in cases where share ownership was 
dispersed and ownership of a corporation was separated from control of it. Jensen & 
Meckling acknowledge this problem and define agency as “a contract under which one or 
more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on 
their behalf which involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent”.33  They 
argue that most agency relationships will incur monitoring and bonding costs as well as 
residual loss arising from the possibility of divergent interests between the principal and the 
agent.  Jensen & Meckling go on to argue that the relationship between shareholders and 
company managers is purely one of agency and so the separation of ownership and control 
would invariably create agency problems.
34
  They also draw a relationship between agency 
costs and a theory of firm ownership.  
Fama & Jensen
35
 highlight that social and economic activities can be carried out by different 
forms of organisations and argue that an important factor in the survival of organisational 
forms is the control of agency problems because the organisation that succeeds most is the 
one that delivers goods and services to the consumers at the lowest price whilst covering its 
cost.  Departing from the dominant contractual view of the firm, Rajan & Zingales
36
 define 
the firm as a nexus of specific investments, highlighting the need for the specialised skills of 
                                                          
29
 See M. Jensen & W. Meckling, ‘Theory of the Firm, Managerial Behaviour, Agency Costs and Ownership 
Structure’ (1976) 3(4) Journal of Financial Economics 305-360. 
30
 See also F.H. Easterbrook & D. R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press 1991). 
31
 See Coase, (note 25) and Alchian & Demsetz, (note 28); see also E.F. Fama, ‘Agency Problems and the Theory 
of the Firm’ (1980) 88 Journal of Political Economy 288-307. 
32
 See A. Berle  & G. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (New York: Macmillan 1932) 
33
 See Jensen & Meckling, (note 29) 308. 
34
 See also E. F. Fama & M.C. Jensen, ‘Separation of Ownership and Control’ (1983) 26 Journal of Law and 
Economics 301-325. 
35
 See E.F. Fama & M.C. Jensen, ‘Agency Problems and Residual Claims’ (1983) 26 Journal of Law and 
Economics 327-349. 
36
 See R.G. Rajan & L. Zingales, ‘Power in a Theory of the Firm’ (1998) Quarterly Journal of Economics 387 
21 
 
employees.
37
  Here, the team production theory is employed as the contributors to the team 
production process relinquish control of their specific investments to an independent party in 
order to reduce transaction costs which they would otherwise incur if complete contracts 
were embarked upon ex ante.   
The nexus of contract and the nexus of specific investment theories of the firm are essentially 
rooted in economic/finance literature, but there are also legal theories of the firm.  Lan & 
Heracleous
38
 outline the legal theories of the corporation and their stages of development; 
from the concession/fiction theory,
39
 to the contractual/aggregate theory,40 and to the 
realist/organic theory.
41
  The contractual theory of the firm has both legal and economic 
dimensions.  The legal contractual theory posits that a company is simply the aggregate of 
two or more persons who unite in order to undertake commercial activity.
42
  This presupposes 
that the company is rooted in private contract law as the members are connected in the origin, 
existence and demise of the company by virtue of the contract which they enter into; and  one 
implication of this theory is that a company is a creation of individual free will and therefore 
not subject to social responsibility.
43
  Again, the company is placed under the sphere of 
private law with its legitimation powers originating from the entrepreneurial activities of the 
members and lessening any justification for State or public interference by way of 
regulation.
44
   
                                                          
37
 See also M. Blair, ‘Firm-Specific Human Capital and Theories of the Firm’ in M. Blair and M. J. Roe (eds.) 
Employees and Corporate Governance (Washington DC: Brooking Institute 1999), who argues that the firm 
specific investments of employees cannot be adequately protected by means of contract and the firm is a 
relationship of trust. 
38
 See L.L.Lan & L. Heracleous, ‘Rethinking Agency Theory: The View from Law’ (2010) 35(2) Academy of 
Management Review 294-314 at 295-296. 
39
 The corporation is viewed as a legal fiction, a creature of the state and bound by its charter. See E. Latham, 
‘The Body Politic of the Corporation’ in E. Mason (Ed), The Corporation in Modern Society (Cambridge MA: 
Harvard University Press 1959) 218-236. 
40
 The corporation exists as a result of the voluntary contracts created by corporate constituents. See R. 
Kraakman, ‘Corporate Liabilities Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls’ (1984) 93 Yale Law Journal 857-898 
41
 The corporation is a real entity, having separate personality and can be viewed as a social being.  See M. 
Phillips, ‘Reappraising the Real Entity Theory of the Corporation’ (1994) 21 Florida State University Law Review 
1061-1123. 
42
 See S. Bottomley, ‘Taking Corporations Seriously: Some Consideration for Corporate Regulation’ (1990) 19 
Federal Law Review 208. 
43
 See D. Sugarman & G. Rubin (eds.), Law, Economy and Society, 1750-1914 (Abingdon: Professional Books 
1984).  
44
See Sugarman & Rubin, ibid 209. 
22 
 
The economic contractual theory is based on the view that free markets are the most efficient 
mechanisms for wealth creation.
45
  Economists such as Coase then view the company as a 
nexus of contracts entered into in order to reduce transaction costs of a complex market 
consisting of a series of bargains amongst parties and corporate law exists solely to provide 
bottom line rules which the entrepreneurs would have had to contract upon separately with 
their agents.
46
  Corporate law, therefore, serves to simply enhance the basic functioning of the 
market.  Jensen & Meckling theorized that the firm is simply a nexus of contracts, and argued 
that companies essentially serve as avenues for contracting relationships.
47
  It has been 
argued that under the contractual theory, the law has minimal function beyond substantiation 
of contracts and legal rules merely spell out what the human aggregates would have agreed to 
in the first place.
48
  The contractual theory “rests on notions of rationality, efficiency and 
information”, with the view that a rational person would enter into transactions which benefit 
him/her as well as society.
49
  The contractual nature of the relationship between investors and 
managers is emphasised under the contractual theory, and this theory gained prominence after 
the era in which companies were created by specific State charters and authorised to operate 
solely for specified purposes.
50
 
The communitarian theory of the firm views the company purely as a creation of the State 
and to be utilized for State purposes, and therefore the company has no strong commercial 
identity and is more of a political tool.
51
  Companies modelled on this theory were common 
in the former communist countries and in fascist Italy.
52
  Here the State grants companies the 
right to function and also determines the extent to which they function.  The goals and 
objectives of the company are set out by the State and are usually in furtherance of State will.  
Therefore regulation by the State is paramount and inevitable.  The concession theory of the 
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firm views the existence of the company as a concession granted by the State and regulatory 
intervention in the governance of companies is justified because the company is a legal 
creation whose existence derives from the State.
53
  The concession theory differs from the 
communitarian theory to the extent that in the concession theory, the State only “has a role to 
play in ensuring that corporate governance structures are fair and democratic”, and the State 
does not aim to align the company’s goals with its social or political aspirations.54  In the era 
when companies operated based on State charters, it was under the concession of the State; 
even though the companies at that time were restricted in their activities to those specified in 
the charter.
55
  However, the concession theory as it is understood presently refers to the 
notion that the company is a creation of the State regardless of its objects, and exists to meet 
public needs; and flowing from the concession theory, the State has the right to impose 
regulations on companies based on public interest.
56
   
According to Dine, one important factor as regards the regulation imposed by the State under 
the concession theory would be the necessity of such regulations taking cognisance of the 
role of shareholders as owners; and preserving the rights which shareholders have to exercise 
in the bid to ensure that the company is well governed.
57
  Dine argues that one vital question 
for the State would be whether shareholders are able to regulate the operations which the 
State is seeking to regulate.  Understandably, if shareholders are able to achieve that which 
the State aims to achieve, then there may be no need for State intervention.  Dine further 
argues that reliance on contractual theories of the firm would leave the society in a situation 
where shareholders are the sole guardians of public interest in corporate governance.  But 
Dine adds that considering that one import of the idea of separate legal personality is to allow 
for separation of ownership and control, separation can become extreme in many cases so 
that shareholders are no longer an effective governance mechanism even as regards issues 
that directly concern them as owners.  In truth, if shareholders are so dispersed that there is 
no opportunity and mechanism which enables a meaningful coalition in order to create an 
impact, then the utility of shareholder intervention as a mechanism in corporate governance 
becomes doubtful.   
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Dine concedes, and rightfully so, that it is much less likely that shareholders can be relied on 
to protect public interest when they have been ineffective in protecting theirs, because in 
reality, small investors are usually more interested in the return on their investment whilst 
institutional shareholders would rather adopt exit mechanisms rather than voice in companies 
that are underperforming.
58
  Again, vital information is held in the hands of management, so, 
to depend on shareholders as an effective governance mechanism is essentially to allow 
directors and management free rein “subject to the unpredictable whims of the market for 
corporate control”.59  This would prove to be true because if shareholders are not in effective 
control of companies, then the directors and managers who are involved in the actual running 
of the companies would be in a better position to navigate the companies towards the 
direction which accomplishes their own purposes, which may differ from that of the 
shareholders.   
Recently, there has been an increased consideration of interests other than shareholder 
interests in companies.
60
 Therefore, in relation to corporate matters, there are various interests 
involved.
61
  If shareholders cannot effectively protect their interest or that of others in 
corporate operations, then “some other system of regulation is clearly required”.62  This 
means that a departure from the purely contractual theory in which the shareholders are 
responsible for determining the terms of the corporate contract as well as its major governing 
rules and a move towards the concession theory in which State regulation is acceptable in the 
interest of the public as stakeholders in corporate operations, is a reasonably acceptable 
situation.  An analysis of the corporate theories discussed above indicates that companies are 
essentially vehicles for economic enhancement and occupy an important place in society.  
Public listed companies, particularly, require adequate regulation for the reason that 
ownership is usually separated from control.  As stated earlier, under the contractual theory of 
the firm, self-regulation is preferred and State intervention by way of regulation is acceptable 
only to the extent that it provides rules for the basic functioning of markets.  It means that if 
an issue is viewed as contributing towards the functioning of markets, then regulation in that 
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regard is acceptable.  The concession theory admits of regulation by the State in the public 
interest.  The problem of personality risks in corporate governance is one that arises out of 
and affects the functioning of markets and is also an issue in the public interest as it has the 
potential to result in corporate failures.  The solutions suggested in this thesis are based on 
arguments that both theories admit of regulatory intervention when the problem in issue 
affects the functioning of markets and is in the interests of society.  The regulatory approach 
suggested in this thesis also takes cognisance of these theories by incorporating both soft law 
and hard law provisions.  In relation to the substantive structure of the company, Hansmann 
& Kraakman
63
 identify five characteristics of the company as follows: (i) legal personality, 
(ii) limited liability, (iii) transferable shares, (iv) centralised management under a board 
structure, and (v) shared ownership by contributors of capital.   They argue that in most 
jurisdictions, corporate law statutes provide for the formation of firms with all of these 
characteristics.  They also highlight the fact that these characteristics which make the 
company an attractive organisational form for economic activity also generate tensions and 
trade-offs which lend a corporate character to the agency problems which corporate law must 
address.  The agency problem inherent in firms as a result of the separation of ownership 
from control is also the origin of corporate governance.  The corporate theories discussed 
above influences the different perspectives on corporate governance as will be illustrated in 
the next section.      
2.3 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE  
The foundational description of corporate governance may be traced back to the separation of 
ownership and control theory propounded by Berle & Means.
64
  The crux of their argument 
was that the agency problem which arose from the dispersion of share ownership resulted in 
owners not being able to monitor managers effectively in order to ensure adequate returns on 
their investment and the reduction of managerial appropriation.
65
 A mechanism for mitigating 
agency problems therefore became imperative.  Corporate governance is a multi-disciplinary 
and inter-disciplinary subject with its research cutting across major disciplines including law, 
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economics, finance, management and accounting.
66
  Some of the theories of governance that 
have emerged include the finance or shareholder model, stewardship or managerial model, 
and the stakeholder model.
67
  Systems of governance have also been created based on 
characteristics such as the concept of the firm, the board system, the stakeholder exerting 
influence, the stock market in the economy, market for corporate control, ownership 
structure, executive compensation and time horizons of economic relationships.
68
  Flowing 
from these different theories, models and systems of governance, significant differences can 
be noted between the perspectives on corporate governance held in Anglo-Saxon regions as 
compared with and between other regions such as Continental Europe, Latin America and 
Japan; creating divisions into “market oriented” systems and “network oriented” systems of 
corporate governance.
69
  An examination of varying definitions of corporate governance 
tends to show that these definitions emanate predominantly from the particular model or 
theory of governance that exists in the mind of the definer, and these theories appear to be 
dependent on one’s idea of what corporate objectives should entail.70   
Shleifer & Vishny view corporate governance from an agency perspective and state that it 
“deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of 
getting a return on their investment”; and they highlight that the subject of corporate 
governance is of enormous practical importance.
71
  The Cadbury Committee defined 
corporate governance as “the system by which companies are directed and controlled”,72 
emphasizing the need for owners to devise mechanisms of exercising control over 
management.  Blair views corporate governance as “the  whole set of legal, cultural and 
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institutional arrangements that determine what public corporations can do, who controls 
them, how that control is exercised and how the risks and returns from the activities they 
undertake are allocated”,73 an emphasis on public corporations being evident.  Tirole argues 
that a good governance structure is one that selects the most able managers and makes them 
accountable to investors.
74
  Tirole emphasises the importance of recruiting managers who are 
most capable of pursuing the investor’s objectives.  Neubauer & Lank explain that corporate 
governance is a system of structures and processes to secure the economic viability as well as 
the legitimacy of the corporation.
75
  In the UK, in the late 20
th
 century, and particularly in the 
realm of finance, the shareholder theory of corporate governance has emerged as the 
dominant theory,
76
 with the stakeholder theory emerging as the most definitive contrasting 
theory amongst the other variants of theories opposing the shareholder model.  In essence, the 
shareholder theory is underpinned by an understanding of the corporation as an entity 
existing for the benefit of its owners and, therefore, all governance mechanisms should be 
geared towards the maximisation of shareholder value.  The stakeholder theory on the other 
hand views the corporation as existing to serve much wider interests, including those of 
constituencies affected by its operations such as its employees, creditors, suppliers and the 
community.
77
  It has been argued that the major divide between these theories originates from 
the fundamental corporate law mechanisms historically enshrined in different regions of the 
world.
78
  There are also views that the agency problem would not appear in all cases because 
share ownership is not dispersed in every region of the world and in certain regions, 
Continental Europe being an example, ownership patterns are quite concentrated.
79
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Corporate governance mechanisms have also been said to fall into one of two groups: those 
internal to firms and those external to firms and it is flowing from this grouping that internal 
actors and external actors emerge in relation to corporate governance.
80
  Huse views 
corporate governance in this way and states that corporate governance is “the interaction 
between coalitions of internal actors, external actors and the board members in directing a 
corporation for value creation”.81  Internal actors are described as those who make decisions 
and take actions while external actors are those who seek to influence and control decisions.
82
  
As noted earlier, there has never been a consensus definition of corporate governance and all 
that it entails.  In fact, corporate governance has been described as a struggle between 
ideologies.
83
  However, it can also be argued that regardless of whichever specific theory of 
governance is adopted, company managers will still need to be controlled in order to achieve 
whatever has been postulated as the chosen corporate objective, be it shareholder value 
maximisation or stakeholder interest.   There may also be overlaps in both theories as is 
evident in some definitions of corporate governance, for instance, Monks & Minow view 
corporate governance as the relationship among various participants in determining the 
direction and performance of corporations. The primary participants are (i) the shareholders 
(ii) the management led by the CEO and (iii) the board of directors. Other participants 
include the employers, customers, suppliers, creditors and the community.
84
  This perspective 
highlights the involvement of all known constituencies in the governance process, even 
though certain primary participants are named, giving an indication of the fact that those are 
the major players in the corporate governance chain.   
The Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) in its Principles of 
Corporate Governance (2004) states that “corporate governance involves a set of 
relationships between a company’s management, its board, its shareholders and other 
stakeholders”.85  This inclusive definition incorporates both the shareholder and stakeholder 
theories and considering the events of the past decades in the area of corporate collapses, it is 
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arguably worthwhile to adopt a definition of corporate governance which is all 
encompassing, taking into cognisance the needs of all the facets of a society affected by the 
activities of a company.  However, considering the exertion of control and decision making 
within the company itself, certain constituencies may naturally have dominance, the obvious 
groups being the owners and managers of the company.  Du Plessis highlights that the 
meaning of the term “corporate governance” has surprisingly not been given an in-depth 
interpretation, with most definitions just referring to the term generally without offering 
deeper clarification;  and he argues that the preferred explanation of the term is that it is “the 
process of regulating and overseeing corporate conduct and of balancing the interest of all 
internal stakeholders and other parties who can be affected by the corporation’s conduct in 
order to ensure responsible behaviour by corporations and to achieve the maximum level of 
efficiency and profitability for a corporation”.86   
An analysis of the literature relating to the theories of governance and definitions of corporate 
governance highlights the diversity and multi-faceted nature of corporate governance both as 
a mechanism and as a broad concept.  It also establishes that views on what amounts to 
“corporate governance” may differ considerably depending on one’s background and 
perception of the firm.  However, it is clear on the basis of the preceding literature that one 
thread which runs through the entire range of governance theories and definitions is the 
notion that corporations need to be governed and that governance is actualised through the 
intervention of company directors.   
2.4 THE CORPORATE BOARD AND COMPANY DIRECTORS 
A review of the literature in previous sections highlights that companies are formed for the 
actualisation of identified purposes and this requires the involvement of persons in the 
management of companies.  The selection and retention of company directors who are 
capable of ensuring the achievement of corporate objectives is a fundamental and core 
element of the corporate governance process.
87
  Based on the concept of incorporation, a 
company is a separate legal entity, but must necessarily “act” through its human agents.88  
                                                          
86
 See Du Plessis, (note 50) 43-44.  
87
 See Tirole, (note 74). 
88
 See s 16 of the United Kingdom Companies Act 2006.   The United States has no uniform Companies Act, but 
see for instance The State of Delaware Code, Title 8 on Corporations, s 106 of which highlights the effects of 
incorporation and s 107 which states that incorporators shall “manage” the affairs of the company, credence 
to the fact that companies though legal entities cannot realistically manage themselves.  See also H. Hansmann 
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Corporate law recognises the notion that a company can never develop hands and legs, 
neither can it acquire brains; and so its actions are basically those of its appointed agents.
89
 
As highlighted by Jensen & Meckling, the shareholders are the principals in the agency 
relationship whilst the managers are the company agents.
90
  Corporate governance 
mechanisms have traditionally focused on the relationship between company directors and 
shareholders, and emphasised the role of the board.
91
  The UK Corporate Governance Code 
2010 states clearly in its preamble that the board of directors are responsible for the 
governance of their companies.  The term “director” had originally been used to describe the 
members of a governing board or the people in charge of the business of the joint stock 
company.
92
  The popularity of the company as a business form and the issue of separated 
ownership from control arising out of the fact that investors of capital are not usually 
professional managers necessitated the appointment of “directors” to oversee the affairs of 
the modern day company.
93
   
Despite the evidence in corporate law and corporate governance that directors are 
traditionally the persons charged with the management of companies, they were at some point 
regarded as “ornaments on a corporate Christmas tree”,94 and the chief executive officer 
(CEO) and management team were relied upon to undertake the responsibility of 
organisational performance.
95
  Mace argued that directors were incapable of exerting 
effective impact on the companies they governed because their existence was viewed as more 
of a legal requirement than as originating from a practical need because the management 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
& R. Kraakman, ‘What is Corporate Law?’ (2004) Centre for Law, Economics and Public Policy Research Paper 
No. 300. 
89
 See for instance s 155 of the United Kingdom Companies Act 2006 which highlights the necessity of human 
agents by specifying that at least one director of any company must be a natural person. 
90
 See Jensen & Meckling, (note 29) 308. 
91
 Corporate governance codes emphasize the role of the board as one of strategic leadership. See A.1 
Supporting Principle in the UK Corporate Governance Code 2010.   
92
 See R.R. Formoy, The Historical Foundations of Modern Company Law  (London: Sweet & Maxwell 1923); see 
also C. O’Donnell, ‘Origins of the Corporate Executive’ (1952) 26 Bulletin of the Business Historical Society; see 
also F.A, Gevurtz, ‘The European Origins and the Spread of the Corporate Board of Directors’ (2004), 33 
Stetson Law Review 925. 
93
 See Berle & Means, (note 32). The emergence of the principle of limited liability in UK company law in 1855 
and the Companies Act 1862 contributed towards companies becoming the preferred vehicle for business 
activities. Also, the decision in cases like Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] AC 22 which promoted the 
separate legal personality principle encouraged the adoption of the company as a business organisation. 
94 These descriptions gave credence to the perceived passivity associated with the role of director. See L.A.A 
Van den Berghe & A. Levrau, ‘Evaluating Boards of Directors: What Constitutes a Good Corporate Board’ 
(2004) 12(4) Corporate Governance: An International Review 461-478 at 461 referring to J.A. Bryne, 
‘Boardroom Changes that Could Rebuild Trust’ (Commentary in Business Week, 17th June 2002).  
95
 See C.G. Kiel & G.J. Nicholson, ‘Evaluating Boards and Directors’ (2005) 13(5)  Corporate Governance: An 
International Review 613-631. 
31 
 
team appeared more in control of organisational affairs.
96
  Today however, company directors 
are held increasingly accountable for corporate performance, a development which is 
underpinned by theoretical advances in agency theory and tales of corporate excesses, 
resulting in shareholders and stakeholders demanding that boards demonstrate leadership and 
control capabilities.
97
  Monks & Minow highlight that vital company processes such as 
hiring, firing and compensation of management executives are now actively undertaken by 
the board of directors, an indication of their in-depth involvement in organisational 
development.
98
  In essence, the function of the board of directors is now an aggregation of 
various aspects such as the development of strategy, assessment of executive performance 
and calibre, assessment of controls and audit systems, prevention and management of crises, 
facilitation of the flow of legal and ethical values as well as information dissemination.
99
 
Kiel & Nicholson argue that the role of the board of directors has metamorphosed from that 
of supporting the management team to actually partaking in company management, which is 
arguably their rightful place.
100
  As a matter of law, directors are indeed the recognised 
corporate managers.  UK company law, for instance, provides for the adoption of a Model 
Articles of Association by companies, and the Model Articles states that “subject to the 
articles, the directors are responsible for the management of the company’s business….”101  
Article 5 of the Model Articles also grants the power of delegation to directors, so in effect, 
they may delegate their duties and powers to the management executives.  However, the 
responsibility of company management remains with company directors.  Directors are, 
therefore, the primary corporate managers and assume an agency relationship with the 
company as do the management executive in the same sense as was propounded by Jensen & 
Meckling.  Lan & Heracleous argue that the company directors are not agents of the 
shareholders, but rather agents of the firm.
102
  That may appear so from their perspective, but 
nevertheless, there is an acknowledgement of an agency relationship in existence and an 
argument as to who the rightful principal should be does not preclude the existence of the 
relationship.  The pertinent question here would be whether the company and the 
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 See R.A.G. Monks & N. Minow, Corporate Governance (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers 2004). 
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 See J.A. Confer, D. Finegold & E.E. Lawler, ‘Appraising Boardroom Performance’ (1998) 76 Harvard Business 
Review 136-148. 
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shareholders are one and the same?  The legal doctrine of separate legal personality posits 
that the answer would be negative.  However, one important issue is the fact that a company 
is usually formed by the shareholders,
103
 and they are the directing will of the firm as 
encapsulated in the articles of association and in the appointment of directors.  It is also 
recognised by law in the concept of lifting the veil of incorporation that a company is indeed 
a legal fiction.
104
  Therefore, the company and its shareholders can be viewed as one and the 
same in certain cases.   
Blair & Stout have argued that directors are not in any legal sense anyone’s agent and that 
directors do not owe any duty of obedience to shareholders or to anyone else. 
105
  Arguing 
from the perspective of corporate law which specifies that directors must exercise 
independent judgment,
106
 and case law which support this view,
107
 the director primacy 
theorists argue that the directors are autonomous fiduciaries and not agents.
108
  To the extent 
that directors do not owe a duty of obedience to shareholders and are mandated to exercise 
independent judgement, the director primacy theory makes some sense. However, 
considering the fact that directors are usually appointed by shareholders and can be removed 
by them as well, and are given authority to act on behalf of shareholders, especially in the 
case of dispersed share ownership, it does not seem realistic to abandon the agency theory.
109
  
The director primacy theorists also highlight the importance of trust in the fiduciary role of a 
director and argue that it is easier to obtain loyal behaviour from directors under the terms of 
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 269. 
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Western University Law Review 547; see also S. Bainbridge, ‘Director v Shareholder Primacy in the 
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fiduciary duty law than it is by threatening liability under the terms of a contract.
110
  But, the 
agent also owes his principal certain duties which are in fact fiduciary in nature.
111
  Fiduciary 
duties emanate from general common law principles which have been developed by the 
courts over time.
112
  Therefore, the existence of an agency contract does not preclude the 
presence of a fiduciary relationship.
113
  Blair & Stout also argue that the directors should be 
viewed as “mediating hierarchs” who balance the conflicting claims of the various 
constituents in a firm.
114
  Certainly, there are various constituents of the firm who contribute 
to production, however, the company shareholders primarily appoint directors to run their 
company on their behalf.  The powers of the directors cannot be exercised ultimately against 
the wishes of the shareholders because the owners of the company reserve the right to specify 
what is contained in the articles of association and direct the actions of directors.
115
  In any 
case, the success of a company depends on the effectiveness of its directors in governing the 
company.  Tirole argues that selecting the appropriate company managers and rendering them 
accountable to investors is the bane of corporate governance.
116
  Irrespective of the 
theoretical arguments regarding the precise status of company directors, or the theory which 
best explains the firm, the practical outcome is that the board of directors are saddled with the 
management of companies, even though the directors may not be involved in the day to day 
running of the company in certain cases.  Consequently, company directors are company 
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agents carrying out governance functions on behalf of the company, the company being 
essentially its members, the shareholders.
117
   
2.5 CORPORATE FAILURES 
As discussed in section 2.3, corporate governance is concerned with the management of 
companies in order to achieve corporate goals.  The last two decades have witnessed 
extensive debate on ways of improving corporate governance mechanisms from quarters such 
as governments, academics, lawyers, accountants, economists, business associations etc.
118
  
One reason for this debate is the recurrence of corporate scandals and failures in most regions 
of the world.  Examples include the corporate collapses of the Bank of Credit and Commerce 
(BCCI), Maxwell Group, Polly Peck and Barings Bank in the United Kingdom; WorldCom 
and Enron in the United States; HIH in Australia; and the corporate scandals involving 
Eurotunnel and the Shell Group.
119
  More recent examples include the collapses and near 
collapses of various banks and financial institutions in Europe and the United States.
120
  Du 
Plessis points out that a history of business organisations shows that governance problems 
have existed from as early as the eighteenth century.
121
  However, as Cadbury highlighted, 
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“corporate governance” as a term became prominent at least in the United Kingdom after the 
corporate collapses of the early 1990’s.122  Corporate governance reforms arising after 
corporate collapses would normally elicit a series of measures ranging from laws, listing rules 
and codes of best practices, all in the bid to forestall future occurrences of corporate 
mishaps.
123
  Despite these measures, corporate scandals and failures have persisted.
124
  Du 
Plessis argues that there are similarities between the corporate governance issues debated 
historically and those occurring in our society today.
125
  This is true because an analysis of 
the events that contributed to the corporate failure in cases such as Maxwell, BCCI, HIH, 
Enron, WorldCom and Lehman Brothers would elicit similarities in the behaviour of the 
company directors.  In the Maxwell failure, there were indications prior to the collapse of the 
company that he was not a person who could be relied on to govern a public company.
126
  
Lord Bingham in his investigation of the BCCI failure highlighted the falsification of 
company accounts perpetuated by the company directors.
127
  The HIH Royal Commission 
Report indicates that the management of the insurance group had concealed the true state of 
the group’s financial position, a fact which contributed to its failure.128  In the Enron failure, 
the executives were accused of manipulating company accounts amongst other issues.
129
  
Bernie Ebbers, the WorldCom CEO, was charged with fraud, conspiracy and making false 
statements in relation to the company accounts.
130
  The Lehman Examiners Report states that 
there are colourable claims against the corporate officers who oversaw and certified 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
establishment of governmental agencies to scrutinize the conduct of company directors and managers, a 
situation which did not augur well with business men as they much preferred to govern themselves in the 
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misleading financial statements which in turn contributed to the corporate failure.
131
  The 
above examples illustrate that one of the issues which recur in corporate collapses is the 
inappropriate behaviour of company directors.
132
   The OECD highlighted four areas for 
urgent action in response to the on-going financial crisis and these are corporate risk 
management, pay and bonuses, performance of board directors and shareholder 
participation.133  The behaviour of the board of directors was therefore a source of concern in 
the financial crisis.  Therefore, if reduction and prevention of corporate failure is desired, it 
becomes important in corporate governance to investigate the linkage between the behaviour 
of company directors and corporate failures.  It is equally important to understand the 
influence of personality and behaviour on corporate governance processes.  
2.6 PERSONALITY AND BEHAVIOUR  
It has been highlighted that corporate governance is a process which is undertaken primarily 
by company directors.  These are persons engaging with the management processes in 
companies through their decisions and actions.  Psychological research and literature has 
established that certain kinds of personalities produce certain kinds of behaviour, which is 
reflected in their decisions and actions.
134
  This means that the personality of company 
directors is a significant factor in relation to their behaviour in the management of companies.  
In relation to behavioural issues in corporate governance, in the UK and US, there has been 
more focus on corporate governance structures in recent decades and far less focus on the 
behaviour of corporate officers who bring these structures to life.
135
  Bragues argues that no 
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matter how good the laws may be, they still have to be enforced by people and if these 
individuals are not of sound character, the laws will either be disregarded or twisted to 
suspect ends.
136
  The UK Corporate Governance Code states clearly in its preface that the 
code is only a guide in general terms as to principles, structures and processes, and cannot 
guarantee board behaviour.
137
  The question arises therefore as to what contributes to actual 
board behaviour.  A number of studies have highlighted the need to investigate the 
behavioural processes of company boards in a bid to understand the conditions which aid 
effective corporate governance.
138
  These studies focus on the company board as a whole.  
Ees, Gabrielsson & Huse highlight that most studies that have explored boards from an 
economic perspective have neglected actual board behaviour and have focused on the 
relationship between ideal board structures and corporate performance.
139
  Behavioural 
theories of the firm as illustrated in the works of March & Simon, Cyert & March and Argote 
& Greve are founded on the concepts of bounded rationality, satisficing, routine decision 
making and political bargaining in the context of coalitions; and there are also theories 
regarding organisational culture and its impact on behaviour within an organisation.
140
  These 
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concepts lend perspectives towards understanding organisational behaviour and group 
decision making, but do not explain individual behaviour and decision making in its entirety.  
Board behaviour would be the aggregate sum of individual behaviour and the factors that 
influence organisational behaviour, such as situations and organisational culture.  Situational 
elements and organisational culture are factors which are important in determining board and 
individual behaviour.  It has been stated earlier in chapter one that behaviour consists of 
personality and situations.  Therefore, the behaviour of directors in an organisational setting 
would be influenced by situations which exist within that organisation.   Organisational 
culture can also impact on behavioural outcomes to the extent that the board can act in ways 
which conform to the tenets of the culture established within that organisation.   However, 
some of the actions and decisions that have led to corporate failures were taken by individual 
directors.  It is, therefore, important to investigate the drivers of individual behaviour because 
considering the negative impact of corporate failures on society,
141
 efforts made towards 
improving corporate governance mechanisms become important. 
 
The UK Walker Review 2009 contains recommendations as to the requisite behaviour to be 
expected of board members.  The findings state that board behaviour cannot be regulated or 
managed through organisational structures and controls alone.  Also, there is a 
recommendation for independent assessments of board members at appointment and 
annually, and a statement which indicates that a full psychological assessment should include 
assessment of behaviour, experiences, knowledge, motivation and intellect.
142
  The Institute 
of Chartered Secretaries and Administrators (ICSA) also highlighted in their report on 
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boardroom behaviour (prepared in June 2009 for the Walker review) that the degree to which 
best practice board room behaviours can be delivered is shaped by a number of key factors, 
the first of which is the character and personality of directors and the dynamics of their 
interactions.
143
  ICSA also noted that weaknesses in the application of governance processes 
lie at the heart of some of corporate collapses and an analysis of recent governance failures 
required responses at three levels namely institutional, organisational and behavioural.
144
   
The UK Corporate Governance Code does not contain provisions which relate to the 
personality of company directors.  Reverting to the formation of a company under corporate 
law, the directors are appointed by the shareholders.  Shareholders normally delegate the 
powers of subsequent appointment of company directors to the existing directors.  Under 
corporate governance requirements in the UK and US, the board of directors effects 
appointments to the board through the nominations committee.
145
  These modes of 
appointments of directors do not specify that company directors must conform to any specific 
personality dimension.  Based on the fact that different personalities produce different 
behaviours, and particularly for the reason that certain personality types are more conducive 
to corporate governance,
146
 it is noteworthy that the selection and appointment of directors is 
not usually accompanied by personality and behavioural assessment under corporate law and 
corporate governance codes.
147
  In the UK, the financial services sector is regulated by the 
Financial Services Authority (FSA) and there is an Approved Persons Regime in place which 
evaluates persons who are authorised to carry out certain functions in regulated firms.
148
  As 
regards the influence of the regime on individual behaviour, two schools of thought emerge. 
One perception is that the regime makes no difference to behaviour and one is either the type 
of person who is professional or not.
149
 The other perception is that the regime influences 
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behaviour and people are made to act more professionally because they have an additional 
responsibility beyond the company to the FSA.
150
   
Corporate governance codes and guidelines provide for an evaluation process but it is not one 
that focuses on the personal characteristics of company directors.  The nominations 
committee is required to evaluate the balance of skill, knowledge and experiences required on 
the board and then take that into consideration in making recommendations for new 
appointments.
151
  The predominant form of “evaluation” recommended in corporate 
governance codes and guidelines is the performance evaluation to be undertaken during the 
continuance of the service.
152
  Hence, most of the literature on board and director evaluation 
addresses performance evaluation.  It is essential to discuss the relevant literature in this 
regard as it highlights the issues which have been focused on in terms of evaluation processes 
in corporate governance.  Kiel & Nicholson argue that performance evaluation is a key means 
by which boards can recognise and correct corporate governance problems and add value to 
their companies.
153
 They identify four categories of governance failure: Strategic, Control, 
Ethical and Interpersonal Relationship failure. They draw up a framework for board 
evaluation which addresses issues such as what are the objectives of the evaluation, who will 
be evaluated, what will be evaluated, who will conduct the evaluation, what methods will be 
used, and how will the results be used. This framework covers the essential elements that are 
needed in the actualisation of a functional and effective evaluation framework.  As regards 
who will be evaluated, Kiel & Nicholson further suggest that the board and then key 
governance personnel such as the CEO and company secretary should be evaluated.  This is a 
positive step which goes further than what is recommended in the codes.   
Long argues that it is equally the responsibility of shareholders and stakeholders to encourage 
an evaluation process which reflects integrity of purpose and which increases the levels of 
knowledge and understanding for those operating within the board.154  Van den Berghe & 
Levrau identify that the three main criteria often used in academic research to evaluate board 
effectiveness are board size, board composition and board leadership structure.
155
  They argue 
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that the board has to have appropriate people as well as the structures for it to function 
effectively because structures are brought alive by people. They further argue that structures 
can only facilitate effectiveness and therefore, more emphasis should be placed on the 
selection and re-election of directors.  Ingley & Van der Walt focus on performance appraisal 
and highlight that there are disagreements in governance literature about the usefulness of 
evaluations because of the type of evaluations in governance which appears horizontal, as 
against the widely accepted vertical evaluation which is obtainable in management 
literature.
156
  They further argue that there should be consistency in the process of selecting 
directors and the board evaluation process.   
Kazanjian argues that one advantage of board and director assessment is that it addresses the 
problems of shareholder accountability.
157
  He points out different reasons why the evaluation 
process is not carried out with enthusiasm, such as that in the UK for instance, individual 
director evaluation is seen as unnecessary because the board is viewed as a whole, and the 
evaluation process seems too full of processes, highlighting that the alternative to self-
evaluation recommended by codes is rules and laws which would still be full of processes 
and encroach on corporate decision making, and that directors feel uncomfortable by the fact 
that they are being assessed and judged.  Kazanjian also argues that boards shy away from 
evaluation because it may uncover governance problems, disrupt open interaction and the 
collegiality within the board and the evaluation results may also be unreliable considering the 
process may not have been carried out effectively, efficiently and objectively.158   
As stated earlier, most of the literature which relates to evaluation in corporate governance 
does not deal specifically with personality evaluation at the point of selecting directors; 
however, there are authors who have highlighted more elaborately the need for an adequate 
evaluation process at the recruitment stage.  Lee & Phan argue that the selection and 
evaluation of directors should be made in terms of competencies that are both generic to 
board activities and specific to global firms.
159
 They identify some personal qualities of an 
effective director as being generic, and these include strength of character, integrity, sound 
judgement, business sense.  They also refer to the work of Dulewicz & Herbert who 
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postulated the twelve competences of directors as strategic perspective, business sense, 
planning and organising, analysis and judgement, managing staff, persuasiveness, 
assertiveness and decisiveness, interpersonal sensitivity, communication, resilience and 
adaptability, energy and initiative, achievement and motivation.
160
  Minichilli, Gabrielsson & 
Huse state that seeing the advantages of an effective board evaluation process, it is surprising 
to note that board evaluations have not received more attention in theory and in practice.
161
 
They acknowledge that board evaluations can contribute to effective boards and improve 
corporate performance. They further argue for improved systems of evaluation taking 
cognisance of issues such as who does the evaluation, what is evaluated, for whom it is done 
and how it is done, bearing in mind the importance of fitting the system used to the purpose 
of the evaluation. They present four evaluation systems based on the end users of the 
evaluation outcome.
162
   
Under examples of what can be evaluated, Minichilli, Gabrielsson & Huse refer to board 
membership which includes evaluation of issues such as director’s education, professional 
background, and capabilities.  As regards who conducts the evaluation, they suggest 
consultants, researchers, and other external agents as possible evaluators.  It is noteworthy 
that they argue that evaluation should include an assessment of the capabilities of directors.  
Considering the fact that personality is a significant factor as it relates to behaviour, it is 
essential to also evaluate company directors based on their personal characteristics, 
particularly at the point of recruitment.  It is equally important to investigate the relationship 
between personality and behaviour in order to provide more knowledge regarding the issues 
and enable an informed approach in relation to developing evaluation mechanisms which take 
cognisance of those issues.   As stated in chapter one, the behaviour of directors was 
highlighted as a point of concern in recent corporate failures; and reflecting on the 
inappropriate behaviour of corporate officers in corporate collapses of the early 1990s and 
2000s, it becomes essential to adopt a risk view of behavioural issues in corporate 
governance as it is apparent that behavioural risks contribute to corporate failure. 
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2.7 CORPORATE RISK AND RISK MANAGEMENT  
Considering the argument that personality and behavioural issues contribute to corporate 
failures and, therefore, constitute risks in the corporate governance process, it is essential to 
understand the meaning of risk.  It is also necessary to understand what risk management 
entails as that is pivotal in the determination of solutions which address perceived risks in 
corporate governance.  Historically, risk has been defined as measurable uncertainty.
163
  It is 
the potential for unwanted negative consequences of an event or activity.
164
  Agrawal argues 
that risk represents the numerous types of threats caused by environment, technology, 
humans, organisations, politics etc.
165
  Therefore, humans as well as organisations are risk 
originators, as risk is conceived in human and organisational activities.  Risk can be framed 
and classified in various ways, one of which is its origin.
166
  Corporate risks are, therefore, 
risks that emanate from the corporation in its functioning processes.
167
  Risk management is 
the act of taking action to mitigate the occasion or implication of risk.
168
  In corporate 
governance, the understanding of risk and its implications for the company is evidenced in 
the Turnbull Guidance which states that “A company’s system of internal control has a key 
role in the management of risks that are significant to the fulfilment of its business 
objectives”.169  The Revised Turnbull Guidance states that “A company's objectives, its 
internal organisation and the environment in which it operates are continually evolving and, 
as a result, the risks it faces are continually changing.  A sound system of internal control 
therefore depends on a thorough and regular evaluation of the nature and extent of the risks to 
which the company is exposed.  Since profits are, in part, the reward for successful risk-
taking in business, the purpose of internal control is to help manage and control risk 
appropriately rather than to eliminate it”.170  The board of directors is primarily responsible 
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for risk taking and risk management in a company and bear the task of maintaining the 
internal controls in the company.
171
   
The UK Corporate Governance Code also states that the board should maintain sound risk 
management and internal control systems.
172
  Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) has also 
developed as a framework which elevates risk discussions and management to strategic levels 
in companies.
173
  ERM is basically the identification and assessment of the collective risks 
that affect firm value and the implementation of a firm-wide strategy to manage those 
risks.
174
  The Committee of Sponsoring Organisations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) 
issued an integrated framework to provide a model for ERM.  That framework defines ERM 
as “a process effected by an entity’s board of directors, management and other personnel, 
applied in strategy setting and across the enterprise, designed to identify potential events that 
may affect the entity, and manage risks to be within its risk appetite, to provide reasonable 
assurance regarding the achievement of entity objectives”.175  The COSO Framework also 
defines risk as “the possibility that an event will occur and adversely affect the achievement 
of [entity] objectives”.176  From the foregoing, it can be gleaned that risk represents factors 
which may prevent a company from achieving its objectives.  Part of ensuring that companies 
achieve their objectives is preventing corporate failures.
177
  It therefore means that the risks 
which contribute to corporate failures should be managed effectively.  The examples of 
corporate failures that have been highlighted and the contributory element of behavioural 
issues to those failures is an indication that the behaviour of company directors is a risk issue 
in respect of corporate governance processes.  The fact that personality contributes to 
behavioural issues places personality as a risk element as well in relation to behaviour.  The 
crux of the matter then remains whether present corporate governance mechanisms are 
effective in relation to managing personality risks and in turn behavioural risks, or whether 
other options such as regulation in that regard would prove more effective. 
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2.8 REGULATORY THEORIES      
The problems associated with personality and behavioural risks in respect of corporate 
governance processes require that mechanisms are developed to manage those risks if 
effectiveness is to be achieved.  One of the possible options and the one suggested in this 
thesis is regulatory intervention.  There are various theories regarding the import of 
regulation and how best to achieve effective regulatory outcomes.  It is pertinent to examine 
the relevant regulatory theories in this regard in order to ascertain different perspectives and 
enable an evaluation of which regulatory approaches are justifiable and would best achieve 
the desired aim.  Ayres & Braithwaite argue that based on economic analysis and empirical 
research, a highly punitive regulatory regime engenders a subculture of resistance and a 
crucial danger of a punitive posture that projects negative expectations of the regulated actor 
in that it inhibits self-regulation.
178
  They argue further that a solely punitive regime leads to 
firms defying the spirit of the law by exploiting loopholes and then the State ends up creating 
more specific laws to cover the loopholes.
179
  It has also been noted that a regulator that 
establishes a relationship with the regulated and exercises a degree of discretion is usually 
preferred and the regulated would feel more open if the regulator confers benefits as well as 
policing duties, for example the stock exchange in the UK.
180
   
In line with reducing transaction costs, Ayres & Braithwaite argue that States should produce 
regulation only when it is the cheapest option of regulation for the purpose, otherwise 
external contracting in the form of self-regulation by private actors should be employed.
181
  
This external form of regulation, they say, is cheaper because it is internal to the regulated 
and achieves better cooperation and depth within the company; and it would also enable the 
avoidance of over-strict rules for smaller enterprises and the rules that evolve with fast 
changing circumstances.
182
  Ayres & Braithwaite also argue for a tripartite regulatory 
framework, with public interest groups (such as environmental agencies, employees, 
institutional shareholders etc.) being empowered to intervene in the relationship between the 
regulator and the regulated in order to prevent capture and corruption.
183
  They also suggest a 
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pyramid of sanctions, from lower level sanctions to heavier penalties in cases of non-
cooperation.
184
  Therefore, due to issues such as resentment, inefficiency, expense and 
uncertainty of enforcing punitive laws, it is arguably better to create cooperative laws.
185
    
Baldwin & Cave
186
 note that the issue of regulation requires a multidisciplinary approach, 
cutting across law, economics, political science, sociology, psychology, management etc.  
They refer to Selznick’s idea of the central meaning of regulation as “sustained and focused 
control exercised by a public agency over activities that are valued by a community”.187  
Regarding the reasons why a State may decide to regulate, Baldwin & Cave point to issues 
such as monopolies in the market, regularising windfall profits, externalities or spill overs, 
information inadequacies, continuity and availability of service, anti-competition or predatory 
pricing, public goods or moral hazards, unequal bargaining power, scarcity and rationing, 
distributional justice and social policy, rationalisation and coordination and planning for 
future generations.
188
  As regards approaches to the origin and development of regulation, 
Baldwin & Cave identify public interest theories, interest group theories, private interest 
theories, force of ideas theory and institutional theories.
189
  In the public interest theory 
approach, the purpose of regulation is to achieve certain publicly desired goals in 
circumstances where for instance the market would fail to yield those results.  Proponents of 
regulation in this regard act as agents of public interest.   
Baldwin & Cave point out problems with this theory, such as the absence of a clear definition 
of what constitutes public interest, failings on the part of regulators to actually pursue public 
ends, and the fact that public interest theorists under estimate the power of economic and 
political influence over regulation.
190
   Therefore, in the final analysis, regulation purported to 
be in the public interest may actually be in the interest of particular groups who influenced it 
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and made it appear as if it was done in the interests of the public.
191
  In instances such as this, 
the interest group theory intertwines with the public interest theory.  Interest group theorists 
view regulation as being a result of the relationship between different groups and between 
such groups and the state.
192
  In the private interest theory, regulation is driven by purely 
private interests, although there is sometimes an overlap between private and group interest 
approaches.
193
  The force of ideas approach connotes a situation in which regulation is a 
result of intellectual conceptions which express how and why the government ought to 
intervene in a market.
194
 This basically involves the government rationalising its reasons for 
regulation based on its ideas of what ought to be in place.  Institutionalism theorists argue 
that institutional structures as well as social processes drive regulation and regulatory 
intervention goes beyond an aggregation of individual preferences.
195
  These institutions 
include law, economic, political and religious units, with each exerting its own influence on 
the regulatory process.
196
    
Ogus points out that in all industrialised societies, there is a tension between two systems of 
economic organisation, the market system and the collectivist system.
197
  The role of the law 
in the market system is simply to facilitate the functioning of the market by offering a set of 
formalised arrangements with which individuals can go about their welfare seeking activities 
and relationships.  These arrangements are usually through instruments of private law.  In the 
collectivist system, the State seeks to direct or encourage behaviour which would not 
otherwise occur without such intervention and the aim is to correct perceived deficiencies in 
the market as regards its ability to meet collective public goals.
198
  Ogus makes a distinction 
between social and economic regulation and reiterates that the public interest theory of 
regulation rests on justifications such as that the consumers of goods and services often have 
inadequate information concerning the quality offered by suppliers and so the unregulated 
market may fail to meet their preferences.
199
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Wright & Head
200
 explain different perspectives on regulation as follows: 
1) Normative Theory: This theory makes prescriptive claims and connotes legally 
enforceable standards which are set and applied uniformly across the entire regulatory 
space.  There are no tailored requirements to specific characteristics of individuals, 
firms or industries.  The limitations of this approach are the needs of different sectors 
and expensive compliance regimes. Under this theory comes traditional directive 
regulation (command and control) which is often described as cumbersome, costly, 
inflexible, and inefficient.
201
  There is also responsive regulation which engages the 
regulatory space, enforced by rational strategizing and self-regulatory techniques.
202
  
It suggests that governments should be attuned to appreciating the different 
motivations and characteristics of regulated entities and regulators must be able to 
respond differently and with measured levels of sanction to the diverse conducts of 
the industry.  Both of these models aim to advance public purposes, but essentially, 
the traditional regulatory methods are better suited to a regulatory space with minimal 
diversity and where the regulated bodies have relatively uniform characteristics.  
Responsive regulation thrives in a place where regulators, the regulated and the 
community can build the basis for negotiated responsiveness. 
2) Descriptive Theory-Smart Regulation: This theory emphasises the active role that 
specific contexts such as organisational, political, economic and cultural can play in 
deciding regulatory regimes and outcomes.  It builds on responsive regulation but the 
major focus is in its contextualisation and it deals more with the specific issues 
confronted by an industry; for example environmental pollution or occupational 
health and safety rather than the normatively laden negotiation of responsiveness and 
rational strategizing.  Central to this theory is the perspective that regulated bodies are 
always embedded in contexts that significantly influence their needs and compliance 
motivations.  Smart regulation posits that regulatory studies must be undertaken at the 
lower level of generality and strategies should be formulated across specific social, 
economic and institutional contexts.  It examines existing regulatory regimes in terms 
of strengths and weaknesses and indicates which new instruments might operate 
constructively.  It also emphasises that optimal regulatory solutions require a mix of 
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regulatory instruments.  The strength of smart regulation lies in its sensitivity to the 
connection between governance arrangements and the cultural, economic and 
institutional contexts in which they are embedded.  Smart regulation contributes to 
what is already in existence.  One weakness of this mode of regulation is that it comes 
into play after substantive policy goals have been articulated and so it can only 
operate in a regulatory space where legitimacy is already assured.  The descriptive 
perspective leads policy makers to ask important questions within a principle based 
framework, but in the absence of normative yardsticks there can be no guarantees. 
3) Post Structuralism Theory-Nodal Governance: This theory highlights regulatory 
arrangements at the level of governance networks.  Nodal governance posits that 
although power is transmitted across networks, the node is the point at which 
knowledge and capacity are organised and mobilised.  Nodes can be companies, non-
governmental organisations, community groups, government departments, 
associations etc. and can exist across specific sectors such as health, banking, 
education etc. The potential strength of the nodal model of regulation is the ability to 
map interactions and capacities of nodes, both as sites of continuity and of 
contestation.  A disadvantage is the assumption of legitimacy outside the state.  
As regards regulatory design, Gunningham & Grabosky
203
 suggest various principles which 
would aid the development of regulation in the environmental policy sector but which are 
also potentially useful in the analysis of regulatory designs in the commercial sector.  The 
authors argue that adherence to these principles is at the heart of successful regulatory policy 
design and contribute towards effective and efficient regulation. These principles are as 
follows: 
1) Adopting a mixture of regulatory instruments and applying only the minimum 
required to achieve the purpose. 
Gunningham & Grabosky point out that individual regulatory instrument would in the 
majority of cases be inadequate to achieve a regulatory goal. For instance, command 
and control regulation would be dependable and predictable but would also be 
inflexible and inefficient.  Economic regulation tends to be efficient but not 
dependable in most cases.  Self-regulation has the advantage of being non coercive 
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and cost effective, but it can be highly unreliable in a lot of cases and its success 
depends on the gap between public and private interests.  Therefore, the best means of 
overcoming individual instrument deficiencies is to adopt a combination of 
instruments. 
2) Less interventionist measures. 
Gunningham & Grabosky argue that highly prescriptive and highly coercive 
instruments are not the most effective regulatory measures, and a more successful 
regime should aim to adopt the least interventionist measure in achieving the 
outcome. 
3) Creating a regulatory pyramid. 
Gunningham & Grabosky here distinguish between the regulatory pyramids proposed 
by Ayres & Braithwaite in which the state regulation is the single instrument and 
instead propose a mixture of instruments and regulatory participants. 
4) Empower participants to act as surrogate regulators. 
Gunningham & Grabosky argue that the state need not be the sole regulator and can 
create efficiency by engaging second and third parties who are in the best position to 
support the regulatory outcome. 
5) Maximise opportunities for win-win outcomes. 
Gunningham & Grabosky argue that there should be the opportunity for end users of 
the regulation to rise above mere compliance and benefit more widely from the 
regulatory intent.  These principles are in keeping with the tenets of smart regulation 
which essentially connotes regulating in the most effective and efficient manner 
taking cognisance of the context in which regulation is desired. 
In the consultation report on better regulation in the EU, it was noted that smart regulation is 
not about more or less regulation but is simply about delivering regulatory outcomes in the 
least burdensome way.
204
  It was also noted that regulation is a necessary aspect of modern 
society and in business it serves to create a level playing field for companies to operate in the 
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market place.  However, in designing regulatory instruments, governments are looking to 
employ the right regulatory tools which would maximise benefits and minimise negative 
effects, whilst being responsive to the needs of the end-users.
205
  It would then be reasonable 
to say that present realities demand that regulation must be needful, effective and efficient.  
Some general methods of regulation include the following: 
1) External Prescriptive Rules. 
Dine argues that this sort of regulation alone will not always be effective and satisfactory.
206
   
2) Responsive Rules. 
Ayres & Braithwaite argue in support of this model which thrives on the cooperation of the 
regulated.
207
 
3) Internal Self-Regulation. 
This involves private actors regulating in the place of the State.
208
 
Dine argues that an ideal situation in terms of achieving regulatory outcomes is the regulator 
relating with the recipients of the regulation “in a relationship that ultimately has coercive 
power”.209  Examples would include corporate governance codes,210 as well as the 
proceduralisation model
211
 rooted in the legal philosophy that regulation should be about the 
law taking a back stand as regards formulating substantive norms and instead focus on 
providing the framework and enabling environment for the decision making by ensuring that 
the best possible forum of interested parties can be convened to arrive at the eventual 
substantive norm.
212
  Dine further argues, however, that due to the influence and impact of 
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corporate operations globally, there should be a rejection of “the underpinning of free market 
economics and the consequent demand of corporations to be permitted to self-regulate”.213  
She points out that the grave impact of the effect of corporate activities is a firm justification 
for stronger regulation.
214
  Dine adds that there is clearly a place for codes and internal 
regulation, but the task is to institute a legal framework that can contribute towards enforcing 
internal self-regulation.
215
   Ensuring that companies are effectively regulated should be the 
most important consideration, and the regulatory approach which achieves this aim is 
preferable in any case.      
Comparing self-regulatory approaches to statutory intervention, Kirkbride & Letza discuss 
the UK Local Government Act 2000 which involves a National Standards Board with agreed 
codes of conduct and enforcement mechanisms, and observe that this public authorities’ 
regime is now more advanced than the corporate regime because its duties are more explicitly 
defined by statute.
216
 They contend that since the public and private sector have an agenda in 
ensuring good corporate governance, the adoption of a similar regime in the corporate realm 
would be worthwhile.  Ingley & Van der Walt also argue that there is a challenge for 
regulators and researchers to push for changes in the architecture of corporate governance in 
order to ensure that the full potential of the corporate board is realised.
217
  Musikali argues 
that despite the reasons put forward in favour of self-regulation in corporate governance, 
government intervention is inevitable when markets have failed.
218
  He argues that the 
stability of companies is important as the success of any economy in the 21st century lies in 
its ability to create and maintain successful corporations.  Musikali further asserts that the 
survival and long-term profitability of corporations is now a matter of public interest, which 
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should to a certain degree be protected through State regulation.
219
  He goes on to argue that 
private law mechanisms and non-law mechanisms have proved inefficient and ineffective in 
protecting shareholders and stakeholders from expropriation and excessive risk-taking, and so 
government intervention is not only desirable but necessary.
220
   
From the emergence of the company as a business form, business leaders have been in favour 
of the view that businesses should be controlled by business persons and not by government 
officials, hence the current trend for the business community to promote soft law and self-
regulation in corporate governance.
221
  However, from the arguments highlighted above, 
corporate failures and the impact they have had on society are viewed as justification for 
government intervention.
222
  Perhaps the important issue is to avoid over regulation and to 
identify the areas of corporate governance which would definitely function more effectively 
with statutory regulation.
223
  With regard to regulating the selection of corporate officers, 
Dulewicz & Herbert point out that only a minority of nominations committees focus on 
descriptors of high performance in evaluating appointees and traditional methods of director 
selection still prevail.
224
  If the aim is to improve corporate governance, then there is a reason 
for the selection process to take cognisance of all the elements which would affect a 
director’s performance.  Cadbury states that improvements in board accountability and 
performance are the aim of corporate governance reform.
225
 He argued that word of mouth or 
personal network approach to the selection of directors should be increasingly unacceptable, 
but acknowledges that old habits die hard and patronage breeds power and influence.
226
 He 
further argued that the pressure for a more formal selection process will come from 
institutional shareholders and the management team.
227
 He asserts that the link between 
assessment and selection is straightforward and the board should start a selection process to 
fill a vacancy by looking at the attributes of the present board members and thinking of issues 
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such as age, gender, professional qualifications etc. and then decide where the gap is and seek 
to fill it.
228
  
Cadbury notes that in the light of his experience on the Financial Aspects of Corporate 
Governance Committee in 1992, there are areas of governance which are not easily dealt with 
statutorily and he refers to the requirement for a certain “calibre” of non-executive directors, 
a qualitative judgement which shareholders are able to make but cannot be framed in legal 
language.
229
  This may be true, but on the other hand, allowing shareholders to make that 
judgement based on undefined or unclearly defined criteria can encourage discretion which 
could result in inconsistent judgements.  This might result in situations where different 
standards are propagated by different shareholders.  It would augur well for consistency if a 
qualitative criterion were framed in legal language to such an extent that would ensure more 
explicit identification and clarity of the “calibre” of persons that should be selected as 
company directors.  Cadbury also argues that another advantage of self-regulatory approaches 
such as the corporate governance code is that its spirit can be invoked beyond its letter and 
that it can be swiftly adapted to suit new developments.
230
  There are certainly advantages to 
having self-regulatory codes,
231
 but that should not preclude the existence of statutory 
regulation in cases where it is deemed more effective and necessary.
232
   
In relation to the role of law, Hansmann & Kraakman point out that as a normative matter, 
the overall objective of corporate law, as of any branch of law, is to serve the interests of 
society as a whole.
233
  Chip Pitts argues that corporate leaders continue to affirm that 
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corporations also serve public purposes intended to benefit society as a whole.
234
  He also 
asserts that enlightened companies increasingly understand that reasonable regulation is 
indispensable to effectively functioning sustainable markets.
235
  Therefore, it is in the best 
interests of society that companies are well governed in order that they achieve the objectives 
for which they were incorporated.  In analysing the arguments for and against entrusting the 
regulation of companies to the markets, Ferran points out that there is recognition of 
imperfection in the markets particularly as regards information asymmetries, and market 
participants may find it difficult to accurately assess the risks they take in dealing with 
companies.
236
  She also states that arguments to justify statutory intervention include the fact 
that legal rules provide default standards which can reduce transaction costs and the State 
may also intervene on public interest grounds where activities raise concerns which cannot be 
adequately addressed through market mechanisms.  
Regarding how regulatory intervention addresses the issue of personality and behavioural 
risks at present, there are existing legal rules designed to check the behaviour of corporate 
officers to varying degrees and in different situations. Examples in the UK include sections 1-
9 of the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 and sections 171-177 of the UK 
Companies Act 2006.
237
  However, these provisions do not relate specifically to personality 
issues.  Again, even in the areas to which they relate, the provisions are mostly reactive in 
nature and take effect after the fact.  Hicks observed that the aims and objectives of 
disqualification of directors is the protection of the public interest by prohibiting unfit 
directors from managing limited companies, deterring improper conduct of directors, and 
establishing standards of good practice in the management of companies.
238
  However, the 
National Audit Office (NAO) report in 1999 concluded that the legislation though efficiently 
enforced has only a marginal effect on improving the behaviour of directors.
239
  One reason 
for that might be the impact of personality on behaviour and the fact that disqualification 
                                                          
234
 See J.W. Chip Pitts, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility: Current Status and Future Evolution’ (2009) 6(2) 
Rutgers Journal of Law & Public Policy 334-433, at 344-345.  
235
See Chip Pitts, Ibid 415. 
236
 See Ferran, (note 215) 387. 
237
 Sections 1-9 of the Company Directors Disqualification Act deals with disqualification of directors for 
reasons such as persistent breaches of companies legislation, fraud, and unfitness whilst sections 171-177 of 
the Companies Act deals with the duties of directors.  These include the duty to act within powers, to exercise 
reasonable care, skill and diligence and to avoid conflicts of interest.  
238
 See A. Hicks, ‘Director Disqualification: Can it Deliver?’ (2001) Journal of Business Law 433-460.  
239
 See The NAO Report, 1999. 
56 
 
rules apply after the fact.
240
  Hicks rightly noted that the unfit directors are only discovered 
and dealt with after running a company into insolvency and having caused damage to 
creditors.
241
  He also argues that another obvious gap in the disqualification net is that only 
those companies that go into formal insolvency proceedings are subject to investigation and 
unfit conduct reports by receivers or liquidators.
242
  Therefore, in relation to companies 
outside this cadre, the disqualification rules are completely irrelevant.   
As was stated earlier, the UK Companies Act 2006 does not contain provisions relating to 
qualifying criteria for directors except as regards minimum age.
243
  There are no provisions 
which deal with the personality of company directors.  Provisions such as those in sections 
171-177 relating to the duties of directors are ordinarily expected to influence the behaviour 
of directors.  But, a recent survey of the impact of the UK Companies Act 2006 since its 
promulgation reports that there is a need to further clarify the duties of directors and provide 
guidance in order to increase behavioural change.
244
  This is an indication of the fact that 
there has been no overwhelming evidence of improvement in the behaviour of directors since 
the Act came into force.  The absence of a definitive behavioural change based on the current 
provisions of the Act as it relates to directors’ duties is not surprising because, hypothetically, 
the Act is applicable to the same directors that were managing companies before the Act 
came into force and the provisions of the Act would not ordinarily change their personality.  
For the reason that their personality influences their behaviour, if their personality remains 
the same, then their behaviour can be expected to remain the same.  Also, the wording of the 
provisions of section 172 of the Act, for instance, has been argued to indicate a personal and 
subjective judgement.
245
  This reinforces the argument that if there is no change in 
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personality, then the provisions of section 172 cannot reasonably be expected to change the 
behaviour of company directors.   
Again, sections 386-389, 393 and 414 of the 2006 Act in relation to keeping proper accounts 
are also largely reactive in terms of mandating appropriate behaviour.  The civil and criminal 
liabilities take effect after the offence has been committed.  Ideally, the provisions should 
also act as deterrence, but the extent to which civil and criminal sanctions deter inappropriate 
behaviour is debatable considering examples of corporate failures, and the literature on 
personality and criminology,
246
  a recent example of this issue being the Lehman Brothers 
bankruptcy.  The Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the US had mandatory provisions relating to the use 
of off balance sheet instruments and clearly provides for personal liability for contravention 
of the provisions of the Act but that did not deter the company directors at Lehman Brothers 
from contravening those provisions.
247
  The Sarbanes-Oxley Act in itself has been described 
as a reactive and poorly considered piece of legislation.
248
  However, its provisions are 
legally binding on company directors as it is still in force.  An important issue in relation to 
securing the effectiveness of regulation is to ensure as much as possible that the regulated 
would abide by its provisions, and not rely solely on the deterrence element of sanctions 
where applicable.  In the absence of a system which ensures that regulation is complied with, 
there are chances that effectiveness would be undermined.   
Drew & Kendrick argue that poor corporate governance is a major source of enterprise 
risk.
249
  Considering that the personality and behaviour of directors are issues which can 
contribute to poor corporate governance and in the quest to manage corporate risks 
effectively, it is necessary to adopt risk management approaches which would yield the 
desired results and this includes statutory regulation.  Arguments in favour of statutory 
regulation include the fact that legal rules provide certainty and predictability, exude 
democratic legitimacy and are better enforced as against market based self-regulation which 
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has been said to lack teeth.
250
 Nevertheless, it is vital to engage with the various regulatory 
theories in the development of a regulatory framework in order to harness the most beneficial 
aspects of the different theories and utilize them in the formulation of a regulatory policy that 
would be effective, efficient and sustainable. 
2.9 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has reviewed the relevant literature in the areas which are at the heart of this 
thesis. The issues highlighted in this literature review form the basis of the thinking upon 
which arguments in support of this thesis are developed in subsequent chapters.  From this 
literature review, a background is provided for the development of a conceptual framework 
surrounding the specific problem and solutions addressed in the thesis.  This review brings 
clarity and focus to the issue of personality and behavioural risk in corporate governance, 
having discussed literature highlighting the meaning of companies and corporate governance, 
the role of company directors, the impact of their personality and behaviour in relation to the 
management of companies and corporate failures, the import of risk and risk management, 
and regulatory intervention as a possible risk management approach.  The analysis of 
literature in this chapter particularly lends credence to the major argument in this thesis which 
is that the personality of company directors contributes significant risks to the corporate 
governance process, and there is a need to explore effective means of mitigating these risks.       
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CHAPTER THREE 
RISK AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
It has been highlighted in the two previous chapters that personality and behavioural issues 
represent risks which should be engaged with by the corporate governance process.  The aims 
of this chapter are firstly, to provide a context for the term “risk” as used in this thesis.  
Secondly, it discusses the import of risk management as a concept, as well as providing a 
historical analysis of the manner in which risk and risk management have been approached 
and dealt with in corporate governance.  Thirdly, it examines current corporate governance 
mechanisms and evaluates the extent to which they identify and manage personality risk.  In 
discussing these issues, this chapter identifies that personality risk qualifies as a significant 
risk issue because of its potential effect on the behaviour of directors who are subject to 
corporate governance processes, and that behavioural risks are not effectively managed under 
existing corporate governance mechanisms. This is because there is no framework to enable 
the identification and in turn management of personality risk, which is a core element of 
behavioural risk.  This chapter also illustrates that there are attempts to manage behavioural 
risks in corporate governance, but these attempts have omitted an essential element which 
impacts on behaviour, and that is personality.  It is also evidenced in this chapter that the 
management of behavioural risk becomes ineffective if the elements which contribute to the 
risk, such as personality, and its associated risk elements remain unidentified and unmanaged.  
A detailed discussion on the relationship between personality and behaviour is undertaken in 
chapter five.     
3.2 RISK  
The meaning of the term “risk” has been traced to Arabic, Latin and Greek origins; and 
generally referred to chances of outcomes whether positive or negative.
251
  The English word 
in itself was derived from the French word risque which has mostly negative but sometimes 
positive connotations.
252
  Over time, the connotation associated with risk has become that of 
negativity, particularly the chances of occurrence of undesirable outcomes.
253
  There is no 
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singly accepted definition of the term, but the numerous definitions of risk provide an 
indication of its connotation.
254
  Risk has been variously defined as the potential for 
unwanted negative consequences of an event or activity; 
255
 the chancing of a negative 
outcome; 
256
 the numerous types of threats caused by environment, technology, humans, 
organisations, politics etc.; 
257
 a probability or threat of a damage, injury, liability, loss or 
other negative occurrence that is caused by external or internal vulnerabilities, and that may 
be neutralised through pre-emptive action; 
258
 a measurable uncertainty; 
259
 events with a 
negative impact which can prevent value creation or erode existing value; 
260
 the probability 
of an adverse outcome; 
261
 a set of scenarios, each of which has a probability and a 
consequence; 
262
 a situation involving exposure to danger;
263
  uncertainty about and severity 
of the consequences of an activity with respect to something that human beings value; 
264
 the 
possibility of deviation in the results from expected goals; 
265
 the effect of uncertainty on 
objectives, whether positive or negative; 
266
 and peril, danger, the chance of loss or injury.
267
 
These definitions mostly highlight the fact that risk connotes the possibility of an outcome 
which is undesirable, unexpected, unwanted and therefore elicits the need to be influenced by 
prevention or minimisation of its effects.  From the above, it can be gleaned that risk is a term 
which refers to the potentiality of negativism resulting from actions and inactions.  There can 
be overlaps between the use of the terms  “risk” and “uncertainties”, but generally risk is 
particularly used to denote situations where the probability of outcomes is known whereas 
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uncertainties refer to cases in which the consequences of actions as well as the probability of 
occurrence is relatively unknown.
268
  For instance, there is a probability of death or injury 
resulting from drunk driving and so that risk can be identified and managed by establishing 
regulations to protect against it.  However, there might be no reasonable probability of the 
effects of a natural disaster and the extent of its consequences as those situations are usually 
uncertain.   
The connotation which is ascribed to terms can also depend on the context and so people may 
view risks and uncertainties differently depending on their situation.
269
  Risk can also be 
classified and framed in various ways, one of which is the origin.
270
  Therefore financial risks 
may be so called because they originate from financial issues, and likewise personality risks 
may be so called as they originate from personality issues.  Classification of risk types and 
sources is essential for directing the priorities and attention of risk managers and for 
developing models for risk management.
271
  The causes of risk may also be complex and 
interrelated.
272
  It is therefore vital to ensure that risks which are interrelated are managed 
accordingly, as that is one way to generate overall effectiveness in the risk management 
process.  
3.3 RISK MANAGEMENT  
Risk management is the human activity which integrates the recognition and identification of 
risk, assessment of risk, developing strategies to manage risk and mitigation of risk using 
managerial resources.
273
  Risk management enables company management to deal effectively 
with identifiable events that can have an adverse effect on the company.
274
  Incorporating the 
definition of management as the planning, organisation, coordination, control and direction of 
resources toward defined objectives, and the meaning ascribed to risk, risk management has 
also been explained as the identification, assessment and prioritization of risks followed by 
coordinated and economical application of resources to minimise, monitor and control the 
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probability and/or impact of unfortunate events.
275
  Risk management covers all the processes 
involved in identifying, assessing and judging risks, assigning ownership, taking actions to 
mitigate or anticipate them, and monitoring and reviewing progress.
276
  From the definitions 
and explanations of what risk management entails, it becomes evident that the first step in 
risk management is the identification of risk itself.  Arguably, risk can only be managed when 
it has been identified.  Considering the meaning of risk as the potential for a negative 
outcome, it is therefore a risk in itself for a risk element to be unidentified, as that would 
mean that the chances of effective assessment and management are reduced, if existent at all.  
After identification, risk assessment and risk management processes follow.  The issues 
involved in risk assessments and analysis are as follows: 
i) Defining the undesirable outcome 
ii) Identifying the probability of occurrence 
iii) Measuring the consequences/severity of impact of occurrence 277    
In the light of what risk connotes as evident from the various definitions of risks, and the 
knowledge of the processes involved in risk identification and management as discussed 
above, a review and discussion of risk perceptions and risk management approaches in 
corporate governance will then be undertaken, in order to assess whether and how corporate 
governance mechanisms have managed personality and behavioural risks.  
3.4 RISK, PERSONALITY AND BEHAVIOURAL RISK IN CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 
THE TURNBULL GUIDANCE, INTERNAL CONTROL AND RISK MANAGEMENT 
The first attempts at bringing risk issues into focus in corporate governance recommendations 
can be seen in sections 4.31 and 4.32 of the Cadbury Report dealing with internal control.   
The Cadbury Committee was set up in response to perceived problems in the financial 
aspects of corporate governance in the early 1990s and corporate failures in the UK expanded 
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the remit of the committee.
278
  The internal control provisions in the Cadbury Report state 
that directors are responsible under the Companies Act for maintaining adequate accounting 
records and to meet these responsibilities the directors need in practice to maintain a system 
of internal control over the financial management of the company, including procedures 
designed to minimise the risk of fraud.  The provisions also recommended that directors 
should make a statement in the report and accounts on the effectiveness of their system of 
internal control and auditors should report thereon.  These provisions did not elicit a high 
level of compliance as far as reporting was concerned because they appeared vague and left 
company boards in confusion as to what was required of them in relation to internal 
control.
279
  Risk management was as yet not spelt out in the recommendations.   
 
In 1994, the Rutteman Committee attempted an explanation of what the internal control 
provisions entailed by stating in their report that internal financial control connotes “the 
internal controls established in order to provide reasonable assurance of (a) the safeguarding 
of assets against unauthorised use or disposition; and (b) the maintenance of proper 
accounting records and the reliability of financial information used within the business or for 
publication”.280  The Hampel Committee Report, and the Combined Code on Corporate 
Governance which followed, elaborated more on the issue of internal control and risk 
management.
281
   The Combined Code stated explicitly in Principle D.2 that “The board 
should maintain a sound system of internal control to safeguard shareholders’ investment and 
the company’s assets”.  The Code also stated in Provision D.2.1 that “The directors should, at 
least annually, conduct a review of the effectiveness of the group’s system of internal control 
and should report to shareholders that they have done so.  The review should cover all 
controls, including financial, operational and compliance controls and risk management”.282  
So, the concept of risk management was spelt out in the 1998 Combined Code, even though 
there was still no provision on how it was to be achieved.  In 1999, the Turnbull Committee 
provided much needed guidance on the issue of risk first articulated by the Cadbury 
Committee by explicitly identifying the elements of a sound system of internal control and 
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recommending processes through which company boards could fulfil their reporting 
responsibilities in this regard.
283
  The Turnbull Report also highlighted the relationship 
between internal control and risk management by stating that “A company’s system of 
internal control has a key role in the management of risks that are significant to the fulfilment 
of its business objectives”.284  This connotes that risks in a company would vary across 
different parameters depending on the company’s business objectives, and internal control is 
one important means of managing significant risks.  The statement also lends credence to the 
definitions of risk earlier discussed to the extent that if fulfilling its business objectives is the 
aim of any company, then any event that goes against the achievement of that objective is a 
risk to it.   
 
The Turnbull Guidance was reviewed in 2005 by a group set up by the FRC (Financial 
Reporting Council) and chaired by Douglas Flint.
285
  The Revised Guidance states that “A 
company's objectives, its internal organisation and the environment in which it operates are 
continually evolving and, as a result, the risks it faces are continually changing.  A sound 
system of internal control therefore depends on a thorough and regular evaluation of the 
nature and extent of the risks to which the company is exposed.  Since profits are, in part, the 
reward for successful risk-taking in business, the purpose of internal control is to help 
manage and control risk appropriately rather than to eliminate it.”286   This presupposes that 
risk management efforts from the perspective of internal control are not aimed at a complete 
elimination of risk since entrepreneurial endeavour is an exercise which involves elements of 
risk.  It has also been argued that risk management in itself must take cognisance of the fact 
that risk is inherent in business and risk reduction is practical only up to a point.
287
  The aim 
should therefore be to manage risks up to a practicable level.  In para 19 of the Guidance, 
elements of a sound system of internal control are outlined and these include policies, 
processes, behaviours, tasks etc. that facilitate the effective and efficient operation of a 
company by enabling it to respond appropriately to significant business, operational, 
financial, compliance and other risks to achieving the company’s objectives.288  Internal 
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control systems also encompass mechanisms which help to ensure the quality of internal and 
external reporting; and this requires the maintenance of proper records amongst other issues. 
 
The Treadway Commission had also defined internal control as a process designed to provide 
reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of objectives in the categories of effective 
and efficient operations, reliability of financial reporting and compliance with applicable laws 
and regulations.
289
  Internal control systems should also help ensure compliance with 
applicable laws and regulations, and also with internal policies with respect to the conduct of 
business.
290
  Internal control is, therefore, propagated in the Turnbull Guidance as a 
mechanism which is aimed at managing the risks which a company faces in the achievement 
of its objectives, and it should facilitate the overall effective and efficient operation of the 
company.  Consequently, internal control should encompass all the elements which are 
geared towards ensuring that the actions and decisions taken within the company are in 
consonant with the corporate objectives.  It is argued that should also include controlling the 
risks which accrue from the persons who are taking these actions and making these decisions. 
 
Interestingly, in para 22, the Guidance states as follows “A sound system of internal control 
reduces, but cannot eliminate, the possibility of poor judgement in decision-making; human 
error; control processes being deliberately circumvented by employees and others; 
management overriding controls; and the occurrence of unforeseeable circumstances”.291  So, 
in effect, even though a sound system of internal control is supposed to help reduce the 
occurrence of events such as those stated in para 22, it cannot eliminate them.  That is very 
much in keeping with the idea of risk management in the first place as is envisaged by the 
Guidance.  However, most of the issues highlighted in para 22 relate to deliberate human 
behaviour which as will be seen in subsequent chapters emanate predominantly from 
personality issues, and for the purposes of this thesis, the important factor is whether internal 
control mechanisms are actually helping, and to what extent, to manage these sort of risks 
which can be categorized as personality risks.  
  
Analysing para 22 alongside para 19, one begins to identify a situation in which the success 
of internal control systems mechanisms can, to a large extent, be dependent on the personality 
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of the users.  For instance, if there are systems in place which are aimed at ensuring the 
accuracy of reports such as mandatory compliance with applicable laws and regulations in 
relation to such reports, it may not help to reduce the incidences of inaccurate reports if the 
company directors who are involved in that activity are persons who are prone to 
contravening applicable laws and regulations.  As was stated in para 22, internal control 
mechanisms may not eliminate the possibility of control processes being circumvented and 
management overriding controls.  However, these circumstances of circumvention are 
significant risks in themselves which must be managed because they impact on the 
achievement of corporate objectives.  Para 19 seems to place the focus of internal control 
particularly on business, operational, financial and compliance risks, even though it mentions 
“other risks”.  Personality risks are an issue in all of those areas because people are involved 
in taking actions and decisions in those areas.  The central issue here is that personality risks 
are not explicitly catered for under the Turnbull Guidance, and even though arguments may 
be made that it could be implied, the fact that the issue is not clearly elucidated makes it 
impossible to identify personality risks appropriately and develop mechanisms for managing 
those risks effectively.   
 
It has already been noted that internal control and risk management and all they entail was 
not explicitly spelt out in the Cadbury Report through to the Hampel Report, and that 
situation made the articulation of internal control and risk management processes difficult in 
practice as well as for reporting purposes until the Turnbull Guidance was promulgated.  
Therefore, supposedly, one goal of the Turnbull Guidance was to elucidate in totality what 
internal control and risk management should entail, and it has done so, without particularly 
identifying personality risks as a distinct and significant risk parameter.  It does, instead, 
provide the indication in para 22 that personality risks may not be effectively managed under 
regular internal control processes and rightfully so as will be made evident from examples of 
corporate failures in which controls were actually circumvented by company directors.  The 
Turnbull Guidance is simply guidance, and there is a possibility that some companies may 
identify personality risks within their own risk analysis exercise.  However, the issue is that 
the guidance is meant to serve as a standard for all relevant companies to follow.  Therefore, 
if the issue of personality is not appropriately addressed in the guidance, then there is a risk 
that it will not be addressed by the companies that are required to follow the guidance.  
Corporate governance codes and guidance are meant to elucidate acceptable standards for 
companies to follow.  These codes and guidance are promulgated through a system which 
67 
 
draws on consultations and consensus from the business community and in the process 
creates standards which can be viewed as the most reasonably acceptable requirements in 
relation to the issues in question.
292
  It is therefore possible that companies have not 
considered personality risks as an important issue.  Even if companies assumed a definition 
of personality risk which placed it within the parameters of the other risks clearly articulated 
in the Turnbull Guidance, or placed it within the ambit of “others”, then it would be a case of 
different companies articulating different responses to personality risks without any specific 
guidance; a situation which is likely to result in a potential risk of mismanagement of those 
risks.  Moreover, as will be illustrated in the next chapter in relation to corporate failures and 
the ensuing reports thereon, there is no clear evidence that companies have attempted to 
articulate and manage personality risks appropriately, particularly in relation to company 
directors.   
 
In relation to questions as to whether internal control processes as envisaged by the Turnbull 
Guidance actually manage personality risks, the answer would be negative.  The internal 
control and risk management process provided for in the Turnbull Guidance does not deal 
with personality risk as an issue vital to the management of the kind of risks envisaged under 
para 22 and, for that reason, all other internal control processes aimed at reducing the 
possibility of occurrences of those sort of situations would not be as effective as they should 
be because personality which is a fundamental element that brings about the occurrence of 
those situations has not been dealt with appropriately.  From the explanation in relation to 
risk analysis in the earlier sections of this chapter, there must be an identification of the 
source of risk for there to be a meaningful attempt at assessing it and managing it.  Therefore, 
if internal control systems have not identified personality risks explicitly as a distinct and 
significant risk source, then there are flaws in the system.  The aim of developing internal 
control processes should be to ultimately engender the creation of efficient and effective 
corporate governance, and any issue that impacts on the achievement of this aim can be 
viewed as a risk source.  A risk source which is significant to the attainment of the overall 
corporate objective and remains unmanaged is a vital gap in the risk management process.    
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The following diagram illustrates the flow of the risk management process as envisaged by 
the Turnbull Guidance, with an indication of the gap created by the absence of personality 
risk management, as well as the possible impact.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
 
 
 
Figure 1 above illustrates the flow of the risk management process in corporate governance, and indicates that 
there is an impact of behaviour on control processes and vice versa, highlighting the gap created by non-
existent personality risk management and the possibility of overall ineffective risk management. 
 
In relation to behavioural risks in general, it is possible that internal control processes are 
aimed at managing those risks to the extent that controls are supposed to act as checks on 
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behaviour.
293
  However, the pivotal argument here is that if controls can be circumvented, 
then they cannot in effect be the most effective and sole means of managing behavioural 
risks, as well as all other corporate risks.  Considering that there are factors which influence 
and impact on behaviour, one of the most significant ones being personality, there can be no 
meaningful attempt at managing behavioural risks without a meaningful attempt at 
identifying and managing personality risks.  Controls are nonetheless necessary in corporate 
risk management because they are designed to cater for varying situations which the 
company directors are faced with, and it is the case that perhaps in the absence of adequate 
controls and guidance, even the best of directors may be at a loss regarding what actions and 
decisions to take in certain situations.
294
  However, having controls alone as envisaged by the 
Turnbull Guidance, without dealing with personality risks, would not suffice if overall 
effective risk management is sought.  It has been acknowledged that there is a level of 
subjectivity in risk assessment which results from issues such as the personal objectives, 
perspectives and underlying values of the person engaged in the risk management activity.
295
  
Therefore, since personality has an influence on these issues, it follows that the personality of 
company directors would definitely impact on their assessment and management of risk in 
every area of the business, and there is then a risk that these personality issues might override 
any objective controls in place if personality risks are not in themselves managed.
296
  
Managing personality risks with the use of internal controls would require specific 
knowledge regarding the personality of company directors, so as to permit the creation of 
internal control processes which would be fit for the purpose.
297
  One size may definitely not 
fit all companies in this case, and particularly for the sake of efficiency, it would be 
reasonable to apply minimum controls where it is safe to do so and adopt more stringent 
measures where necessary.  This would be beneficial for a company which seeks to generate 
profit by reducing cost, as well as minimise losses and derailment from its corporate 
objective by fostering an effective risk management system.  Applying controls in a situation 
where the personality of a director is unknown and unmanaged is simply increasing the 
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uncertainties surrounding the effectiveness of those controls.
298
  It then means that in relation 
to managing all other corporate risks, effectiveness may not be achieved because the 
underlying personality risks have not actually been managed effectively.  Personality risks 
are, therefore, foundational risks as they affect the success of every other risk management 
process.  In this way, personality risks become highly significant in relation to the 
achievement of business objectives.     
The other factor which could impact on behaviour is situations, but then, these are largely 
taken care of by controls,
299
 meaning that if situations are provided for by controls, that 
would leave the other significant element of behaviour which is personality to determine 
eventual outcomes.  It then means that where controls are already in place, the other part of 
the equation which deserves attention and has not received it appropriately in corporate 
governance is actual personality issues.  Still in relation to situations, when there are 
consequences for the contravention of controls, the issue of deterrence may influence the 
level of compliance with the control measures.
300
  However, one would be minded to argue 
that it is more effective to manage personality risks actively than to rely on the prospect of 
deterrence since that factor in itself would also be dependent on personality issues.
301
  For 
instance, as regards the issue of compliance with established rules, it is acknowledged that 
rules may not always be obeyed and the personality of the person in question plays an 
important role in determining the probability of a rule being obeyed.
302
  Again, where the 
gains of contravening controls outweigh the consequences of doing so from the perspective 
of the contravener, then the issue of deterrence becomes meaningless if the contravener is a 
person who is focused on the gains.
303
   
In determining the gains of contravention, a contravener may also consider the risk of being 
caught, and the lower that risk, the lesser the effects of deterrence.  Also, the gains of 
contravention might be viewed in relation to the value acquired or in terms of the likelihood 
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of getting caught.  For instance, if a person decides to commit fraud, the reasons why the 
consequences for the offence might not act as deterrence might lie in the fact that he/she 
expects to gain one million pounds and that supersedes any consequences; or he/she has 
considered that the risk of getting caught is so low that any amount of money gained as a 
result of the fraudulent activity would be worthwhile as there is a higher likelihood that the 
consequences of being caught would not even come into question.  It may actually be 
profitable in certain cases to circumvent a control measure because of the value of the gains.  
However, the issue is that there are personalities who are more likely to do so than others, 
irrespective of any gains or the value of the gains.
304
 Even in the case that the consequences 
actually prove more detrimental than any possible gains, if a person is focused on the gains 
and not the consequences, it means that the gains would be the driving force behind the 
decision to contravene the control measure, and the deterrence factor of the consequences 
loses significance.  Again, there may be persons who would focus more on the gains and 
others who would focus more on the consequences, and in the latter case the issue of 
deterrence becomes meaningful.
305
    
Consequences for contravening controls could come in the form of financial detriment or 
physical detriment.  Some persons would contravene controls simply as a result of their 
personality, irrespective of the losses which might arise as a result of the contravention.
306
  
This would be one of the reasons why there are law breakers in prisons for offences which 
have long been spelt out in regulations with dire consequences.  If deterrence was a concept 
that could have the same effect on every kind of individual, then laws for offences which 
have presumably appropriate detrimental consequences would never be contravened.  Even if 
the impact of deterrence is dependent on the severity or nature of consequences, then it still 
means that different kinds of individuals would respond to the issue of deterrence in different 
ways.  This is because there will be different perceptions of consequences, so for instance, a 
detriment which appears severe to one person may not do so to another.  There is also the 
issue of stigma which may be attached to being found guilty of offences and might act as 
deterrent, but again, there will be different perceptions of its detrimental value and impact 
depending on the personality of the individual.  Therefore, as the issue of deterrence is to an 
extent dependent on personality, then it is also a risk to rely on deterrence as a means of 
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managing behavioural risks, without considering personality issues.  In effect, internal control 
processes and the consequences of contravening them which actually form part of the control 
process are made less effective without the appropriate management of personality risks.   
The Turnbull Guidance indicates that corporate risks including business, operational, 
financial and compliance risks.
307
 Behavioural risk was highlighted implicitly with the 
indication that it may not be absolutely eliminated under the guidance, and internal control 
measures could reduce it.  It is perplexing that the Turnbull Guidance simply refers to a 
reduction of the possibility of behavioural risks when it should be aiming to create a situation 
in which these risks are managed effectively.  This is because if a reduction results in 
effective risk management, then that would suffice, but a reduction in the occurrence of a 
phenomenon may not equate to an effective result in relation to the problem as a whole.  
Internal control measures can only begin to manage behavioural risk effectively if those 
measures approach the problem in an appropriate manner, by identifying, assessing and 
managing the issues which create the risk in the first place.  An issue which is not highlighted 
and provided for in a code or guidance, or other reference material for company directors 
stands minimal chances of being addressed adequately as there might be no clear standards to 
follow.   
As is evidenced from the discussions above, corporate governance mechanisms have not 
provided adequately for the identification and management of personality risks, and in turn 
behavioural risks.  It may have been an oversight over the years, due to the fact that 
behavioural issues have only become increasingly focused upon with the issue of recurring 
corporate failures attributable to inappropriate behaviour as indicated by the reports of 
investigations into failures which will be discussed in chapter four.  It may also be the case 
that sufficient evidence was not historically available to establish a linkage between 
personality and behaviour in corporate governance.  Again, personality might have been 
viewed as an abstract and qualitative issue, for which definitive control mechanisms might 
prove challenging.  Personality risks might also have been viewed as insignificant in relation 
to other risks, especially in the light of internal control processes and other risk management 
systems, causing it to escape being framed as a distinct risk issue in relation to behaviour.  
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Nevertheless, as made evident from psychological literature, personality dimensions can be 
identified, and so any associated risks can also be identified and managed.
308
    
The approach that is adopted in the management of behavioural risk is an issue as much as 
the management of the risk itself.  For instance, the adoption of a voluntary mechanism in the 
management of risks as against the establishment of a mandatory process is likely to impact 
on the overall effectiveness of the risk management process.
309
  Internal control mechanisms 
and other corporate risk management processes will be ineffective if they fail to identify and 
manage risks which have the potential to impact adversely on corporate objectives.  
Corporate failures are certainly not in the corporate plan of companies as objectives, and 
usually occur when corporate objectives are truncated.  In relation to effectiveness, the COSO 
framework in analysing criteria for evaluating the effectiveness of an enterprise risk 
management framework highlighted eight elements which should be used as parameters for 
judgment as to effectiveness.  The framework states as follows: “determining whether an 
entity’s enterprise risk management is “effective” is a judgment resulting from an assessment 
of whether the eight components are present and functioning effectively…for the components 
to be present and functioning properly, there can be no material weaknesses…”310  These 
eight elements are internal environment, objective setting, event identification, risk 
assessment, risk response, control activities, information and communication, and 
monitoring.
311
  Therefore, in relation to effective risk management, an issue such as the 
identification of risk categories is central to the effectiveness of the entire regime.  In the 
event that significant risk issues are omitted, ignored or unidentified, it is then arguable that 
material weaknesses exist in the components of the risk management process and render the 
entire process ineffective.  This appears to be the case in respect of the treatment of 
personality risks in corporate governance.  The absence of a framework for identifying and 
managing personality risks effectively in corporate governance is a significant risk to the 
entire governance process.  This becomes even more important at a time when many boards 
are looking to develop new approaches to managing and monitoring their risks, focusing in 
particular on areas of change.
312
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Interestingly, in one of the reports issued after the recent financial crisis, it was stated that the 
Turnbull Guidance does not provide a helpful approach to the mechanics of creating an 
effective and lasting risk management and assurance framework over the long term.
313
  The 
report highlights that some of the problems of risk management which are not adequately 
addressed by guidance such as Turnbull include the fact that risks are frequently not linked to 
strategy and that risk definitions are often poorly expressed.
314
  This is true because as noted 
in section 3.3, risk must necessarily be identified appropriately if it is to be managed 
effectively.  Defining risk issues with clarity forms part of an adequate and effective 
identification process.  In cases where risk issues are not identified effectively, there will be a 
negative impact on the entire risk management process.  It becomes even worse for risk 
management outcomes if risk issues are not conceived of and identified at all, as is seemingly 
the case with personality risks.  Also, another reason for this remark might be the fact that 
behavioural issues were at the forefront of the financial crisis, and the Turnbull Guidance has 
not adequately addressed the risks associated with behaviour.  
  
The Turnbull Guidance provides in para 15 that the board of directors is responsible for the 
company’s system of internal control.315  It has also been asserted that the whole area of 
contemporary corporate governance hinges on the complexity of risk and understanding of 
risk by the board of directors.
316
  The UK Corporate Governance Code has articulated an 
increasingly focused role for the board in relation to risk and risk management by stating that 
“The Board is responsible for determining the nature and extent of the significant risks it is 
willing to take in achieving its strategic objectives. The board should maintain sound risk 
management and internal control systems.”317  This means that boards of directors bear the 
primary responsibility for corporate risk management.  The Financial Reporting Council 
(FRC) in 2011 sought to decipher how boards were engaging with their responsibilities in 
relation to risk assessments, management and reporting in line with the provisions of the new 
code and held a series of meetings with participants from major listed companies including 
chairmen, executive and non-executive directors, and heads of risk and internal audit, as well 
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as selected investors and advisers.
318
  The report on the discussions highlights that one of the 
conclusions drawn was that the Turnbull Guidance was still broadly fit for purpose, but that a 
limited review would take place during 2012 to take cognisance of the role of the board as 
articulated in the UK Corporate Governance Code.  The summary of the findings also 
highlights a number of issues relevant to this thesis, and these are discussed below.   
 
Firstly, it is stated that boards needed to focus particularly on those risks which are capable of 
undermining the strategy or long-term viability of the company or damaging its reputation.
319
  
Personality risks are such that they may impact on all the actions and decisions emanating 
from company directors and therefore have potentially grave implications for the 
development of strategy which would ensure long-term viability of the company as well as its 
success.  Secondly, the summary also states that a focus only on “net risk” could be 
dangerous and that it was essential that boards had a view on the company’s potential 
exposure to risks.  Boards needed a view of the combination of risks (“gross risk”) before the 
application of risk mitigation policies in order to understand the effectiveness of those 
policies.
320
  Personality risks can be classed as elements which contribute to gross risks to the 
extent that they potentially impact on every other risk management and mitigation policy.  
For example, in a situation where the internal control processes provide for the approval of a 
transaction by two directors of the company with aim of ensuring that one is a check on the 
other, that concept in itself is risk managing the situation only to the extent that both directors 
do not connive to circumvent the process.  If one director is faithful to the controls, then the 
risk management procedure is effective.  But, if not, then it becomes ineffective.  Therefore, 
in the consideration of the overall effectiveness of the risk management process, issues such 
as personality risks which could include the potential capability of the company directors and 
the likelihood of their being the kinds of persons who might connive to circumvent the 
process should also be taken into account when considering the effectiveness of the entire 
process.  If those factors are considered, perhaps additional or different risk mitigating 
processes would then be viewed as more effective and necessary.   
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Considering companies’ approaches to risk, the FRC report notes that non-financial 
companies were having greater challenges in identifying and mitigating risks.
321
  No 
particular reason was stated for this situation, but it can be argued that one reason may be that 
companies in the financial sector in the UK are regulated more intensely, and particularly 
have a more articulated process for risk management which includes the management of 
personality risks in the form of the FSA’s Approved Persons Regime.322  Therefore, it may be 
the case that the corporate officers in financial companies are better positioned to manage 
risks.  Again, differences in risk management approaches may originate from the nature of 
goods and services provided by different kinds of companies, because for instance, a 
manufacturing company may be exposed to different types of corporate risks from those 
encountered by a financial investment company.   
 
On the nature of risk, the FRC report highlights that participants discussed different 
categories of risks, grouping them predominantly under strategic and operational risks.
323
  
Personality risk was not specifically referred to.  This indicates that it was not highlighted by 
the participants as a risk category.  It means that personality risk was not viewed as a source 
of concern to the participants because the reason for convening the meetings was to discuss 
how boards were engaging with risk management.  Again, this illustrates the fact that 
personality risks are still not viewed as a distinct and significant risk category, and 
considering its impact on corporate governance, it should be so categorised to enable it to be 
dealt with effectively.
324
  It is interesting to note that the FRC report states that reputational 
risk was not considered as a separate risk category by the participants, but was instead 
considered as a consequence of the failure to manage other risks successfully.
325
  Likewise, 
personality risks underlie the management of all other risks, and failure to identify personality 
risks results in a situation where all other risks are not identified and managed sufficiently.  
This would be the case in corporate governance failures where internal controls were in 
existence but failures still occurred because the personality of company directors and the 
potential risks they bear was not identified and managed appropriately.  Therefore, all other 
risk management processes stand the chance of failing on account of personality risks.   
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In relation to risk and control culture, the FRC report states that participants agreed that it 
was important to embed the right culture across the company alongside any improvements in 
techniques and processes.
326
  They noted that good culture resulted in better judgment which 
reduces the reliance on processes.
327
  It is interesting to note the use of the word “culture” 
here, because culture is a phenomenon which also hinges on personality.
328
  So, in a way, 
there is recognition of the fact that having the appropriate personality dimension is vital in 
corporate risk management and is a factor in the effective and efficient functioning of 
processes.  The FRC report also noted that it was essential that boards led by example and set 
the right tone as a means of influencing the behaviour of management and staff.  This 
requires positive leadership from the chairman and chief executive in particular.
329
   This is 
an indication that ensuring that the board consists of appropriate personalities would have a 
trickle-down effect on risk and control culture across the company, because the behaviour of 
board members would influence the behaviour of other officers.  The FRC report states that it 
was recognised that risk and control culture was one of the issues on which it was most 
difficult for boards to obtain assurance.
330
  One reason for this may be the lack of an 
appropriate and effective approach towards issues such as personality risks and its impact on 
behaviour which is invariably a contributory element towards the outcome of risk and control 
culture across the company.   
 
Culture has been stated to be a vital aid to strategic risk management and the personality of 
company directors can create as well as shape organisational culture.
331
  Aspects of culture 
that can particularly work against effective risk management would include unethical 
behaviour, propensity for excessive risk-taking and persecution of whistle-blowers.
332
  In 
relation to public reporting, the participants who were investors noted that they relied more 
the assurances they received in their engagements with the board and management than on 
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statements in the annual reports and this was particularly the case when it came to assessing 
the quality of risk management and internal control, for which their main source of assurance 
was the quality of the board.
333
   Again, the use of the word “quality” here would impliedly 
connote a board with appropriate personalities, as well as the relevant skills, experience and 
knowledge.  Having appropriate personalities would contribute to the quality of the board 
because the board makes decisions and takes actions in supposed furtherance of corporate 
objectives, and as would be illustrated later in the thesis, personality impacts on behaviour 
and behaviour is the bedrock of decisions and actions.   
 
In relation to the Turnbull Guidance, the FRC report highlights that the majority of 
participants were in favour of reviewing at least parts of the guidance for reasons which 
include that it did not adequately address cultural and behavioural issues.
334
  This is also a 
clear indication that behavioural issues are indeed increasingly viewed as problematic in 
corporate governance.  The salient point however is that despite the attempts made at 
addressing the problem, which will be considered in chapter four, no definitive mechanism 
has been deployed which seeks to identify and articulate all of the issues surrounding 
behaviour, and there has been no clear elucidation of the relationship between personality and 
behaviour, and the related mechanisms of managing the risks associated with personality and 
behavioural issues.  As was discussed earlier, a limited review of the Turnbull Guidance is 
planned by the FRC for later in 2012; however, the extent and details of that review are as yet 
unknown.  Even though it has been acknowledged that the guidance is deficient in relation to 
how it addresses behavioural risks, it is still unknown whether personality risks and their 
relationship to behaviour is considered an issue in relation to behavioural risks as that much 
was not stated in the FRC report.
335
    
 
3.5 THE UK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE 
 
The UK Corporate Governance Code states in its preface that the code is only a guide in 
general terms as to principles, structures and processes, and cannot guarantee effective board 
behaviour.
336
  The code deals primarily with processes, but should also deal with personality 
as that significantly impacts on processes.  The code does not contain any provisions aimed at 
                                                          
333
 See the FRC Report, (note 318) 13. 
334
 See the FRC Report, (note 318) 15. 
335
 Ibid.  
336
 See the UK Corporate Governance Code 2010, p 2. 
79 
 
identifying and managing personality risks.  Another salient factor is the “comply or explain” 
nature of the UK Corporate Governance Code.  A crucial effect of this mechanism is that a 
company is not always obliged to follow the provisions of the code.  A company can decide 
that non-compliance with the code would not negate the principles behind the code 
provisions.  The company is then required to explain the reason for its non-compliance to its 
shareholders, and if the shareholders are satisfied with this explanation, the code provision is 
ignored and can be invariably be construed as “non-existent”.  There is, therefore, a 
considerable risk in the fact that the provisions of the code relating to internal control and risk 
management may not be observed.  By way of example, in the UK, the Listing Rules only 
require that companies disclose whether they have complied with the provisions of the UK 
Corporate Governance Code, and if not, to disclose the reasons for not doing so.
337
 
 
Recently, in a review of corporate governance prepared by Grant Thornton, it was stated that 
only 50% of all FTSE 350 companies complied with the UK Corporate Governance Code in 
full, with companies opting for explanations in one or two areas over full compliance and 
only seven FTSE 350 businesses complying fully with the UK Corporate Governance Code 
throughout the ten years of the review.
338
  The Grant Thornton review indicates a fluctuation 
in the pattern of compliance over the years, and particularly notes that board structure and 
composition remains the most common reason for non-compliance with code provisions.
339
  
The inherent possibility of acceptable non-compliance with the provisions of the code, even a 
single one, creates an atmosphere of varying standards.   The issue of compliance is critical, 
especially as there are already doubts regarding the effectiveness of corporate governance 
codes because its flexibility allows a considerable room for the application of discretion and 
enforcement/monitoring of compliance with governance codes is informally left to company 
shareholders and market participants
340
   
 
It has been stated that the efficacy of the “comply or explain” regime is doubtful to the extent 
that it requires the participation of a sophisticated and discerning set of participants, company 
directors and company shareholders and that is not realistically the case; and given that the 
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companies in question have a high societal impact, it may be that the “comply or explain” 
approach is no longer sufficient to ensure compliance.
341
  The fact that there is a level of 
discretion built into the compliance regime of the code is a good reason why it is important to 
manage personality risks adequately.  This is because that would in turn help manage all the 
other risks to the extent that appropriate personalities would make better decisions and take 
better actions in the corporate governance process.  Appropriate personalities are also likely 
to abide and be guided by the spirit of code principles even in cases where enforcement 
mechanisms for code provisions are ineffective.  It is clear from the above analysis that 
personality risk is not adequately provided for in corporate governance codes and guidance.  
Again, the voluntary and discretionary nature of corporate governance codes and guidance 
casts a shadow of doubt on the issue of whether those are the best vehicles to utilize in the 
development of mechanisms to manage all the aspects of personality risks, considering its 
significance and impact on the management of all other risks in corporate governance.
342
 
 
3.6 UK COMPANIES ACT 
 
UK company law does not provide explicitly for personality risk management mechanisms.  
UK Companies Act 2006 does not contain specific provisions on internal control and risk 
management; and has no provisions which deal with the identification and management of 
personality risks; even though there are several provisions in the Act which can be said to 
serve as behavioural risk management processes.
343
  Directors’ duties aim at specifying the 
standards of behaviour expected from company directors in the performance of their task.  
However, the specification of these duties does not in itself ensure compliance with them 
except to the extent that contravention of the duties may attract certain consequences.  If such 
consequences serve as a deterrent to non-compliance, then behavioural risks as they relate to 
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the company directors are managed to that extent.  But, if the personalities of company 
directors are such that the issue of consequences does not serve as deterrence to them, then 
behavioural risks are not effectively managed by the specification of directors’ duties, and 
personality risks are not specifically managed by the same provisions either.  Specifying the 
duties of directors statutorily can be said to contribute in a way towards identifying 
personality risks as the provisions aim to articulate standards of behaviour expected of 
directors, which invariably provides an indication as to the kinds of personalities considered 
appropriate for directorship roles.  This is because behavioural tendencies are expected to 
emanate from personality dimensions.  However, in relation to effectively identifying 
personality dimensions and managing the associated risks in corporate governance, neither 
the provisions on directors’ duties nor any other company law provisions achieve that aim.   
 
The aim of company law in a contractual theory of corporations as exists in the UK is to 
provide minimum standards of regulation in support of corporate existence.
344
  It might be the 
case that company law provisions are solely aimed at providing the barest minimum 
standards in relation to issues such as behavioural risks.  However, considering the impact of 
behavioural risks and in turn personality risks on corporate existence, it becomes important to 
bring the issue under the purview of corporate law if that is a means of ensuring that the issue 
gets the necessary attention.  Corporate law could provide an effective means of dealing with 
this problem as there are usually prescribed consequences for contravention of the provisions 
of corporate law.  Company directors’ disqualification processes also serve as risk 
management mechanisms to the extent that they prevent persons adjudged as inappropriate 
from subsequently getting involved in corporate governance.  However, the provisions of the 
Company Directors’ Disqualification Act 1986 take effect after the director has committed 
acts which are deemed inappropriate.
345
  Therefore, the provisions do not operate in a manner 
which manages personality and behavioural risks by preventing the commission of 
inappropriate actions, save in so far as the consequences of disqualification act as a deterrent.  
Again, the provisions do not address in a direct manner the issue of personality risk 
management in corporate governance because there is no process which enables the 
identification of personality dimensions and the particular risks associated with them.      
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3.7 OTHER REGULATIONS/CORPORATE MECHANISMS 
 
In the UK, the financial sector is regulated by the Financial Services Authority (FSA),
346
 and 
it has a personality risk mitigation process in the form of the Approved Persons Regime. This 
is designed to ensure that persons who hold significant positions in financial companies are 
“fit and proper” persons according to FSA standards.347  However, even the FSA regime does 
not explicitly identify personality assessment as a vital issue in determining fitness and 
propriety.
348
  The FSA regime does not also establish a clear relationship between personality 
and behaviour.  Recommendations in Basel II and Basel III are also aimed at managing 
financial and operational risk in banking institutions, but again, there is no explicit 
articulation of personality risk or processes aimed at mitigating it appropriately.
349
  The 
Financial Services Authority Disclosure and Transparency Rules have provisions aimed at 
risk management.  Section 7.1 provides that an issuer must ensure that as a minimum the 
relevant body must monitor the financial reports, processes and the effectiveness of the 
issuer’s internal control, internal audit and risk management systems.  Section 7.2 provides 
that an issuer should produce a corporate governance statement which contains a reference to 
the corporate governance code to which the issuer is subject.  There are similar requirements 
under EU Law.
350
  These provisions are hinged on the application of the risk management 
processes embedded in corporate governance codes and guidance, and so do not explicitly 
create avenues for managing personality risks appropriately.   
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Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) is another mechanism which is helpful in the 
management of corporate risks because it is a framework aimed at elevating risk issues to a 
strategic level and enabling an enterprise wide approach towards risk management.
351
  It goes 
without saying that ERM is essential and would serve its purpose as long as risk issues are 
identified and appropriate measures are designed to manage the risks.  It is one thing to 
allocate the responsibility of risk management to specific persons or cadres in an 
organisation, but it is quite another to identify potential risks and develop structures and 
procedures for their effective management.
352
  ERM would be useful in the management of 
personality risks in corporate governance if these risks have already been identified and 
definitive processes have been instituted to manage them.     
 
An analysis of the inadequacies in corporate governance mechanisms in identifying and 
managing personality risks serves to strengthen the argument that behavioural risks have not 
been managed sufficiently by existing corporate governance mechanisms. For risks to be 
managed effectively, every element that significantly contributes to the origin and existence 
of those risks should be identified and managed accordingly.  This issue of unmanaged or 
ineffectively managed behavioural risks becomes significant when attempting to decipher the 
reasons for corporate failures which appear to be attributable to behavioural issues.  If 
effective corporate risk management is a process which is aimed at managing the risks which 
could impact on the attainment of corporate goals and objectives, in a manner which ensures 
that these risks do not truncate the achievement of these goals and objectives, then 
behavioural risks must be managed effectively if effective overall risk management is to be 
achieved.   
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3.8 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has provided the meaning of risk, indicating its context in the thesis and has also 
explained what risk management connotes, as well as highlighting the processes involved in 
effective risk management. The chapter has also discussed risk management in corporate 
governance, highlighting the origin and development of risk management processes in 
relation to corporate governance mechanisms in the UK.  An evaluation of the extent to 
which risk management mechanisms in corporate governance provide for the management of 
behavioural and personality risks was also undertaken.  This chapter illustrates that 
behavioural risks are not managed effectively under corporate governance mechanisms in the 
UK, because the components which impact on behaviour, particularly personality, and its risk 
elements has not been effectively identified and managed.  More importantly, the chapter has 
argued that personality risk as a distinct risk issue has not been effectively provided for in 
corporate governance, and this can undermine the measures established to manage all other 
corporate risks.  Subsequent chapters of the thesis analyse the significant linkage between 
personality and behaviour, and illustrate that the behaviour of company directors has been a 
contributory element in corporate failures, a fact which renders personality risk a pertinent 
issue in corporate governance.  An understanding of what risk and risk management entail, as 
well as a consideration of the fact that personality risk has been unmanaged by corporate 
governance mechanisms, provides the foundation for an appreciation of the behavioural 
issues which contributed to the corporate failures discussed in the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
IMPACT OF BEHAVIOURAL RISKS IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Having discussed the import of risk and risk management, and established that existing 
corporate governance mechanisms do not provide for the identification and management of 
personality risk as it relates to behavioural risk, the aim of this chapter is to assess the 
significance and impact of behavioural risk in corporate governance from a practical 
perspective.  The starting point is an analysis of the manner in which behaviour has been 
raised as an issue in the investigations and reports following major corporate failures.  This is 
to illustrate how pertinent the issue has become and to highlight the fact that behavioural 
issues have been viewed as a problem in corporate governance.  Then, there is an analysis of 
the behaviour of company directors in some examples of major corporate failures.  The 
inappropriate decisions and actions undertaken by these directors establish a linkage between 
behaviour and corporate failures.  This chapter also discusses the perceptions of the judiciary 
and society in relation to the behaviour of company directors as evidenced in some of the 
court cases following some corporate failures.  The last section discusses the issue of 
behavioural risks in corporate governance, and reiterates the impact of personality on 
behaviour.      
4.2 INVESTIGATIONS AND REPORTS  
The practical implications of the issue of behavioural risks in corporate governance can be 
illustrated by the fact that the behaviour of company directors has been raised as an issue in a 
lot of corporate failures.
353
  The investigations and reports following major corporate failures 
have re-iterated that behavioural issues were viewed as a contributory problem in the 
majority of the cases and in some cases led directly to the failure of the companies.
354
  There 
has therefore been a heightened emphasis on the behaviour of company directors.  Beginning 
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with the most recent cases of corporate failures, some of these investigations and reports 
which are publicly available and relate to major corporate failures are as follows:    
 
4.2.1 The UK Walker Review 
In February 2009, in response to the financial crisis and its attendant losses, the UK 
government commissioned Sir David Walker to undertake a review of corporate governance 
practices in UK banks and other financial institutions.  The final report of the review made 
recommendations relating to the role and constitution of the board, the role of shareholders, 
the governance of risk and remuneration amongst other issues.
355
  Of particular interest are 
the recommendations made in relation to the behaviour of board members.   In the section on 
psychological and behavioural elements in board performance outlined in Annex 4, Walker 
states clearly that boards and board behaviour cannot be regulated or managed through 
organisational structures and controls alone.
356
  Walker goes on to identify behavioural 
capabilities and intrinsic traits (personality dimensions) which are required for effective 
management.
357
  There is a recommendation that the board of directors should be 
independently assessed at appointment and annually, and a full psychological assessment 
should include assessment of behaviour, experience, knowledge, motivation and intellect.
358
  
Walker states that the assessment report should be used not only as a decision making tool for 
selection of directors but also as a key to avenues of reducing the risks inherent in the board 
of directors as a group.
359
  Particularly, Walker indicates that assessments are a means of 
identifying the current and future potential capability of board directors and corporate 
leaders.
360
    
It is evident from the recommendations made in Walker that managing the behaviour of 
company directors is an essential component of effective corporate governance.  There is also 
an acknowledgement of the fact that behaviour cannot be regulated by organisational 
structures alone,
361
 therefore, the mere presence of established rules, regulations and 
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principles would not suffice to generate the requisite behaviour which engenders effective 
corporate governance.  Walker recommended assessments to be made as regards behaviour, 
and that would make sense in so far as the assessments target all the aspects that contribute 
towards behaviour.  It is also remarkable that the review highlighted the fact that reports of 
board assessment are an essential tool for selection purposes and risk management purposes.  
This in itself is an indication of the perception of Walker that there are behavioural 
tendencies which would engender effective corporate governance.  Hence the 
recommendation for the use of board behavioural assessment for selection purposes, although 
ideally, the assessment should cut across several indicators including behavioural elements.    
The salient issue to be noted here is that the behaviour of company directors has been 
highlighted as an area of concern in the light of corporate failures.
362
  Investigations such as 
the Walker review would usually involve consultations with the stakeholders in the corporate 
arena in order to gain their views on the issues which are relevant and worthy of being 
investigated and reviewed.  The fact that behavioural issues were highlighted in the Walker 
review is a clear indication of how important the subject has become in relation to effective 
corporate governance and prevention of corporate failures.  One major aim of corporate 
governance is the creation of effective systems and processes for the governance of 
companies in order to ensure the accomplishment of corporate goals.
363
  In Walker, under the 
section dealing with the context for the review, it is stated as follows: 
There were material deficiencies in both financial regulation of individual 
institutions and in the prudential oversight of the stability of the financial 
system overall. Substantial public policy initiative is underway domestically 
in the UK, the US, both nationally and regionally in Europe, and globally, 
under the Financial Stability Board (FSB), to address these gaps. But there 
were also material deficiencies in the effectiveness of boards in the well-
publicised cases of some financial institutions and, albeit less directly, 
inadequate capability within major fund managers to protect the interests 
of those for whom they were acting. Inadequate oversight by the boards and 
shareholders of the executive management of these BOFI entities and their 
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collective failure to understand the new complex products resulted in 
spiralling enterprise-wide risk.
364
  
 
This statement underscores the role played by board behaviour in the crisis and highlights 
that the external regulatory shortcomings were only one side of the entire story of 
contributory elements to the failures.  Board behaviour is essentially the behaviour of board 
members.  It means that behavioural shortcomings on the part of directors contributed to the 
crisis.  With these levels of conclusions regarding the causes of the recent corporate failures 
in financial institutions around the world, it is no surprise that Walker made 
recommendations as to behavioural elements, supposedly with a view to improving the 
behaviour of directors.  The remit of Walker was to consider companies in the financial 
services sector; nevertheless, the recommendations in relation to behavioural issues are 
indeed applicable to boards of directors of companies generally, because directors are 
expected to exert their behaviour in the management of companies and behavioural 
assessments would be relevant in any case.
365
   
Regardless of the extent to which behavioural issues contributed to the failures, the 
significant point is that they did.  Again, even if there was a way of quantifying exactly how 
much each of the contributory elements were responsible for the failures, and behavioural 
issues were found to be less than the prudential regulatory elements,
366
 the fact would remain 
that some of the aspects of the corporate failures might have been prevented if there were no 
behavioural shortcomings.  It means, therefore, that the part of the failures attributable to 
behavioural issues might invariably be non-existent.  In the same vein, the negative impact of 
corporate failure would be expected to have been lessened in similar measure, a situation 
which would be more favourable for shareholders and the society as a whole.  This is 
because, as highlighted by Walker, the financial crisis was exacerbated by deficiencies in the 
effectiveness of the boards.
367
  Had the boards been more effective, some of the issues which 
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led to the financial crisis, and its impact, might have been averted.  For instance, in the case 
that systemic risks are needed to be managed in accordance with specific prudential 
regulations which were ultimately found to be inadequate, a company might become 
bankrupt and corporate failure could occur as a result of this.
368
  However, if the board of 
directors also failed to report the financial exposures of the company on a timely basis as 
required of them, it can only worsen a situation which might have been remedied to some 
extent had a timely report been made.  If a timely report is made, the chances are higher that a 
solution could be adopted which ameliorates the inadequacy of the prudential regulations.  
Behavioural issues, therefore, have the potential to adversely impact on the overall 
effectiveness of a corporate governance regime.  This is an important reason why there needs 
to be a focus on reviewing issues relating to behavioural shortcomings on the part of 
company directors.  Effective corporate governance can be engendered by the effective 
behaviour of the persons involved in corporate governance.   
Investigations such as Walker highlight the areas in which change is needed in the light of 
events that have occurred surrounding corporate failures.  Behavioural shortcomings have 
been identified as an area in which reforms are needed,
369
 and so rightfully there should be 
efforts made in response to this identification.  Recommendations in Walker regarding 
requisite behaviour for company directors are certainly a response to the realisation of the 
necessity to have persons who would behave “appropriately”, in the light of the impact which 
behaving “inappropriately” has had on companies.  The model proposed in this thesis is a 
similar response, although on a larger scale as it deals with a wider sphere of companies, and 
utilises different approaches.  
4.2.2 The UK Turner Review  
The Turner Review which was published in March, 2009 reflected on the financial and 
regulatory shortcomings which were identified as existing during the recent global financial 
crisis.
370
  The Review highlighted the specific details of what went wrong, the developments 
in the UK as regards financial regulation, fundamental theoretical issues surrounding the 
failures, and possible solutions to the problems including supervisory improvements for the 
FSA in the UK.  Of particular interest here, and most relevant to the question of behavioural 
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shortcomings on the part of company directors, is the issue of the ineffectiveness of market 
discipline.  In Section 1.4,
371
 the Review states as follows: 
The analysis of the causes of the financial crisis implies the need for major 
changes in our approach to capital, liquidity, accounting, and institutional 
coverage, which are addressed in Chapter 2.  But the crisis also raises 
important questions about the intellectual assumptions on which previous 
regulatory approaches have largely been built.  At the core of these 
assumptions has been the theory of efficient and rational markets.  Five 
propositions with implications for regulatory approach have followed: 
 
(i) Market prices are good indicators of rationally evaluated economic 
value. 
(ii) The development of securitised credit, since based on the creation of 
new and more liquid markets has improved both allocative efficiency and 
financial stability. 
(iii) The risk characteristics of financial markets can be inferred from 
mathematical analysis, delivering robust quantitative measures of trading 
risk. 
(iv) Market discipline can be used as an effective tool in constraining 
harmful risk taking. 
(v) Financial innovation can be assumed to be beneficial since market 
competition would winnow out any innovations which did not deliver value 
added. 
 
Each of these assumptions is now subject to extensive challenge on both 
theoretical and empirical grounds, with potential implications for the 
appropriate design of regulation and for the role of regulatory authorities.   
 
  
The Review, therefore, points out that amongst the other issues and challenges posed to 
efficient market theory, there are implications for the reliance on market discipline rather than 
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regulatory action in relation to constraining corporate risks.
372
   It had been assumed that 
market forces were sufficient to constrain the behaviour of company directors, but the events 
of recent years have illustrated the inadequacy of market forces in this regard.
373
  The Review 
also states that increased disclosures of corporate activities have been propagated as a key 
response and in some cases as the single most important response to the crisis.
374
  However, 
increased disclosure requirements may not adequately solve the problems which led to the 
recent financial crisis, and other corporate failures.  For instance, in a situation where the 
market is supposed to rely on information such as the annual reports provided by company 
directors to determine the relative financial position of a company, and the information 
provided is false, the utility of the disclosure requirement is undermined.  How then can the 
market for corporate control address any wrongs?   Shareholders can only begin to take 
definitive remedial action if it becomes evident that the information provided is false.  If the 
information provided is of a nature which occasions a spiral of decisions and actions within 
the market whether positively or negatively, the realisation that it is false may prove too late 
in emerging.    
Again, if company directors are persons accustomed to providing false information, they 
could still meet the requirements of adequate and increased disclosure.  The problem would 
then be the falsehood of the information disclosed, and it is at this stage that the issue of 
behavioural deficiencies arise.  Increased disclosure would be effective in the sense of 
triggering the operations of a market in the direction which the information dictates only to 
the extent that the information provided is valid.  So, considering that it is essential for the 
market to respond to valid information, this means that it is clearly more important to ensure 
that the information provided is true than it is to ensure that the information is actually 
provided.
375
  In cases where there are regulatory requirements or established principles 
stating that information provided to the market must be true, then it also becomes more 
essential to ensure that company directors are indeed able to abide by these regulations and 
principles.  It is in keeping with issues such as ensuring that true information is provided to 
the market that it becomes essential to recruit directors who are capable and accustomed to 
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providing information which is true.
376
   Any situation other than this is a risk to the corporate 
governance process, and should rightfully be mitigated if corporate success is desired.
377
  
Market forces may in certain cases influence company directors in pursuing a particular 
course of action, but it is also possible that market forces will not be able to determine the 
actual behaviour of these directors in all cases, especially in relation to the everyday 
governance of companies and the decisions which culminate in the information available to 
the market.  Therefore, the impact of the market for corporate control on the behaviour of 
directors is diminished to the extent that it relies on adequate and true information provided 
by the same directors whose actual ability to provide adequate and true information it cannot 
guarantee.   
The Review highlights that evidence from past years illustrates that market forces have 
actually contributed negatively to failures.
378
  This holds true particularly in relation to the 
quest for profit maximisation in which company directors may be keen to take excessive risks 
in order to increase profits for shareholders.
379
  In the case that these directors are, for 
instance, persons who are inclined to disobey established regulations and principles which go 
against excessive risk taking, the market pressure to maximise profits would invariably aid 
the propensity and probability on the part of the directors to embark on excessive risk 
taking.
380
  If, on the other hand, the directors are persons who are not inclined towards 
disobeying regulations and principles, there is a decreased risk that market pressures would 
propel them towards taking excessive risks.
381
  The following example best explains the 
situation.  If excessive risk taking is understandably viewed as morally wrong because it is 
likely to result in corporate failure, and is viewed as best avoided as a matter of principle, a 
director who adheres to moral inclinations will more likely than not refrain from excessive 
risk taking.  Again, if excessive risk taking is stated clearly in regulatory provisions as an act 
which should be avoided, a director who is dutiful would be accustomed to abiding by 
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regulations as a matter of duty, and would more likely than not avoid excessive risk taking.  
This illustrates the direct impact of behaviour on the actions of company directors and 
highlights the limits of market forces as it relates to their actions. 
The Review also highlights that some of the major decisions taken in companies, RBS in the 
UK for instance, were clearly risky, and even though institutional investors expressed 
concerns regarding the decisions, they were neither able nor willing to force any change in 
direction of the companies.
382
  This indicates that shareholders are not always in a position to 
control or influence the decisions of company directors; or willing to do so, a situation which 
makes it all the more essential to have the most appropriate persons on corporate boards.  
This way, there is a higher expectation that the decisions they make would be appropriate.  
The Review concludes as follows “A reasonable conclusion is that market discipline 
expressed via market prices cannot be expected to play a major role in constraining bank risk 
taking, and that the primary constraint needs to come from regulation and supervision”.383  
Even though the recent financial crisis emerged in banks and financial institutions and 
reviews such as the Turner Review have focused on banks, the fundamental issues 
surrounding these corporate failures and the possible solutions are nevertheless relevant and 
applicable to other companies, particularly public companies which are traded on the stock 
exchange, because these companies attract financial commitment from the public and it is 
essential that they are governed effectively. 
 
Again, the negative effects of the financial crisis have extended to other sectors and society as 
a whole, and so it becomes imperative to develop solutions which can help prevent similar 
crises in companies generally.  In relation to the recent crisis and the ensuing investigations 
and reports, specific solutions in terms of developments in financial regulations might appear 
to be tailored to suit banks and financial institutions, but the behavioural issues highlighted 
and the recommendations made in relation to them would invariably apply to company 
directors generally because the same issues could arise in any company.  For instance, one of 
the issues highlighted was to do with abiding by regulations and principles in general.
384
  The 
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issue of ensuring that directors behave appropriately is certainly one which is essential for 
any kind of company regardless of the sector in which it operates.  The Review has 
highlighted the shortcoming of the market for corporate control, and the analysis above 
illustrates that market discipline does not influence behaviour in all cases.  It is particularly 
important that the market receives adequate information if it is to exercise effective influence 
in corporate dealings.  This is because shareholders can only take useful and effective actions 
in relation to a company if they are abreast of the on-goings in the company.
385
    
 
Part of the aims of the model proposed in this thesis is to provide information to the market 
regarding the potential behaviour of company directors.  The model also provides to the 
market the information regarding the potential of the corporate information provided by the 
directors to be true or false.  This is because, depending on the judgments made as to the 
personality and behaviour of directors, the information they provide to the market would also 
have the potential to be true or false.  This information has the potential to influence the 
responses of the market as regards corporate dealings, and may have an impact on the 
timeliness and extent of market reactions.  For instance, in a case where a company is known 
to have a board of directors who are dutiful and so are likely to abide by regulations,
386
 and 
there is a regulation specifying that all losses incurred by a company must be disclosed to the 
market within a number of days, when this disclosure is made, the market can be more 
confident of a number of issues such as that (i) the said loss has actually occurred (ii) it 
occurred at the time specified (iii) the loss is exactly as disclosed.  Increased confidence in 
the potential accuracy of this information would enable the market to react or respond in a 
better manner in respect of the information disclosed.  The inherent knowledge of the fact 
that the information is more likely to be true than false will assist the market generally in 
terms of swifter and more accurate responses as well as influencing the need and cost of 
verification exercises which might otherwise take place in cases where there is uncertainty 
about the true state of an affair.  Therefore, this is clearly one way in which the model 
proposed in this thesis can help improve the functioning of the market for corporate control 
and perhaps help the mechanism influence the actions of company directors more than it 
ordinarily would. 
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4.2.3  The ICSA Report 
The Institute of Chartered Secretaries and Administrators (ICSA) in June 2009 prepared an 
informative report on boardroom behaviour for submission to the Walker Review.
387
  The 
report states that an emerging view in the light of the recent crisis is that the system for 
governance of companies is not inherently broken, but rather that its effectiveness has been 
undermined by a failure to observe appropriate boardroom behaviours.
388
  In recognition of 
this, the ICSA embarked on an analysis of boardroom behaviour and the ensuing report in its 
executive summary concludes that: 
Appropriate boardroom behaviours are an essential component of best 
practice corporate governance; and that the absence of guidance on 
appropriate boardroom behaviours represents a structural weakness in the 
current system; 
had that guidance been available and, more importantly, observed, some of 
the consequences of the current crisis might have been less severe and that, 
in any case, prevention of a recurrence of the events of the last year is at 
least partly dependent upon guidance on appropriate boardroom 
behaviours being incorporated in the Code; and 
 
better articulation of the business case for best practice corporate 
governance, and more focus on directors’ responsibilities and potential 
liabilities, should incentivise directors to exhibit appropriate boardroom 
behaviours. 
 
The ICSA Report highlights that its consultation process generated certain observations 
regarding the characteristics of best practice boardroom behaviour some of which include a 
clear understanding of the role of the board; appropriate deployment of knowledge, skills, 
experience and judgment; independent thinking; challenge which is constructive, confident, 
principled and proportionate.
389
  The interesting issue here is that the report then goes on to 
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state that the extent to which these ideal boardroom behaviours can be achieved is determined 
by a number of key factors, the first on the list being “the character and personality of the 
directors and the dynamics of their interactions”.390  This indicates that there is a clear 
understanding that appropriate behaviours cannot be achieved by persons who do not possess 
the appropriate character and personality to do so.  A director who is not of a personality that 
is attuned towards abiding by regulations and codes might not take the time required to 
clearly understand his/her role as a company director, much less abide by the specified role.  
The ICSA Report states that it considers that in relation to the recent crisis, responses are 
required at three levels; institutional, organisational and behavioural.
391
  Institutional 
responses relate to whether corporate governance policies and architecture are fit for 
purpose.
392
  Organisational responses relate to company management installing adequate 
systems and processes.
393
  Behavioural responses relate to company directors exhibiting the 
appropriate behaviours.
394
   
The ICSA Report also states that investigations such as the Walker Review are focusing 
hugely on institutional and organisational responses in relation to the crisis, but the ICSA 
report has explored the behaviour of boards beyond the recent financial crisis to the 
behavioural aspects of boards more generally irrespective of sector and economic 
circumstances.
395
  The ICSA Report was subsequently submitted to the Walker Review, so 
this lends credence to the arguments made in the previous section that reviews undertaken in 
the aftermath of the financial crisis are nevertheless relevant to companies generally, and are 
important for the prevention of similar occurrences in the future, irrespective of the sector in 
which the companies operate.  The ICSA Report goes on to recommend that corporate 
governance codes should be amended to incorporate wording or references relating to 
appropriate boardroom behaviour amongst other issues.
396
  The ICSA Report states that the 
recommendations therein fall short of calling for a more formal requirement for boardroom 
behaviours to be prescribed or for oversight functions of regulatory agencies to be 
established.
397
  It had been highlighted that despite the importance of behavioural 
considerations, it is remarkable that there is practically no guidance in the corporate 
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governance codes on this issue.
398
  Also, the ICSA Report indicates that it does not consider 
that formal responses in terms of legislative provisions would be needful and desirable, but 
that it is possible to formulate guidelines on appropriate behaviour for directors.
399
  From the 
foregoing, it can be seen that the ICSA recognises the vital role played by the behaviour of 
directors in corporate governance.  The ICSA Report identifies that behavioural aspects of the 
board of directors is critical to effective corporate governance and is an area which has been 
neglected.
400
  The ICSA Report also highlights that behaviour is largely dependent on 
character and personality, and this would be discussed in greater detail in chapter five.  The 
position of the ICSA as it relates to actions which can be undertaken towards improving the 
behavioural aspects of the board is a soft law approach in terms of providing guidance in the 
corporate governance codes.
401
           
4.2.4 The OECD Report 
In June 2009 the OECD Steering Group on Corporate Governance issued a report on the 
financial crisis.
402
  The OECD Report states that four aspects of corporate governance require 
urgent attention: remuneration and incentive systems; risk management practices; the 
performance of boards and the exercise of shareholder rights.
403
  The OECD Report notes 
that the negative assessments regarding remuneration policies and risk management 
continually point back to the board of directors as being both a cause of the problems as well 
as a potential solution, indeed often the only foreseeable solution in view of the difficulties in 
specifying direct regulation in a lot of situations.
404
  The financial crisis pointed in a large 
number of cases to boards of financial companies that were ineffective and certainly not 
capable of objective and independent judgment as recommended in the OECD Corporate 
Governance Principles.
405
  The OECD Report notes that approaches such as having board 
members who are not available at all times and the presence of independent board members 
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to act as monitors have proven to be ineffective.
406
  In relation to policy issues and proposals, 
the OECD Report states that perhaps the most important policy issue is the normative 
proposal that boards be capable of objective and independent judgment.
407
  The OECD 
Report further notes that in all of this, the real question is how to promote objective and 
independent boards and it is stated that one way of so doing is the enforcement of fiduciary 
duties of directors and the specification of such duties.
408
  The OECD Report also notes, 
however, that fiduciary duties appear to be a blunt instrument in many jurisdictions, one 
reason for that being the existence of some form or another of the business judgment rule in 
many jurisdictions.
409
  It is noted in the OECD Report that the “fit and proper person” test 
applied in the financial industry is usually in relation to basic board behaviour of propriety 
and honesty.  The test has thus encompassed issues of fraud and history of bankruptcy, but, in 
the light of the crisis, such tests should be extended to technical and professional competence, 
especially skills needed for corporate governance generally.
410
  In conclusion, the OECD 
Report states: 
In sum, it appears to be difficult to find a “silver bullet” in the form of 
laws and regulations to improve board behaviour and performance. It is 
simply not possible to regulate for board competence and objectivity. 
Improved enforcement of fiduciary duties and other forms of legal 
liability might help although it is a blunt instrument. Some other options 
might be available in banking but these do assume that the authorities 
possess important information and an ability to act. At the end of the day, it 
is hard to escape the conclusion that the appointment and recall of board 
members might be seriously flawed, raising questions about shareholder 
behaviour.
411
    
 
It is interesting to note that the OECD Report emphasises the ineffectiveness of 
fiduciary duties and other forms of legal liability.  This is true because in the face of 
mechanisms such as this which are already in existence, the financial crisis still 
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occurred and board behaviour is stated as a fundamental cause.
412
  This situation 
certainly strengthens the argument for a focus on the behaviour of board members, 
as this is a factor which contributes to board effectiveness.
413
  If directors are not 
appropriate persons who are capable of exercising objective and independent 
judgment for instance, the presence of principles and regulations may not create the 
effectiveness required in corporate governance.  It is understandable to see the 
OECD Report stating emphatically that it is simply not possible to regulate for board 
competence.  In relation to regulating behaviour, this assertion would assumedly be 
based on reasons such as the freedom of shareholders to appoint directors of their 
choice and the uncertainty as to what contributes to overall board behaviour and 
performance.  It could also include the fact that board members are not usually 
assessed in order to ascertain their behavioural tendencies, the lack of adequate 
knowledge regarding the relationship between personality and competence in 
corporate governance, and most importantly, the fact that regulation is generally not 
an immediate option in corporate governance due to the preference for self-
regulation.  However, the pertinent reason why investigations are undertaken when 
crises like these occur is so that the reasons for their occurrence are identified, and 
also to develop means of preventing similar occurrences in the future.  This 
presupposes that in-depth thought must be given to all possible avenues of 
preventing the situations which led to the crisis, including taking on approaches that 
have never been tried before, as long as there are strong indications to support the 
possibility that the approach is a solution.   
 
The perspective to adopt in the light of the conclusions reached in the OECD Report 
is to evaluate the conditions which create the desired board behaviour and 
performance, and then create a corporate atmosphere which fosters those conditions.  
For instance, there should be an analysis of the factors which result in board 
competence and objectivity, and then efforts should be made to engender those 
factors in company boards.  Promoting board objectivity and independence should 
simply be an exercise in identifying the factors which contribute towards the 
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achievement of these ends, and putting those factors in place.  As behaviour is one 
of the factors which impacts on effectiveness, it is pertinent to explore the factors 
which impact on behaviour.  Then the next step is to decipher which aspects of 
behaviour contribute to appropriateness, since appropriate behaviour impacts more 
positively on effectiveness.  Efforts should then be made to ensure that persons who 
are involved in corporate governance are capable of appropriate behaviour.  It is 
equally important to ensure that the approaches adopted in the pursuit of these 
objectives are such that they can deliver the desired ends.  Therefore, changes in 
policy direction and previously accepted paradigms are consequential developments 
which should be acceptable in cases such as this in which problems are identified 
and solutions are desired.  So, contrary to the indications in the conclusion of the 
OECD Report, it is actually possible to regulate for board competence and 
objectivity because any regulation which contributes to improvement in these 
directions is in fact a regulation for the purpose.  For instance, regulation which is 
aimed at ensuring that company directors are persons who are capable of objective 
and independent thinking is certainly regulation in this regard, and albeit a 
challenging prospect, it is nevertheless a possibility.  Indeed, the OECD Report 
states clearly that the financial crisis represents a challenge for corporate governance 
policy, one which is akin to the challenges that followed the collapse of Enron and 
the Asian financial crisis of 1997.
414
  The OECD Report concludes that the process 
for the appointment of directors is flawed, and that shareholders alone are not able to 
make the best decisions on this issue.  Particularly in relation to public listed 
companies, regulation in this area should be inevitable if that is a means of creating 
an effective solution to the behavioural problems commonly identified by the reports 
on the financial crisis.   
 
There are a number of issues which determine a director’s ability to contribute to 
effective corporate governance, and behaviour is one of them.
415
  If more effective 
and sustainable systems of corporate governance are desired, a good approach is to 
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provide a systematic improvement in effectiveness in all the areas which contribute 
to overall corporate governance.  A situation in which some areas become the focus 
of attention and development whilst others are ignored cannot augur well for the 
entire process of corporate governance in the long run.  The issue of behavioural 
deficiencies has been highlighted but efforts to create improvement in this area have 
not included a detailed analysis of all the factors that contribute to behaviour, of 
which personality is a key one.
416
  Regulation should be applied in cases where it has 
been identified as essential, and soft law approaches can be utilised in cases where 
they would prove more effective.
417
   
 
The OECD Report notes that strengthening the enforcement of fiduciary duties of 
directors or their statutory duties as the case may be is one way of bringing 
improvement to the behaviour of directors.
418
  This might indeed have an effect on 
the behaviour of directors in terms of their being deterred as a result of 
consequences. However, as has been argued previously, statutory duties which 
impose behavioural expectations on directors are not likely to change the behaviour 
of a director who is not naturally attuned to behaving in the manner proposed by the 
statute.
419
  For instance, section 172 of the UK Companies Act 2006 provides that 
directors should promote the interests of the company whilst taking cognisance of 
certain constituencies.  But, the real and more important issue actually lies in the 
capability of the director in question to abide by the provisions of the statute.  
Resorting to punishment for contravention of a statutory provision is an option, but, 
it is better to develop approaches which engender behavioural conformity in the first 
instance, than depend on the efficacy of enforcement mechanisms which operate ex 
post.  This is because if the enforcement mechanisms do not act as deterrence, then 
the statutory provision stands a chance of being contravened.  Enforcement 
mechanisms are put in place to ensure that compliance is secured, and so if there is a 
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chance that these mechanisms might not secure compliance, then other approaches 
which might do so should be explored.  In a lot of cases, the recent financial crisis 
being an example, the greater harm would already have occurred before the 
enforcement mechanisms of laws enacted to safeguard their occurrence actually sets 
in.  Although there is the potential of punishment acting as deterrent, cases have also 
shown how ineffective this approach can be, because existing regulations did not 
prevent directors from inappropriate behaviour in the recent crisis.
420
        
 
4.2.5 The EU Green Paper 
 
The European Commission in April 2011 issued a Green Paper on the corporate 
governance framework for the EU region.
421
  The Green Paper states that “corporate 
governance is one means to curb harmful short-termism and excessive risk-
taking”.422 The purpose of the Green Paper was essentially to assess the 
effectiveness of the current corporate governance framework for European 
companies in the light of the EU agenda.
423
  The Green Paper addresses three key 
areas of corporate governance: the board of directors, the shareholders and the 
application of the “comply or explain” approach.424  There is a clear 
acknowledgement of the vital role played by the board of directors in the 
development of sustainable and responsible companies and the paper discusses 
various aspects of the company board, but of particular relevance is the fact that the 
Green Paper poses a question seeking to ascertain whether recruitment policies of 
companies should be more specific in relation to the profile of directors.
425
  The 
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Green Paper also seeks to ascertain how best these initiatives could be achieved and 
the level of governance at which these interventions may be made.
426
   
 
Although the Green Paper does not specifically refer to personality profiling, it does 
state that directors should ideally be selected based on a broad range of criteria 
which includes the personal qualities of the candidate.
427
  The attention being given 
to the issue of personality at the EU level is a reflection of the fact that the issue has 
not been adequately addressed in the past, and there is a clear understanding of its 
importance in corporate governance.  In addition to considerations regarding the 
level of governance at which policy interventions in relation to recruitment of 
directors are to be made, it is equally important to utilise effective regulatory 
instruments.  There is a necessity to ensure that the approach adopted towards 
tackling this issue is effective and sustainable.  The responses to the questions posed 
in the Green Paper in relation to recruitment policies indicate that the respondents 
were almost equally divided between those who favoured specific measures and 
those opposing them.
428
  Some of those favouring more specific recruitment policies 
were against regulation at EU level, indicating that responses at the national level or 
at the level of the companies, through the nominations committee, was more 
appropriate.
429
  The respondents who were against specific recruitment policies 
considered that there was no need for action in this regard and indicated that one size 
should not fit all in this case.
430
  It is agreed that one size might not fit all companies 
in terms of specific recruitment policies; however, considering that the behaviour of 
directors was a contributory factor to the financial crisis and other corporate failures, 
and the fact that personal qualities influence behaviour, recruitment policies which 
take cognisance of personality dimensions are clearly needed.     
 
Responses to the questions in the Green Paper were bound to generate varying 
approaches and different solutions to the problems presented, possibly dependent on 
the peculiar perspectives of a respondent, but one salient factor is that where the 
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problem is viewed as real, whatever approach is proposed as regards dealing with 
the issue of personality is one which fundamentally acknowledges the place of 
personality in corporate governance.  The place of personality in relation to 
behavioural risks in corporate governance processes and the need to develop a 
mechanism which mitigates these risks in the bid to help enhance effective corporate 
governance in companies and prevent corporate failures is the crux of this thesis.  It 
is evident in any case that the European Commission sets out in the Green Paper to 
assess the existing corporate governance framework with a bid to developing 
improvements to the framework, therefore, it is noteworthy that personality is indeed 
one of the highlighted areas.  Instituting recruitment policies which take cognisance 
of the personality dimensions of directors is one way of ensuring that appropriate 
persons are selected as directors, and at the least, it would provide information 
regarding the personality of directors for risk management purposes even in cases 
where inappropriate persons are selected.   
 
4.3 THE BEHAVIOUR OF COMPANY DIRECTORS IN CORPORATE 
FAILURES 
 
The model suggested in this thesis is particularly directed towards company 
directors.  Directors are the persons at the helm of affairs in a company and all other 
corporate officers are expected to act in accordance with instructions emanating 
from company directors.
431
  Therefore, if personality risks are dealt with effectively 
at the level of company directors, then there are higher chances of creating effective 
corporate governance.  In an ideal situation, it would actually be most effective to 
evaluate every corporate officer in the same manner as company directors so as to 
ensure that their personalities are appropriate for corporate governance.  But, other 
corporate officers essentially execute the instructions and follow the policies issued 
by company directors.  So, as long as these persons execute the orders as given, it is 
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more imperative to start by ensuring that these instructions are in accordance with 
the corporate objectives and in line with established rules and norms.   
 
The examples of corporate failures examined below show that the actions of 
company directors contributed to these failures, and even in cases where the 
corporate officers were not directors, the actions they undertook might as well have 
been undertaken by company directors.  This is because the directors had an overall 
duty to ensure the effective management of the companies culminating in a situation 
where other corporate officers should act only based on instructions from the 
directors or take decisions that are only within the lines approved by the directors.  
Therefore, these actions are still relevant in drawing a linkage between the behaviour 
of directors and situations contributing towards corporate failures.  The specific 
actions and decisions undertaken by company directors in the following examples 
indicated to a large extent their behavioural tendencies and the risks contributed to 
the corporate governance process as a result of their behaviour.
432
 The relationship 
between inappropriate behaviour and corporate governance is a clearly negative one 
to the extent that there is evidence in these examples to show that persons who 
behave inappropriately would invariably be ineffective at corporate governance.  It 
is much the same as the relationship between effective corporate governance and 
corporate success.  As much as it may not be absolutely proven that effective 
corporate governance can guarantee corporate success, it is nevertheless proven that 
ineffective corporate governance would invariably lead to corporate failure.
433
   
 
Even if there is a perception that creating effective corporate governance does not 
generate significant increases in terms of profit for companies, the more important 
issue is whether effective corporate governance reduces the risks of potentially huge 
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losses to shareholders, and it has been argued that there is a significant statistical 
relationship between ineffective corporate governance and poor corporate financial 
performance leading to the reasonable conclusion that corporate governance 
mechanisms should lessen the risk of corporate failure and financial distress.
434
  
Therefore, in the case that there is evidence, as will be seen in this thesis, to indicate 
that certain behavioural tendencies are more likely to result in ineffective corporate 
governance and increase the risks of corporate failure, it is pertinent to understand 
what contributes to these behavioural tendencies and take appropriate steps to 
mitigate these risks in the case that effective corporate governance and prevention of 
corporate failures is desired.   
 
4.3.1 THE MAXWELL GROUP 
 
The proprietor of the Maxwell Group Plc, Mr Robert Maxwell, disappeared at sea 
from his yacht in 1991 after the realisation that his financial empire was in ruins, a 
situation caused by his misappropriation of company funds through actions ranging 
from pledging assets as security for loans and subsequently selling the assets; 
diverting shares and cash between his companies; manipulating the share prices of 
his companies and generally converting company funds to his private use; to cases 
of misrepresentations as to the financial positions of the companies.
435
  Much earlier, 
in a transaction with an American company (Leasco) which was bidding to take over 
one of Maxwell’s companies, issues arose as to the authenticity of the financial 
position of the company as projected by Mr Maxwell.  The dispute which arose 
resulted in the Takeover Panel commissioning a full Board of Trade inquiry into the 
fiasco and two inspectors were appointed, as well as an independent audit carried out 
by Price Waterhouse, the result of which was the declaration that the reported profits 
of the Maxwell company in question (Pergamon) for 1968 had been overstated from 
£140,000 to £2,100,000.  More importantly however was the report issued by the 
inspectors and published in July 1971 in which the following statement was written: 
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 We are also convinced that Mr Maxwell regarded his stewardship 
duties fulfilled by showing the maximum profits which any transaction 
could be devised to show.  Furthermore, in reporting to shareholders 
and investors he had a reckless and unjustified optimism which 
enabled him on some occasions to disregard unpalatable facts and on 
others to state what he must have known to be untrue…We regret 
having to conclude that, notwithstanding Mr Maxwell’s 
acknowledged abilities and energy, he is not in our opinion a person 
who can be relied on to exercise proper stewardship of a publicly 
quoted company.
436
   
In two subsequent reports by inspectors in 1972/73, Mr Maxwell’s business methods 
were criticized.
437
  Maxwell was nevertheless still allowed to hold executive and 
managerial position after the discovery of these flaws in his personality; only for a 
greater manifestation of his personality traits to occur 20 odd years later in 1991, 
with far greater implications.
438
  The Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) report 
on the Maxwell Group collapse stated that it was clear to many people who dealt 
with Mr Maxwell that “he was a bully and a domineering personality, but could be 
charming on occasions”.439  It becomes easy to relate his actions in the running of 
his companies to his personality, as Mr Maxwell clearly dominated the management 
of his companies.
440
  The risks associated with inappropriate personalities are a 
fundamental reason why it is essential to have appropriate kinds of personalities in 
company management.
441
  The net result of the Maxwell scandal was the complete 
collapse of the Maxwell Group, with huge consequences in terms of job and pension 
losses, capital destruction and reduced confidence in business activities.  The DTI 
report states categorically that “As a result of the collapse, many pensioners suffered 
anxiety and loss, and the employees of Mr Robert Maxwell’s companies suffered 
uncertainty and redundancy…”442  One of the far reaching effects of the failure was 
the fact that Kevin Maxwell, son of the proprietor, was reputed to be Britain’s 
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biggest bankrupt in 1992 after admitting debts of about four hundred (400) million 
pounds. 
443
  
 
From the foregoing, it is evident that Mr Maxwell exhibited inappropriate 
behavioural tendencies in respect of corporate governance.  By way of example, the 
pertinent action of inflating his company profits is one which indicates that he was 
not a person who acted with integrity, neither was he one to abide by corporate 
financial regulations which required the presentation of a true and fair view of a 
company’s financial position.  Also, the fact that Mr Maxwell intended to employ 
deceit in a bid to secure the take-over of his company by Leasco is an action which 
portrays him as someone who is capable of dishonesty.  Again, the misappropriation 
and abuse of his employees’ pension funds and the appropriation of corporate funds 
for his private use are actions which indicate that he was a person who lacked the 
traits of self-discipline and dutifulness.  The DTI report states in conclusion as 
follows: 
 
The most important lesson from all the [Maxwell] events is that high 
ethical and professional standards must always be put before 
commercial advantage.  The reputation of the financial markets 
depends on it.
444
 
 
The above conclusion suggests the relevance of personality and behavioural issues 
in corporate governance because essentially, it would take appropriate behavioural 
tendencies to exhibit high ethical and professional standards in the governance of 
companies.  The Maxwell case also raises an important issue that is central to 
corporate governance, that of ethics.  No amount of corporate governance checks 
and balances, codes of practice or even regulation can change a person’s character 
and personality.
445
  If Mr Maxwell had been a person who exhibited appropriate 
behavioural tendencies, or there were mechanisms in place to mitigate the risks 
which accrued to the governance process as a result of his inappropriate behavioural 
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tendencies, the chances exist that the collapse of the Maxwell Group might have 
been prevented or its consequences reduced at the least. 
 
4.3.2 BCCI 
 
Bank of Credit and Commerce International Plc (BCCI), a large international bank 
with branches in over 70 countries, collapsed in July 1991.
446
  The bank had been 
founded by Agha Hasan Abedi in 1972, and was essentially managed until its failure 
by himself and Swaleh Naqvi, an early associate.
447
  The origin of the collapse was 
traced to a situation in which the executives started falsifying BCCI’s accounts in 
order to hide the financial difficulty that was occurring within one of its major 
customers, the Gulf Group.  This eventually led to a liquidity problem in the bank.  
Also, there were allegations that BCCI became involved in money laundering 
activities on behalf of drug dealers in Columbia, resulting in the arrest of some 
officials of the bank in Florida, United States in October 1988.
448
  The United 
Kingdom Prime Minister at the time commissioned Lord Justice Bingham to report 
on the events that led to the collapse and the report published in 1992 indicted the 
auditors, Price Waterhouse for creating an avenue for conflict of interest by acting as 
both auditors and consultants to BCCI.  The Bingham Report also criticised the 
Bank of England, for lacking in its supervisory role.
449
   
 
The blame on the Bank of England was quite valid as it should have been obvious to 
anyone much earlier than 1991, when the Bank of England chose to wind down 
operations at the bank, that there were issues at BCCI which needed investigation, 
especially with the arrest of the BCCI officials in the United States in 1988.  Again, 
the behaviour of the company directors was in issue as was evident from their 
actions.  For example, the UK Companies Act 1985 specified clearly in its section 
221 (1) that every company shall keep accounting records which disclose with 
reasonable accuracy the financial position of the company at any given time.  The 
directors at BCCI disobeyed this requirement.  Had the company accounts not been 
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falsified, the financial distress in the company might have been discovered earlier.  
Also, it is clearly against established rules for a company to engage in money 
laundering,
450
 and so the directors at BCCI who indulged in and approved this 
activity can be described as persons who lack integrity.  The collapse of BCCI 
created financial losses for a large number of individuals (the bank had over one 
million depositors), employees (BCCI was reputed to have had about 14,000 
worldwide), companies (a lot of businesses banked with BCCI), local authorities 
(one of which was a small council in Scotland which lost $45 million), and countries 
(BCCI had branches scattered around numerous countries).
451
   
 
4.3.3 HIH 
 
In Australia, the HIH Insurance Group Plc collapsed in March 2001, resulting in 
crystallised losses amounting to approximately $5.3 Billion.
452
  An analysis of the 
Royal Commission Report after the crisis portrays a company which was totally 
mismanaged by a CEO (Raymond Williams) who was particularly dominant and 
could not be rivalled in terms of authority or influence.
453
  This, amongst other 
factors rendered the rest of the company board including Geoffrey Cohen, its 
chairman, practically ineffective.  The HIH directors involved the company in high 
risk practices in an extremely competitive market and the company ended up under-
reserving its claims, a fact which eventually led to its collapse.
454
  The company 
directors at HIH failed to see, remedy and report what appeared to be obvious 
problems, and in fact management concealed the true state of the group’s financial 
position.
455
  The failure of HIH was the result of attempts to conceal the difficulties 
caused by over-priced acquisitions.
456
  The following are some excerpts and 
highlights from the Royal Commission Report which illustrate the behavioural 
issues that contributed to the collapse of HIH: 
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The last years of HIH were marked by poor leadership and inept management, an 
attitude of indifference and deliberate disregard of the company’s problems. 
 
The officers of the company who were responsible for its stewardship ignored 
warning signs at their own, the group and the public’s peril. 
 
The primary reason for the failure was “under-reserving”, but why did the company 
under-reserve?, Because it was mismanaged. 
 
The factors which contributed to the mismanagement of the group were: 
i) Lack of attention to detail 
ii) Lack of accountability for performance 
iii) Lack of integrity in the company’s internal processes and systems 
iv) Bad business decisions which were poorly conceived and even more 
poorly executed 
 
 
A cause for serious concern was the group’s corporate culture which connotes the 
personality, sometimes overt but often unstated which guides the decision making 
process at all levels of an organisation.  In HIH, the corporate culture was inimical 
to sound management practices and it resulted in decision making that fell short of 
the required standards. 
 
The problematic aspects of the corporate culture at HIH which led directly to poor 
decision making can be summarised as a blind faith in a leadership that was ill-
equipped for the task.  There was insufficient ability and independence of mind in 
the organisation to see what had to be done, stopped or avoided. 
 
Even though management is in a better position to propose strategy, the board of 
directors has the responsibility to understand, test and endorse this strategy.  This is 
what the HIH board failed to do. 
 
The CEO was dominant, not a problem in itself, but in order to have an effective 
management team, other officers needed to have their voices heard. 
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The presence of written guidelines does not guarantee that there will be no 
departures and if there are no systems of checks and balances in operation, or if 
they fail, then losses will occur. 
 
Guidelines were flouted in HIH. For example, the procedures prohibiting “fronting” 
without management approval were flouted, as well as the company’s investments 
guidelines as many investments exceeded board approval guidelines and limits.  This 
was highlighted in a letter to the CEO in August 2000 by the APRA following a 
credit risk management visit at HIH. 
 
Concerns about governance were raised by two of the directors in 1999 but the 
issues were never considered at a full board meeting.  The CEO was not interested 
in pursuing the issues and they soon blew over. 
 
Head, one of the directors who raised the governance concerns eventually resigned 
in 1999.  The other director, Gardner, concluded his concerns will not be acted 
upon and did not bother to raise them again. 
 
The final decisions on whether a company’s accounts are accurately reflecting the 
financial state of the company rests with the company directors and not with the 
management or auditors. 
 
There should be an underpinning of morality and ethical standards in all decision 
making processes, far and above rules, obligations, regulations, codes etc.  
Prescriptive dictates should be adhered to no doubt, but the more important issue is 
the rightness of a decision. 
 
An examination of these excerpts from the HIH Report as highlighted above 
evidences the numerous behavioural issues which were at the forefront of the 
problems in the company.  For example, the company chairman clearly did not abide 
by his duties to the extent that he ignored management excesses and failed to 
investigate governance issues even when two directors raised them.  Had the 
chairman and all the members of the board been persons who were full of integrity 
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and abreast of their role and responsibility on the board, a number of management 
decisions which contributed to the failure would have been adequately challenged 
and perhaps some of the mishaps would have been averted.  The CEO aided the 
board in the approval of falsified accounts, the report clearly indicating that the 
board practically adopted the decisions of management and not the other way round.  
Had the CEO been a person with appropriate behavioural tendencies, the corporate 
collapse of HIH may have been prevented because the decisions which led to the 
failure may have been prevented.   
 
Even in the situation that the CEO was an individual with a dominant personality as 
was the case in HIH, if all the other board members were persons who behaved 
appropriately, the chances are higher that they would question the decisions of the 
CEO and if their voices were not heard, they could all resign.  If all the board 
members resigned, the governance issues would have been brought to the attention 
of the shareholders, the regulatory bodies and the wider public.  Then, the 
governance issues would have been addressed sooner than later.  The actions of Mr 
Head in resigning from HIH in the face of not obtaining answers to his governance 
questions was clearly a good decision and it can be assumed from his actions that he 
was a person of integrity who did not want to be part and parcel of questionable and 
ineffective corporate governance.  The impact of the HIH collapse was far reaching, 
causing problems for individuals and the community as well as serious 
consequences for the public.  Examples of these include the fact that a number of 
permanently disabled persons no longer had access to their insurance funds, 
numerous retirees were left without retirement funds and various home owners who 
took out compulsory warranty insurance were left practically uninsured.
457
     
 
4.3.4 ENRON 
 
The Enron collapse has generated a word which links the failure to broader 
corporate governance issues as follows: “[Enronitis is] A malfunction of corporate 
governance in which top managers become extraordinarily wealthy while misleading 
shareholders, creditors, employees and the general public about the company’s 
                                                          
457
 See Andrew, Cooper & Islam, (note 141). 
114 
 
prospects and practices, eventually resulting in share price collapse, loss of jobs, and 
in extreme cases, the corporation’s bankruptcy......” 458  Professor Greenwood may 
have been attempting a linguistic exercise in this instance, but his description of the 
Enron syndrome aptly captures the reality of what actually took place.  During the 
1990s, Enron grew from a small domestic Texan energy company to become one of 
the largest United States corporations, taking advantage of deregulation and 
globalisation to create opportunities which translated to profit and growth.
459
  It was 
a company run by “apparently” respectable persons with huge political connections 
and had been ranked for several years in a row as Fortune magazine’s most 
innovative company.
460
  Suddenly, it collapsed, due to disclosures of non-existent 
transactions which were placed as off balance-sheet items and consequently, 
estimated incomes which would never materialise.   
 
The company filed for bankruptcy on 2nd December 2001 resulting in the loss of 
thousands of jobs and over $1 billion of its employees’ retirement savings.461  An 
examination of the actions of key Enron executives supports the assertion that 
company agents bring their personalities to bear on corporate decisions which 
ultimately may or may not contribute to the success of the company.  In a paper by 
Sherron Watkins, a former vice president of Enron and the “whistle blower” at the 
company just before its collapse, there is an account of how Kenneth Lay, a Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO) at Enron would verbally preach the company’s core values 
of respect, integrity, communication and excellence (RICE); and yet would not live 
up to its tenets by getting involved in situations such as compelling Enron 
employees to patronise his sister’s travel agency constantly even when that agency 
did not provide affordable and excellent service.
462
  Mr Lay’s actions suggest that he 
was a person who did not abide firmly by the values of integrity and 
professionalism.  Jeffrey Skilling was CEO of Enron between February and August 
2001. He was described as someone who infused a new business image into the 
company, one that placed emphasis on generating profit, regardless of the cost.  This 
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resulted in the company recruiting only the brightest traders and rewarding 
achievement with outrageous salaries and bonuses; with Mr Skilling instituting a 
Performance Review Committee which became known as the harshest employee-
ranking system in the United States.
463
  The “supposed” core values of the company 
were relegated to the background and replaced with a relentless drive towards profit 
making, a situation which could result in a negation of professionalism in the long 
run, as eventually occurred at Enron.   
 
The Chief Financial Officer (CFO) of Enron, Andrew Fastow, actually set up three 
partnerships that engaged in business transactions with Enron and formed part of the 
reason for the losses that the company disclosed eventually.
464
  It is difficult to think 
that the company directors at Enron could not have known the level of conflict of 
interest that would naturally result in a situation in which its CFO is consummating 
business transactions between a company he works for and a partnership he owns.  
As it turned out, those partnerships were primarily set up to facilitate Enron’s 
financial dealings, and this illustrates how directors can get tangled up in a web of 
self-dealing.
465
 Enron directors appeared to allow Mr Fastow run those partnerships 
because it was benefitting their interests and enhancing their profit maximisation 
drive, regardless of the fact that it was bound to create issues of conflict of interest at 
the expense of shareholders.  At one stage, Andrew Fastow was also lobbying the 
rating agencies to provide Enron with positive credit ratings to attract investment.
466
  
Behaviours such as those described above indicate that these company directors 
lacked integrity.   
 
Enron directors reneged on their duties and responsibilities, which contributed to 
ineffectiveness in the governance of the company.  There are various accounts of 
huge salaries and bonuses earned by the executives, with Andrew Fastow earning 
over $30 million in management fees for his partnerships.
467
 They indulged in 
selling off their own shares whilst telling other employees that the company was 
                                                          
463
 See C.W. Thomas, ‘The Rise and Fall of Enron’ (2002) 193(4) Journal of Accountancy 41-53. 
464
 See J.R. Macey, ‘Efficient Capital Markets, Corporate Disclosure and Enron’ (2004) 89 Cornell Law Review 
394; see also Wearing, (note 2) 69; see also Mclean & Elkind, (note 129) 120. 
465
 See Mclean & Elkind, (note 129) 120-121. 
466
 See Arnold & De Lange, (note 141) 757. 
467
 See Wearing, (note 2) 70; see also Mclean & Elkind, (note 129) 122. 
116 
 
performing optimally even up till just weeks before they filed for bankruptcy.
468
  
Aside from the obvious cases of numerous job losses and financial crippling of 
employees that the Enron collapse brought about, many other companies were 
affected by its failure, examples include Arthur Andersen (its auditors), JP Morgan 
Chase, Citigroup and Merrill Lynch (particularly for some transactions relating to 
Nigerian electricity generating barges).
469
  One of the most far reaching 
consequences of the fall of Enron would be the death of one of its former executives, 
J Clifford Baxter.  He had complained to the CEO about questionable accounting 
practices within Enron, but, upon being called to testify before the United States 
Congress, he committed suicide in order to avoid the embarrassment.
470
     
 
From the foregoing examples of the actions of Enron directors and executives, it is 
argued that if their behaviour had been more appropriate and in conformity with 
corporate governance guidelines and processes, the problems which occurred at the 
company might have been prevented or mitigated.  Also, had there been an effective 
risk mitigating mechanism in place to check their behaviour owing to the potential 
which exists that they are persons who are prone to making inappropriate decisions, 
the collapse of Enron might have been averted.  For example, the decision to falsify 
accounts is one which clearly reflects that the directors were not honest persons and 
that, amongst other factors, was a major reason for the failure of Enron.   In the 
original indictment of the Enron executives, Richard Causey, Kenneth Lay and 
Jeffrey Skilling were charged on 53 counts with various issues ranging from issuing 
fraudulent and misleading statements, conspiracy, securities fraud, money 
laundering, bank fraud, wires fraud and insider trading.
471
  The Enron Examiners’ 
Report also concluded that certain senior officers engaged in wrongful conduct and 
violated their duty of loyalty to the company.
472
  In the US Senate Report on the role 
of the Enron Board of Directors, it was stated that the directors breached their 
fiduciary duties because they witnessed numerous indications of questionable 
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practices by Enron management executives over several years but chose to ignore 
them to the detriment of the company shareholders, employees and business 
associates.
473
   
 
The US Senate Report concluded that the board of directors contributed to the 
failure of Enron because the issues which plagued the company such as high risk 
accounting practices, inappropriate conflict of interest transactions, extensive 
undisclosed off the book transactions and excessive executive compensation were all 
facts within the knowledge of the directors who failed to provide sufficient oversight 
and restraint of management excesses as required by their obligations.
474
  In May 
2006, Jeffrey Skilling was found guilty on 19 counts of conspiracy, fraud, false 
statements and insider trading.   Kenneth Lay was found guilty on 6 counts of 
conspiracy and fraud; and in a separate bench trail, Judge Sim Lake also ruled that 
Mr Lay was guilty of 4 counts of fraud and false statements.  After the original 
indictment, Richard Causey pleaded guilty.  Kenneth Lay died in July 2006 before 
sentencing was concluded and before a notice of appeal could be filed, and therefore 
the court vacated his conviction and dismissed his indictment upon a motion brought 
by his estate.
475
  The final judgment and sentencing was made in respect of Jeffrey 
Skilling who was committed to an imprisonment term of 292 months.
476
  
 
Jeffery Skilling appealed against his conviction on grounds which included that he 
did not get a fair trial from the jury which was constituted in Houston, the venue of 
the crime and the court proceedings.  In June 2010, the US Supreme Court vacated 
his appeal on the grounds of a fair trial but upheld his appeal on the grounds of the 
honest services statute upon which his conspiracy conviction was based.
477
  The 
jurors in the first trial noted the flaw in the character and personality of the Enron 
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executives.
478
  The jurors simply refused to believe that the executives were telling 
the truth when Jeffery Skilling and Kenneth Lay claimed that they did not know that 
things were going wrong at Enron.  The jurors noted that it was appalling that Mr 
Lay was selling his own Enron shares even as he assured employees and 
shareholders that the company was fiscally sound.  One of the jurors commented as 
follows “that was very much the character of the person that he was….”479  The 
jurors stated that Mr Lay put his personal financial welfare ahead of his duties to the 
shareholders and employees.
480
  The perception of the jurors is quite valid, 
considering the behaviour of the Enron directors and how it contributed to that 
corporate failure.   
 
4.3.5 WORLDCOM 
 
The United States experienced another major corporate collapse in July 2002 with 
the bankruptcy of WorldCom.  The Securities and Exchange Commission had been 
investigating accounting irregularities at the company, culminating in the admission 
by the company to falsifications in its accounts.
481
  Bernie Ebbers, the former CEO 
was charged with fraud, conspiracy and making false statements in relation to the 
accounts; while Scott Sullivan, the former CFO agreed to plead guilty to similar 
charges.
482
  In the late 1990s, WorldCom was one of the largest companies in the 
world and its CEO had become a spend-thrift, buying up ranches, yachts and 
timberlands; in addition to collecting loans from the company at ridiculously low 
interest rates.
483
  There were also indications that he and his CFO clearly dominated 
the board of directors.
484
  The actions of the CEO appeared to be unprofessional in 
many instances and a typical example is the issue of obtaining loans from the 
company at unfair interest rates.
485
  The failure of WorldCom resulted in a huge loss 
of confidence on the part of investors.  It also had devastating effects on the 
residents of Mississippi in the United States, the home state of the company and the 
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CEO because a lot of those residents had in the spirit of solidarity invested all their 
financial possessions in WorldCom shares and refused to exit the company until 
their shares became invariably worthless.
486
  
 
Again, if the directors at WorldCom had behaved more appropriately by being 
honest and professional in relation to their corporate accounts and dealings, there 
might have been a more effective corporate governance process in the company and 
this might have helped prevent or mitigate the corporate failure.  Bennie Ebbers was 
indicted,
487
 and convicted in March 2005 of securities fraud, conspiracy and filing 
false documents with regulators.
488
  Scott Sullivan, the former CFO at WorldCom 
testified against his boss reiterating that he was acting under his instructions.
489
  In 
July 2005, Ebbers was sentenced to 25 years imprisonment.
490
  Judge Barbara Jones 
of the Federal District Court in Manhattan who handed down the sentence stated that 
Mr Ebbers was the instigator of the $11 Billion fraud.
491
  In rebutting arguments that 
Mr Ebbers was deceived by his subordinates, she stated that “Mr Ebbers’s 
statements deprived investors of their money.  They might have made different 
decisions had they known the truth”.492  This statement underscores the importance 
of shareholders being in possession of accurate and relevant information regarding 
their investee companies as it impacts on their decision making in relation to the 
company.   
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4.3.6 LEHMAN BROTHERS 
 
The story of Lehman Brothers is another case in which disobedience of established 
rules and principles clearly contributed to the company’s failure.493  The Lehman 
Examiners’ Report states categorically that there are legitimate claims against the 
CEO, CFO and other officers who oversaw and certified misleading financial 
statements which in turn contributed to the demise of the company.
494
  Again, in this 
case as in some of the previous examples, there was falsification of financial records 
and there were also instances of the Lehman Brothers officers exhibiting clearly 
inappropriate behaviour, an example of which was terminating the employment of 
one of its staff who blew the whistle on certain accounting abuses.
495
  The company 
was described as one with an “unethical” tone at the top, a reflection of the character 
and behaviour of the company directors who governed it.
496
  For instance, Section 
401 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act clearly provides for disclosures relating to off-
balance sheet items, yet the Lehman Brothers directors flouted that rule and this was 
a contributory element to the failure.  If the directors at Lehman Brothers had been 
persons who were prone to obeying rules, they would have abided by the provisions 
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and this might have prevented some of the problems 
which ensued.
497
   
 
Again, the act of terminating the employment of a whistle blower is an indication of 
a situation in which the executives were involved in obvious wrong doings and were 
taking steps to cover up their actions.  The Lehman Examiners’ Report analyses in 
full the events that led to the failure and one of the significant issues raised is that 
Lehman’s financial problems and the consequences to its creditors and shareholders 
were exacerbated by Lehman executives whose conduct ranged from serious but non 
culpable errors of business judgment to actionable balance sheet manipulation.
498
  
Therefore, the behaviour of the directors was clearly a major contributory factor to 
the Lehman Brothers failure.   This corporate failure became the largest bankruptcy 
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proceeding ever filed as at September 2008.
499
  Even though Lehman Brothers took 
out insurance policies to indemnify the company and executives for liability and 
settlements arising from law suits, the economic and social losses accruing from the 
failure was nevertheless enormous.
500
 
 
4.3.7 RBS 
 
The Financial Services Authority (FSA) issued a report on the failure of the Royal 
Bank of Scotland (RBS) which stated that: “RBS’s failure in October 2008 has 
imposed large costs on UK citizens. To prevent collapse, the government injected 
£45.5bn of equity capital, that stake is now worth about £20bn. But this loss is only 
a small part of the cost resulting from the financial crisis. The larger costs arise from 
the recession which resulted from that crisis, within which RBS’s failure played a 
significant role. That recession has caused unemployment for many, losses of 
income and wealth for many more.”501  This is one example of the impact a 
corporate failure can have on society generally.  In the same report, it was 
highlighted that one of the contributory factors to the RBS failure was poor 
decisions by its board and management which resulted from flawed analysis and 
judgment; and that a pattern of decisions that may reasonably be considered poor 
suggests the probability of underlying deficiencies in issues such as the bank’s 
management capabilities and style, governance arrangements, checks and balances, 
mechanisms for oversight and challenge, and in its culture, particularly its attitude to 
the balance between risk and growth.
502
   
 
Culture was defined in the report to connote a set of attitudes, values, goals and 
practices which together determines how a firm behaves, and a particular culture can 
have a significant influence on the decision-making of a firm.
503
  The report notes 
that there was no evidence of failings in formal governance processes at RBS, but 
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the board were ultimately responsible for a sequence of decisions and judgments 
which contributed to the failure, and therefore it is concluded that there were 
substantive failures of board effectiveness at RBS.
504
  Interestingly, the reports also 
stated that prior to the crisis; the FSA had identified a risk created by the perceived 
domineering behaviour of the CEO at RBS.
505
  Behavioural issues were part of the 
problem at RBS.  In relation to the underlying deficiencies noted above, 
management capabilities and style, as well as culture, are factors which particularly 
reflect behavioural tendencies.
506
  It is also noteworthy that the report highlights that 
even when governance processes are in place, behavioural issues can affect overall 
board effectiveness.  Again, the report acknowledges the existence of behavioural 
risks by stating that the FSA had indeed identified a risk resulting from the 
behaviour of the RBS CEO.        
 
4.4 JUDICIAL AND SOCIETAL PERSPECTIVES 
 
Court cases following corporate failures often highlight the role played by the 
company directors in the lead up to the failure.  In the Enron case, the jurors pointed 
out that the directors lied and were not dutiful in their role.
507
  The WorldCom case 
also highlights the fact that the CEO lied.
508
  These directors were clearly dishonest 
persons, and also had the ability to, and, actually contravened established corporate 
rules and principles.  In the WorldCom trial, the judge noted that the long sentence 
was commensurate with the damage caused by the wrongdoing which led to the 
collapse, and that the government hoped that it would serve as deterrence for 
corporate leaders in the future.
509
  The recent Lehman Brothers failure illustrates that 
this may not be the case.  The Lehman directors were also found wanting in their 
behaviour and the examiners noted that there were legitimate claims against them for 
falsifying company accounts.
510
  The Lehman case has semblances of the Enron 
scandal, an indication that the reforms which occurred after that scandal and were 
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aimed at preventing future occurrences of similar scandals may not actually be 
effective in all respects.
511
  The judge in the WorldCom trial also noted that 
investors were deceived, and they might have made different choices regarding their 
investment in the company if they had known the truth.
512
  That is true, especially to 
the extent that accurate information is essential for the effective functioning of the 
capital market as it enhances the ability of investors to make adequate and rational 
choices.   
 
4.5 CONSEQUENTIAL ISSUES 
 
A close examination of the cited examples of corporate failures shows a recurrent 
pattern of company directors taking actions and making decisions that either wholly 
or substantially contributed to the demise of their companies.  In the quest to 
establish mechanisms which might help prevent future corporate failures attributable 
to the behaviour of directors, one important aspect of the governance process which 
should ordinarily play a significant role in the determination of the calibre of people 
who are allowed to govern companies is the recruitment process.  There is a 
possibility that shareholders as investors might prefer the recruitment in companies 
of persons who have the ability to take risks which are likely to increase returns on 
their investment.
513
  It is agreed that every business involves elements of risk taking 
and the popular saying comes to mind that “the higher the risk, the higher the 
return”.  However, in the interest of all stakeholders in a company, including the 
shareholders, and for the survival of companies, it is essential to recruit persons who 
would take risks within the ambit of prescribed rules and regulations in the business.  
Essentially, the rules which operate in companies are instituted to safeguard the 
company from the risks which are not likely to yield “higher returns”, but might 
actually result in corporate failure.
514
  Therefore, company directors need to be 
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persons who can manage the companies and take the risks which are within the 
agreed parameters.   
 
The examples of corporate failures cited here show that most of them resulted from 
company directors pushing against acceptable boundaries of behaviour.  There were 
numerous cases of falsification of accounts, misappropriation of funds and lack of 
appropriate disclosures; all these being examples of situations which corporate rules 
are usually established to guard against.  However, rules and regulations can only be 
effective if and when they are obeyed.  In the case that a company recruits directors 
who are not dutiful and they decide, for instance, to function outside the rules 
established for the governance of the company, the result can only be negative.  It 
therefore becomes vital to the effective operation of the corporate governance 
process to recognise this inherent risk, and develop mechanisms which ensure that 
directors are persons who will govern companies in the manner envisaged by 
corporate rules and principles or at the least mitigate the risk of not recruiting such 
appropriate persons by developing personality and behavioural risk mitigating 
mechanisms.   
 
Solomon questions how the issue of ethics in the boardroom can be monitored and 
controlled,
515
 but, one answer to that question rests simply in recruiting board 
members who are inherently ethical or ensuring one way or another that those who 
are not so would stand the least risk of being in a position to manifest behaviours 
which are unethical and therefore inimical to the success of the company.  In relation 
to the recent financial crisis, some commentators have suggested that the crisis is a 
phenomenon resulting from “gate-keeper” failures, the term essentially referring to 
the persons who are supposed to guard the company from breakdowns.
516
  
Therefore, it is increasingly evident that mechanisms must be developed to ensure 
that the risks which accrue from inappropriate behaviours in corporate governance 
are effectively managed.  Otherwise, there could be a continuation of the recurring 
cases of corporate failures in which company directors make decisions and take 
actions which lead to corporate failures.  In the bid to manage behavioural risks, 
there is the option of avoiding the risk in the first instance by ensuring that there is 
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no room for inappropriate behaviour on the part of company directors.
517
  There is 
also the option of mitigating the risk by accepting board members who have 
potentially risky behavioural tendencies into governance, but taking adequate steps 
to ensure that all actions and decisions undertaken by such persons are risk managed, 
such that there is minimal room for them to consummate actions which may result in 
corporate failure.
518
   
 
From the examples of the actions of directors discussed in the examples of corporate 
failures above, it is not surprising that there has been an emphasis on the character 
and behaviour of company directors in the reports which followed the recent 
corporate scandals.  Clearly, these behavioural issues have been highlighted in a bid 
to solicit solutions to the problem with the aim of preventing future occurrences of 
corporate failure which are attributable to behavioural flaws.   Behavioural issues 
have been a major contributory factor in a number of major corporate failures and 
corporate governance mechanisms have been geared towards finding solutions to 
issues which lead to corporate failures.
519
  In fact, as stated earlier, corporate 
governance in itself emerged as a major issue in the UK following corporate 
collapses of the early 1990s.
520
  Committees such as Cadbury made proposals for the 
adoption of principles which were aimed at helping to prevent future occurrences of 
corporate failures.  Clearly, further corporate failures occurred, particularly in the 
US with Enron and WorldCom.  There have also been so many other cases of 
corporate collapses and scandals ranging from small obscure companies with 
minimal impact to larger companies with more severe consequences; and occurring 
in various continents of the world.  Examples include the cases of Polly Peck, 
Parmalat, Barings Bank, Shell, Northern Rock, Tyco, One.Tel, Ansett Airlines, 
Sumitomo, Lernout & Hauspie, Sunbeam and Xerox.
521
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There have also been an increasing number of reforms aimed at improving corporate 
governance, each mostly tackling the supposed emergent issues from the most recent 
corporate failures.  After the Enron scandal, there were committees set up in the UK 
to investigate and propose reforms for internal control and for audit committees.
522
  
In the US, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was introduced.  One salient issue to note is that 
most of these corporate governance reforms have often focused on enhancing the 
structural elements of the governance process.  For instance, the Cadbury Committee 
focused on issues such as board structure and composition, board meetings, 
committees etc.  The UK Corporate Governance Code focuses on those same issues 
in the main.  There has been no elucidation of principles and recommendations 
relating to the behaviour of company directors.  The UK Corporate Governance 
Code states clearly in its preface that the code is only a guide in general terms as to 
principles, structures and processes, and cannot guarantee board behaviour.
523
  The 
problem with this approach is that considering the impact of board behaviour on 
governance outcomes, it becomes increasingly arguable that mechanisms should be 
developed which are aimed at ensuring appropriate board behaviour.  It is important 
to place as much emphasis on board behaviour as is placed on board structure if an 
overall system of effective corporate governance is to be attained.   
 
It is inimical to corporate success if far less focus is placed on the behaviour of 
company directors who invariably bring all the corporate structures to life.
524
  
Internal control systems and risk management processes can only become effective 
to the extent that they are utilised.  It is appropriate to utilise processes which have 
been instituted in corporate governance, but then, it is persons who behave 
appropriately who are likely to do so.  Appropriate behaviour in corporate 
governance essentially connotes conformity with the acceptable standard of 
behaviour which is suitable for corporate governance, as the word “appropriate” 
means suitability for the purpose.
525
  Therefore, foundational to the development of 
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more effective processes is the development of mechanisms which ensure the utility 
of those processes.  The examples of corporate failures discussed earlier illustrate 
that inappropriate behaviour occurs despite the existence of corporate governance 
mechanisms.  It is not enough for a company to institute effective systems and 
processes because actual performance and eventual outcomes are determined by how 
the people in the company engage with the structures in place.  Behaviour turns 
systems and processes into reality.    
 
Some of the reports considered have made recommendations in respect of 
“appropriate behaviour” by corporate boards.  However, the more pertinent issue is 
implementing these recommendations.  At present, the UK Corporate Governance 
Code has no specific provisions relating to behaviour.  It is agreed that there are 
numerous factors which may impact on the establishment of a definitive approach to 
the problem such as the fact that under the present system of corporate governance 
which is underpinned by the contractual theory of corporations, the shareholders and 
the company board retain most of the decision making powers and State interference 
in the form of establishing rules for the internal management of companies is 
discouraged and at best grudgingly accepted.  The committees which are set up to 
investigate and issue reports after corporate failures may be constituted by the State, 
but it is doubtful that their recommendations are implemented without recourse to 
the opinions of market participants such as shareholders and company directors.
526
  
In this case, it might be that shareholders are yet to fully understand the impact of 
the behaviour of company directors on the success or failure of their companies.  If 
shareholders had a full grasp of the implications of behavioural issues in corporate 
governance, then the chances are higher that they would realise that there is an 
enormous difference in the risks of corporate failure which is made by their choice 
of company directors.  It would then become vital to shareholders the kinds of 
personalities they allow into and retain in the governance of their companies.  In a 
perfect market which connotes one in which all vital information is readily 
available,
527
 the information relating to the behavioural tendencies of prospective 
directors becomes one which is essential in the decision to invest in a company.  
                                                          
526
 The FRC consults with the business community, see 
http://www.frc.org.uk/corporate/2009DecConsultationamendments.cfm (accessed 15th June 2012). 
527
 See Cheffins, (note 375). 
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Also, shareholders who are interested in the long term success of their companies 
would no doubt lean in the direction of mitigating behavioural risks.
528
  As was 
argued earlier, even in the case that there is no clear evidence that appropriate 
behaviour would lead to corporate success, there is clear evidence that inappropriate 
behaviour would lead to corporate failure.
529
   
 
It is trite that company directors have been prone to recruiting themselves based on 
the old boys’ syndrome.530  Cadbury highlighted that word of mouth or personal 
network approach to the selection of directors has been the traditional mode of 
recruiting directors, and he argued that such approaches should be increasingly 
unacceptable, but also acknowledges that old habits die hard and patronage breeds 
power and influence.531  Recent reports indicate that company directors are still being 
recruited through personal network approaches, and only a minority of nominations 
committees focus on descriptors of high performance.
532
  Essentially, traditional 
methods of director selection still prevail.
533
  More formal and rigorous approaches 
would prove better at ensuring the selection of the most appropriate company 
directors.
534
  But, considering the fact that directors have shown resistance to 
evaluation processes due to reasons such as individual humiliation and exposure,
535
 
one can expect that they might be opposed to the idea of their personality and 
behaviour being scrutinized.  Again, considering the traditional mode of director 
selection, there could be a limited pool from which directors are drawn, and so there 
might be apprehensions regarding the establishment of further supposed “bottle 
necks” in the recruitment process,  however, this process is a seriously needful 
“bottle neck”.  In the UK for instance, company directors in the financial sector 
                                                          
528
 Risks which are unmanaged could result in adverse effects for the company and truncate corporate goals, 
see Van der Elst & Van Daelen, (note 274); see also the Revised Turnbull Guidance, (note 170) 7, it should 
make a difference if shareholders had knowledge of this fact in relation to personality and behavioural risks, 
and it should influence their choice of directors and risk management processes in that regard. 
529
 See Solomon, (note 433) 72. 
530
 See Cadbury, (note 225). 
531
 Ibid. 
532
 See Dulewicz & Herbert, (note 224). 
533
 Ibid. 
534
 See Cadbury, (note 225). 
535
 See Long, (note 154); see also Ingley & Van der Walt, note (156); see also Kazanjian, (note 157) who notes 
that directors are generally reluctant to be assessed. 
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undergo assessments to determine whether they are fit and proper for the role.
536
  
This thesis argues for such recruitment scrutiny to occur in all public companies 
which trade on funds from the public and in which the State is a stakeholder on 
behalf of the general public.  This is because the State under the contractual and 
concession theories of companies has a responsibility to ensure that markets are 
functioning effectively.
537
  If there is an area of corporate governance which has 
been identified as porous and prone to create problems, such as behavioural issues, 
then such areas should be tackled as effectively as possible, regardless of the 
interests of persons other than the society as a whole.  The role of law in a society 
should also be considered in relation to the interests of entrepreneurs and company 
shareholders.
538
  The State has a role in preventing corporate failures in order to 
ensure that the economy is functioning effectively, so that there is enhanced quality 
of living within the society, and there are jobs, capital for businesses, and markets to 
access goods and services.
539
   
 
Central and most vital to solving the problems associated with behavioural issues in 
corporate governance is ascertaining what contributes to inappropriate behaviour.  
Some of the examples of corporate failures examined earlier highlighted some 
linkage between personality and the inappropriate behaviour of corporate officers.
540
  
That is an indication that personality impacts on behaviour.  If behavioural issues are 
risks to the corporate governance process for the reason that they have the potential 
to affect the achievement of corporate goals and objectives, then personality is also a 
risk to the corporate governance process as it has the potential to impact on 
behaviour. The previous chapter demonstrates that corporate governance 
mechanisms have largely ignored the issue of personality risks.  The examples of 
corporate failures and the reports analysed in this chapter have indicated how 
pertinent behavioural issues are in affecting corporate governance mechanisms and 
                                                          
536
 See The Financial Services Authority (FSA)’s Approved Persons Regime.  The FSA is set up under the 
Financial Services and Markets Act (FSMA) 2000.  The Regime is discussed in more detail in chapter seven, 
section 7.3.1. 
537
 See Dine, (note 49). 
538
 See Hansmann & Kraakman, (note 233) who argue that the role of law is to serve the interests of society as 
a whole. 
539
 See C. Coglianese, T. Healey, E. Keating & M. Michael, ‘The Role of Government in Corporate Governance’ 
(2004) 1 New York University Journal of Law and Business 219. 
540
 For instance, the Maxwell Group Plc report, the HIH Group report and the RBS report highlighted the issue 
of domineering personalities. 
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outcomes.  As personality is a factor which impacts on behaviour, then it is worth 
investigating how it does so.  This way, the exact impact of personality risks in 
corporate governance becomes clearer.   
 
In order to develop mechanisms which are geared towards ensuring that appropriate 
behaviours occur in a corporate governance context, it is also important to ascertain 
which aspects of personality contribute to the situations of appropriateness 
envisaged in corporate governance.  In the wider process of seeking to prevent 
corporate failures attributable to behavioural issues, identifying and managing 
personality risks is key.  There might be other factors which impact on behaviour, 
such as situations, but the focus of this thesis is on the personality aspect of 
behaviour.  This is because situations are largely dealt with by processes as already 
highlighted in relation to internal controls in section 3.4, so the gap which exists 
relates more to personality.  The fact that there have been continuous reforms in the 
area of processes and corporate failures have still occurred which are attributable to 
behavioural issues is a reason why there needs to be an emphasis on the gap created 
by the absence of mechanisms to manage personality risks in corporate governance.  
For the reason that personality has a significant impact on behaviour, as will be 
illustrated in detail in the next chapter, then there can be no meaningful attempt at 
managing behavioural risks if personality risks are not managed as well.   
 
4.6 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has illustrated the impact of behavioural issues and invariably 
behavioural risks in corporate governance.  Examples of corporate failures, as well 
as reports issued after investigations into such failures were examined in order to 
illustrate that personality risks and in turn behavioural risks are significant problems 
in corporate governance and have been contributory elements in corporate failures.  
The chapter has also highlighted a linkage between personality and behaviour, and 
indicates that personality risks must be identified and managed in the bid to manage 
behavioural risks.  The next chapter investigates personality in detail from a 
psychological perspective, discussing what personality entails, establishing the 
significant linkage between personality and behaviour, illustrating the means of 
identifying personality dimensions, and presenting arguments regarding the 
personality dimensions best suited to delivering effective corporate governance.          
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CHAPTER FIVE 
PERSONALITY AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE  
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Chapter four discussed the problems associated with behavioural issues in relation to 
corporate governance, particularly in respect of corporate failures, and highlighted that the 
personality of company directors impacts on their behaviour.  The purpose of this chapter is 
to draw on ideas established in psychology research as a foundational basis for understanding 
what personality entails and the linkage between the personality of company directors and 
their behaviour in delivering effective corporate governance.  This chapter also illustrates that 
it is possible to identify different personality types, and that the choice as to who should be 
recruited as directors can be made in such a manner as to give reasonable assurance that the 
most appropriate persons are appointed to positions with responsibility for the delivery of 
effective corporate governance.  The ability to identify personality dimensions also enables 
an identification of the risks associated with inappropriate personality traits, and contributes 
towards managing those risks.  There is also an analysis of the impact of personality 
dimensions on leadership and job performance roles, as well as arguments regarding the 
personality dimension best suited to delivering effective corporate governance. 
 
5.2 WHAT IS PERSONALITY?  
In 1930, Allport & Vernon in a review of 327 articles noted that “there seem to be virtually as 
many definitions of personality, character and temperament as there are writers on these 
subjects”.541  It may be that the personalities of the persons engaged in an exercise of 
articulating a definition of the term “personality” actually impacts on the outcome of the 
exercise, such that different views of the term emerge as there are differences in personalities.  
There are indeed various approaches to the concept of personality and this makes a univocal 
definition of the term a challenging task.
542
  For instance, there are the trait based Five-Factor 
model of personality analysis,
543
 the experimental analysis of the psychophysiological basis 
of personality,
544
 analysis of prototypic acts and act frequencies,
545
 psychodynamic 
                                                          
541
 See G.W. Allport & P.E. Vernon, ‘The Field of Personality’ (1930) 27(10) Psychological Bulletin 677-730. 
542
 See P. Hartmann, ‘The Five-Factor Model: Psychometric, Biological and Practical Perspectives’ (2006) 58(2) 
Nordic Psychology 150-170 at 150.   
543
 See McCrae & Costa, (note 134). 
544
 See H.J. Eysenck & M. Eysenck, Personality and Individual Differences (London: Plenum Press 1984). 
132 
 
formulations,
546
 and behavioural genetics,
547
 all different approaches to the issue of 
personality.  Personality cannot be considered in its totality using one single approach, and 
most personality researchers develop structural components into which facets of personality 
are divided and then seek to determine their individual elements and inter-relationships.
548
  
However, considering the factors that are most relevant for describing and explaining 
personality, some possible definitions emerge.   
 
Allport had explained personality trait in three stages as (i) an independent statistical variable 
(ii) a dynamic trend of behaviour that results from the integration of numerous specific habits 
(iii) a general habitual mode of adjustment that has a directive influence upon specific 
responses.
549
  Allport suggests that personality as a whole should be defined as a matter of 
degree of occurrence of particular traits.  This means that a person should be adjudged to be 
of a certain personality in the case that there is evidence of recurring traits which indicate that 
personality type more than any other.  This analysis also presupposes that an individual may 
display certain personality traits some of the time, but not enough times to be adjudged as a 
person of the personality type which is represented by those traits if he/she displays certain 
other personality traits in a more frequent degree.  This would probably hold true especially if 
the personality traits in question are contradictory.  For instance, a person who is accustomed 
to acting kindly towards others may generally and more accurately be described as a kind 
person, although he/she may actually display acts of unkindness sometimes.  Therefore, the 
crux of judgments as to personality according to Allport’s explanation rest on the frequency 
of display of the personality traits in question.   
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 See D.M. Buss & K.H. Craik, ‘The Act Frequency Approach to Personality’ (1983) 90 Psychological Review 
105-126. 
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 See K. Horney, Our Inner Conflicts (New York: Norton 1945). 
547
 See R. Plomin, J.C. DeFries & G.E. McClearn, Behaviour Genetics: A Primer (San Francisco: Freeman 1980); 
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neuroscience, see T. Canli (ed.), Biology of Personality and Individual Differences (New York: The Guilford Press 
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General Psychology 381-401 at 381. 
549
 See G.W. Allport, ‘Concepts of Trait and Personality’ (1927) 24(5) Psychological Bulletin 284-293. 
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Schultz & Schultz state that personality is “the unique, relative enduring internal and external 
aspects of a person’s character that influence behaviour in different situations”.550  From this 
definition, it can be discerned that personality is relative to an individual, relatively constant, 
and has an impact on the behaviour of that individual.  Again, this definition highlights that 
personality remains relatively constant even though behaviour may vary over different 
situations.  An example would be the case of an individual who is generally adjudged to be of 
a domineering personality.  In a situation where that individual is a subordinate, problems 
might arise as a result of his/her reluctance to obey instructions emanating from a process in 
which his/her contributions were not adopted.  Also, in situations where the domineering 
individual is a superior, problems may also arise if subordinates disagree with his/her 
opinions or instructions.  So, the individual’s domineering personality is evident in differing 
situations.   
 
Personality is also portrayed in both intrinsic and extrinsic characteristics.
551
  The intrinsic 
elements of personality represent the internal evidence of personality traits whilst the external 
elements represent the outward display of the traits.  Hogan notes that the term “personality” 
is usually used to refer to either of two elements.
552
  The first is the underlying structures, 
dynamics, processes and propensities that bring about certain behavioural regularities.  The 
second is the way in which these behavioural regularities are observed and described by 
others in terms of their content.  In other words the first element deals with the causal aspects 
and the second element deals with the descriptive aspects of personality.  The descriptive 
element of personality has its roots in the lexical approach to personality analysis which 
culminated in the five-factor model of personality.
553
  The lexical approach to personality 
analysis utilizes words as the identifying element of traits, so that a projection and analysis of 
particular word/words becomes indicative of the presence of certain personality traits.  
Describing aspects of an individual’s personality entails references to the observable content 
of behavioural regularities.  Hogan’s explanation as to what constitutes personality again 
brings to the fore the impact of personality on actual behaviour.  It also highlights the issue of 
“regularity” in terms of determining a particular behaviour as indicative of a particular 
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personality.  This would presuppose that an individual is adjudged as a certain kind of person 
because he/she acts in a particular way, more often than not.  It would also mean that the 
same individual can be reasonably expected to continue to act in that same way from which a 
judgment as to his/her personality was obtained.   
 
Brody & Ehrlichmann define personality as “those thoughts and feelings, desires, intentions 
and action tendencies that contribute to important aspects of individuality”.554  This definition 
highlights the possible trajectory of behaviour as emanating from within the individual in the 
form of thoughts, desires and intentions which may then culminate in actions and associated 
tendencies.  Again, the relationship between personality and behaviour is direct.  Regarding 
the exact influence of personality on behaviour, there are arguments that actual behaviour is 
dependent on both the personality of an individual and the given situation.
555
  Funder argues 
that every global personality trait is situation specific in the sense that it is relevant to 
behaviour in some but not necessarily all life situations.
556
  This would hold true because, for 
instance, an individual who is accustomed to arriving at work punctually in accordance with 
the regulations for employees may be adjudged a dutiful person because he/she abides by the 
obligation to obey the regulations.  However, there might come some day when due to 
unexpected traffic congestion, this individual arrives later than usual and outside the 
regulated time of arrival for employees.  The situation has clearly been altered by the traffic 
congestion, but, the personality of that individual would probably not have been altered, and 
were the situation to be normal, he/she is more likely to have arrived at the usual time based 
on which he/she was adjudged a dutiful person.  Therefore, making clear judgments as to 
individual personality is a question of consistency, and though these judgments may be 
influenced by different situations, it is doubtful that the basic personality can be altered, with 
the various definitions of personality suggesting that personality is relatively stable over 
time.
557
   
                                                          
554
 See N. Brody & H. Ehrlichmann, Personality Psychology: The Science of Individuality (New Jersey: Prentice 
Hall 1998) 3; see also R. Ryckman, Theories of Personality (2
nd
 ed., Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole Publishers 1982) 
4-5, where it is explained that personality is a concept which is hypothetically understood as it is the sum of 
biologically based and learnt behaviour which forms the person’s unique responses to environmental stimuli.  
555
 See B.W. Roberts, ‘Back to the Future: Personality and Assessment and Personality Development’ (2009) 43 
Journal of Research in Personality 137-145 at 139; see also Trevino, (note 134); see also Funder, (note 13). 
556
 See D.C. Funder, ‘Global Traits: A Neo-Allportian Approach to Personality’ (1991) 2 Psychological Science 31-
39. 
557
 As regards the issue of consistency and personality judgments, see W. Fleeson & E.E. Noftle, ‘Where does 
Personality have its Influence?, A Supermatrix of Consistency Concepts’ (2008) 76(6) Journal of Personality 
135 
 
 
Roberts analyses this cross-situational variance in personality by using an example of an 
authoritarian person who obeys all orders from a superior, and punishes subordinates for 
wrong doing, and so would obviously be prone to acting inconsistently in different 
situations.
558
   There is, however, no actual inconsistency in behaviour, because if 
authoritarians are known as people who possess those varying traits, it means they can 
obviously exhibit those different traits in different situations.  The tendency to obey one’s 
superior cannot be said to be totally inconsistent with the tendency to punish subordinates for 
wrong doing as the two actions are mutually exclusive behaviours of an individual who 
believes in and adheres to authority.  If anything, it is reasonable and consistent to expect a 
person who is accustomed to obedience to also have the tendency to punish others for 
disobedience.  It would have been a different situation if the argument regarding 
inconsistency is that an authoritarian person would obey superiors in certain situations and 
disobey them in others, with no clear consistency in either pattern of behaviour, in which case 
questions of inconsistent personality would be valid.  Essentially, the issue of inconsistency 
as it relates to personality traits would be most significant in cases where there is a display of 
contradictory traits, as in a situation where an individual obeys instructions at certain times 
and disobeys instructions at certain other times making it difficult to reach a definitive 
judgement as to whether that individual is actually an obedient person or not.  If the degree of 
frequency of display of a particular trait is not clearly higher than that of a contradictory trait, 
then it becomes challenging to make adequate judgments as to personality.  Roberts 
concedes, however, that temporal consistency is definitely a key to the existence of 
personality traits.
559
   
 
As to the meaning of personality traits, McCrae & Costa explain that unlike physical 
characteristics, personality traits are abstractions that cannot be directly measured and must 
instead be inferred from complex patterns of overt and covert behaviour.
560
  Hartmann draws 
inspiration from the works of psychology researchers such as McCrae & Costa, and states 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
1355-1385; see also D.C. Funder & C.R. Colvin, ‘Explorations in Behavioural Consistency: Properties of Persons, 
Situations and Behaviours’ (1991) 60 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 773-794. 
558
 See Roberts, (note 555). 
559
  Ibid 140. 
560
 See R. McCrae & P.T. Costa Jr., ‘Personality Trait Structure as a Human Universal’ (1997) 52(5) American 
Psychologist 509-516 at 510. 
136 
 
that a personality trait is a latent attribute constituted of emotions, thoughts and behaviour.
561
  
Hartmann elaborates by indicating that personality traits are not focused on abilities such as 
intelligence quotient but are rather focused on the mental aspects of emotions, thoughts and 
actions as well as the reason behind these phenomena.  He also argues that personality traits 
are latent attributes which may be hidden and not directly observable, and that personality is 
then discerned indirectly from observable actions.  Hartmann also explains that personality 
traits may refer to the causal element of emotions, thoughts and behaviour, as well as the 
descriptive categories of these personality traits.
562
  This means that personality is deciphered 
from outward behaviour which is a pointer to the existence of inward personality traits.  
Hartmann argues that the inward traits are the higher level of elements which inform specific 
personality traits, and the manifested concrete attitudes, actions, feelings etc. are the lower 
level observable elements which indicate the reality of personality traits.  He further explains 
that whereas the manifest lower level elements may change over time and situation, the 
intrinsic higher level elements, which represent the actual personality trait, remain relatively 
stable over time and across situations.
563
   
 
Hartmann argues further that the presence of a specific personality trait of a specific strength 
implies only a tendency for certain concrete attitudes, habits, acts and feelings but does not 
actually determine it or predict it with absolute certainty.
564
  If Hartmann argues that the 
intrinsic personality traits are latent and are indirectly discernible through the observance of 
actual behaviour, then it follows that actual behaviour which is a result of a specific 
personality trait will also be relatively stable over time and can be expected to occur more 
often than not.  After all, it is these observable traits that are usually used to predict the 
existence of the intrinsic traits.  It has been discussed earlier that situations could impact on 
behaviour.  But, judgments as to personality traits are made based on the degree of 
occurrence of particular traits.  Therefore, if an individual displayed particular attributes more 
often than not, then a near accurate judgment can be made as to his/her personality, even if 
the same individual displayed other attributes on some occasions.  It would be problematic if 
opposite and contradictory traits occurred in exactly the same frequency because in that case 
accurate judgments might not be made as to personality dimensions.  Ideally, one personality 
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trait should occur more often than the other contradictory trait for it to be reasonable to 
presume that a certain personality dimension has been identified.   
 
The issue here is that if different behaviours are indicative of a specific personality type, then 
the critical element is simply to understand that these different attributes are peculiar to a 
specific personality type and the issue would now rest on the frequency of occurrence as a 
parameter for measuring more accurately the existence of intrinsic personality traits and 
thereby making subsequent judgements as to personality types.  In essence, personality is 
relatively stable over time, even though different situations may bring about different actions 
and outward behaviour, the judgment as to personality type, though not absolute as with 
nearly every other issue in human existence, is made based on the frequency of occurrence of 
specific traits which enables one presume relatively accurately that those traits would 
reoccur.  It is, therefore, evident that where a judgment is made as to personality dimensions, 
one can expect that the likelihood of occurrence of those personality traits, the evidence of 
which resulted in the personality judgment, is very high.  The actual behaviour which is 
observable is assumed to result from the existence of specific personality traits intrinsically, 
and both the outward behaviour and the intrinsic personality traits are indicative of the likely 
existence of the other.   
 
From the foregoing definitions of personality and analysis of what the concept entails, it 
becomes apparent that personality is a major determinant factor in respect of outward 
behaviour.
565
  Therefore, behaviour can then be influenced by influencing personality 
choices.  Corporate governance codes have not adequately taken this fact into account as 
there is no express requirement for particular personality dimensions in corporate 
governance
566
 Christensen notes that research and opinion have offered numerous reasons for 
unethical business behaviour, but little attempt is made to explain the reasons why people 
make business decisions and take actions which they know to be illegal or unethical.
567
  From 
the import of the concept of personality and its relationship to behaviour as discussed above, 
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it becomes evident that the personality of company directors is a significant factor in relation 
to the decisions and actions they undertake in respect of corporate governance.  
  
5.3 THE FIVE-FACTOR MODEL OF PERSONALITY 
The Five-Factor Model of personality is a trait based approach to the conceptualisation of 
personality, and it provides a platform for combining various approaches to personality 
assessment.
568
  In psychological research, there is almost a consensual view that the best 
representation of trait structure is provided by the Five-Factor Model.
569
  The Five-Factor 
Model originated from the theories of Fiske
570
 and subsequently Norman.
571
  The model 
asserts that only five factors are required for the explanation of variations in personality as 
evidenced from questionnaires and descriptions of individual differences in human 
personality and behaviour.
572
  As much as the model is widely accepted as representing a 
valid theory of personality, there are contrary arguments.
573
  However, the model does not 
claim to provide the answers to all possible aspects of personality, but rather deals with the 
important elements of the subject of personality.
574
  The Five-Factor Model of personality has 
proven robust against scrutinized empirical testing and has provided a valid model for 
understanding personality.
575
  The model provides the most widely used and empirically 
supported structure for describing individual differences in total behaviour.
576
  The five 
dimensions of personality traits are (i) Neuroticism versus Emotional Stability (ii) 
Extraversion (iii) Openness to Experience or Intellect, Imagination or Culture (iv) 
Agreeableness versus Antagonism (v) Conscientiousness or Will to Achieve.
577
  The NEO 
Personality Inventory (NEO-PI) and the NEO Personality Inventory Revised (NEO PI-R) 
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were developed to operationalize the Five-Factor Model.
578
  The NEO PI-R questionnaire 
assesses 30 facets of personality traits, 6 for each factor.
579
  The Five-Factor Model is often 
used interchangeably with the “Big Five” dimensions of personality, but whereas the Five-
Factor Model is mainly used in the non-lexical/casual disposition manner, the Big Five is 
used more in connection with the lexical/categorical view.
580
  Both concepts nevertheless 
posit that there are five super-traits of personality.  There are other models which measure 
personality along the big five dimensions such as the Zuckerman-Kuhlman Personality 
Questionnaire (ZKPQ).
581
  However, the NEO PI-R has become a standard of measurement 
for the Five-Factor Model.
582
  According to the NEO PI-R as developed by Costa & McCrae, 
the following words are descriptive of the five personality dimensions: 
 
NEUROTICISM: Anxious, Worrisome, Vulnerable, Pessimistic, Depressive, Bad-Tempered 
 
EXTRAVERSION: Social, Friendly, Active, Thrill & Sensation Seeking, Optimistic, 
Assertive, Outgoing, Gregarious, Talkative 
 
OPENNESS TO EXPERIENCE: Open to new impressions, Tolerant, Liberal, Flexible, 
Creative, Imaginative, In contact with their feelings, Novelty seeking 
 
AGREEABLENESS: Altruistic, Modest, Trusting, Emphatic, Compliant, Polite 
 
CONSCIENTIOUSNESS: Self-disciplined, Ambitious, Foresighted, Responsible, Orderly 
Conscientious, Deliberate, Dutiful 
 
Dimensions of personality refer to the patterns of co-variations of traits across individuals.
583
  
This means that the above descriptions are dimensions and people can vary across them.  
Many personality traits are blends of two or more of the five dimensions, as for instance 
hostility can be adjudged as evidence of a high level of neuroticism or a low level of 
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agreeableness and shyness can be attributable to a combination of a high level of neuroticism 
and a low level of extraversion.
584
  Individuals can score low to high across the dimensions.  
Therefore, a combination of the dimensions would provide the outcome personality label.  
So, hypothetically, an individual can emerge as a person who is high in conscientiousness, 
medium (normal) in agreeableness and low in neuroticism.  
  
Individuals can, therefore, be categorised into different personality dimensions and the Five-
Factor Model has emerged as the most popular and widely accepted theory regarding this 
characterisation.
585
  The model is rooted in the use of descriptive words to identify the 
different personality traits and develop an understanding of the general personality of an 
individual.  The NEO PI-R is a questionnaire which is used to assess and identify personality 
types and has proven to be a robust measure of the five personality dimensions.
586
  An 
analysis of the descriptive words used to identify the different personality dimensions would 
elicit the fact that the judgment as to personality is usually made based on actual behaviour.  
For instance, the neurotic personality is identified through actions such as anxiety and 
pessimism.
587
  Likewise, the conscientious personality is identified by his/her orderliness and 
self-discipline.
588
  Therefore, going by the Five-Factor Model, it is mostly in actual behaviour 
that personality dimensions are identifiable.  These behaviours are described in words which 
are then interpreted as representing a particular dimension of personality.  This description of 
behaviour which then points to specific personality traits reinforces the linkage between 
personality and behaviour, and emphasises the importance of making appropriate personality 
judgments in all cases where there is a desire to influence behaviour.
589
  In corporate 
governance, there have been several debates regarding ways of improving and influencing the 
behaviour of company directors as evidenced in the reports of committees discussed in the 
previous chapter.
590
  From an understanding of the relationship between personality and 
behaviour, it becomes evident that in order to influence the behaviour of the persons who are 
allowed to govern companies, one issue that is relevant and should be considered as vital is 
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the choice of personalities in corporate governance.
591
  If the aim is to have directors who are 
naturally likely to govern companies in the best possible manner, paying heed to the 
established rules and regulations enacted to ensure good governance, a good step to take 
would be an identification of the most appropriate personality types to achieve this aim, and 
then the recruitment of these appropriate personality types, as well as their retention.
592
  In 
the case that inappropriate persons are recruited, then the associated risks should be identified 
and managed effectively.  
 
5.4 IDENTIFICATION OF PERSONALITY DIMENSIONS 
McCrae & Costa state that “…..unlike physical characteristics, personality traits are 
abstractions that cannot [usually] be directly measured [but] must instead be inferred from 
complex patterns of overt and covert behaviour.”593  In psychology, two methods have been 
developed for identifying personality traits, namely the lexical and the non-lexical 
methods.
594
  The lexical method is based on the theory that individual differences which are 
of most importance and relevance will eventually be incorporated into the language.  This 
theory posits that the greater the significance of the individual difference, the greater the 
likelihood of expressing this difference in a single word.  The lexical method was first 
theorized by Sir Francis Galton who collected more than 1000 words describing personality 
and then the method was further developed by psychologists such as Allport, Norman and 
Goldberg.
595
  The lexical method is essentially descriptive and some of its disadvantages are 
(i) language is used as a method of expression and does not meet strict scientific standards (ii) 
language varies between cultures and countries and even within same locations (iii) language 
is specific to particular subjects (iv) language and the use of language changes over time and 
raises the issue of whether personality traits change along with the language.
596
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The non-lexical method can be traced back to Jung and Murray.
597
  The method was then 
developed by Eysenck & Eysenck, Zuckerman and Costa & McCrae.
598
  The non-lexical 
method argues that all relevant personality traits can be identified either by imagination or by 
re-extraction of relevant personality traits from existing theories.  Some disadvantages of this 
method are (i) the possibility that some personality traits are redundant or just philosophically 
relevant (as against being practically relevant, and so might invariably seem irrelevant) (ii) 
the uncertainty as to whether all relevant personality traits are indeed discovered and 
recorded in existing theories.  At present, in psychological research, the two methods are 
combined to produce robust methods of describing and explaining personality traits.
599
  The 
distillation of the infinite number of personality traits based on language and re-extraction has 
led to the development of simple models, such as the Five-Factor Model, which is essentially 
a result of factor analysing data containing self-ratings or external ratings of personality traits.  
It was Fiske who first applied this method of analysis to the study of personality traits and 
discovered that the infinite number of personality traits could be distilled into five 
factors/super traits.
600
  This finding culminated in the development of the Big Five/Five-
Factor Model, and the emergence of measurement models.   
 
The fact that all factor solutions are indeterminate and that only factors with variance 
represented in the included variables can emerge means there could be an infinite number of 
models of measurement with different elements represented as variables.
601
 The NEO PI-R 
and the ZKPQ have been used more frequently and analysed in literature, with the NEO PI-R 
proving more popular because of its synonymy with the Five-Factor Model, thereby creating 
a common metric for the big five dimensions.
602
  One important point to note here is that the 
NEO PI-R is just one of the many potential models and is certainly not one which takes 
cognisance of all possible personality trait variables, especially as the model originates from 
the non-lexical approach to personality trait analysis.
603
  But, in order to identify personality 
traits, tests such as the NEO PI-R can be administered.  The NEO PI-R uses the self-rating 
approach to personality tests and even though it is the common one, there are some reasons 
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why the results might be inaccurate.  These include (i) the respondent not being self-aware 
and therefore answer the questions inaccurately (ii) careful/careless responses (iii) 
favourability/social desirability.
604
 These reasons emanate from the fact that the respondents 
are assessing themselves and may compromise the responses, knowingly or unknowingly.  
Despite these shortcomings, these tests are still relatively the most valid and best measuring 
models in existence.
605
   
 
McCrae & Costa explain that human judges are needed in order to make inferences regarding 
personality, and they do so by responding to checklists or questionnaire statements which use 
natural language because personality traits are so central to human interactions and all 
important traits will be encoded in natural language.
606
  Therefore, an analysis of the trait 
language should show the personality structure.  The NEO PI-R is a 240-item questionnaire 
with each of the five factors being represented by 6 specific traits or facets and responses are 
made on a 5 point scale from strongly disagree to strongly agree.  The evidence of reliability, 
stability and validity of the factors are summarised in the NEO PI-R manual.
607
  Research 
conducted by McCrae & Costa also suggests that personality traits conform to the Five-
Factor Model in various languages other than English in which the original model was 
developed.
608
  The application of the translated NEO PI-R in cultures and languages such as 
Chinese, German, Portuguese, Hebrew, Japanese, Korean and comparisons with the 
American English factor structure showed similar structures which leads to the probability 
that personality traits are universally similar.
609
 Therefore, the Five-Factor Model provides a 
good foundation for the understanding of personality in most parts of the world.
610
  It also 
follows that the NEO PI-R can usually be relied upon as a good measurement of personality, 
regardless of race, language and culture.   
 
The Five-Factor Model of personality dimensions is also evident in both self-reports and 
external ratings and this presents one of the strongest arguments in favour of the model.
611
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As regards the short-comings associated with personality tests employing the self-report 
method, it has been suggested that observer-rating methods actually yield incremental 
validity over self-reports.  In their research which was essentially focused on the Five-Factor 
Model and job performance indications, Oh, Wang & Mount state that self-report personality 
measures have been the most commonly used means of measurement but in consideration of 
the controversy relating to the low validity of personality measures in predicting job 
performance, alternatives to self-reports are suggested.
612
  They argue that it is important to 
demonstrate the robustness of findings by showing that results are the same across different 
methods of measurement and other strategies that may be employed include interviews, 
situational judgment tests and conditional reasoning measures.
613
  Evidence also indicates 
that the big five personality dimensions can be inherited and remain stable over time.
614
  
Therefore, in order to elicit objective results, adopting varying methods of measuring 
personality would probably be useful.  In corporate governance, an important factor would be 
the elucidation of personality traits which would be most appropriate for the effective 
governance of companies, and the development of sustainable means of identifying, 
recruiting and retaining such personalities in positions of governance.  Researchers agree that 
using the Five-Factor Model as the basis for personality is a finding consistent enough to 
approach the status of law.
615
  Although there are criticisms of the model, it remains the most 
widely accepted and robust approach for the explanation and identification of personality.
616
  
The model, therefore, enables a reasonably accurate determination of personality, and can be 
utilized in the assessment of personality traits.    
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5.5 PERSONALITY TRAITS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
One of the most prominent, simple and enduring definitions of corporate governance is that 
which emerged in the UK and which states that the term refers to the system through which 
companies are directed and controlled.
617
  From this definition, one can decipher that 
governance of companies involves two facets, the leadership role and the performance role.  
This is because the use of the word “direct” connotes a leadership dimension to the act of 
corporate governance whilst the word “control” conjures up an image of taking actions which 
keep the company in the desired position.  The “actions” which are undertaken to keep the 
company in a desired position can be viewed as the necessary performance required in 
engendering governance.  Therefore, in elucidating the traits that are appropriate to the 
delivery of effective corporate governance, it is necessary to analyse the traits which have 
been adjudged as being correlated to leadership and performance. The five dimensions of 
personality will be discussed below in relation to the two facets of roles which make up 
corporate governance in accordance with the above definition.   
 
5.5.1 LEADERSHIP ROLE  
Judge, Bono, Ilies & Gerhardt in their meta-analysis on personality traits and leadership 
discuss the relationship between personality and leadership, and offer insightful views on the 
correlation between the big five personality traits and leadership.
618
  They also state that there 
are two possible categories of leadership; leadership emergence and leadership effectiveness, 
and analyse the big five dimensions of personality in relation to these categories of leadership 
as follows: 
1) Neuroticism – They refer to the works of Bass, Hill & Ritchie and Hogan et al, and 
state that evidence points to the fact that neuroticism is negatively related to 
leadership emergence and leadership effectiveness.
619
  This means that individuals 
who are rated high in neuroticism would be ineffective leaders and are not likely to 
emerge as leaders in the first place.  
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2) Extraversion - They refer to the works of researchers such as Gough, Hogan et al and 
Costa & McCrae, and conclude that extraversion is positively related to both 
leadership emergence and leadership effectiveness, but more strongly to leadership 
emergence.  Gough had highlighted that adjectives used to describe leaders include 
active, assertive, and energetic, and these are the characteristics of extraverts.
620
  
Hogan et al also noted that extraversion is positively related to leadership perception 
and Costa & McCrae noted that extraversion is strongly related to social leadership. 
621
         
3) Openness to Experience - They refer to the works of Bass, Feist, McCrae & Costa, 
Stogdill, Yukl and Sosik et al, and state that open individuals are more likely to 
emerge as leaders and be effective leaders.
622
  They also state that evidence from 
research shows that originality and creativity, both hallmarks of openness, are some of 
the most indicative skills required for leadership.  
4) Agreeableness - They state that there is ambiguity as regards the relationship between 
agreeableness and leadership.  Whereas being cooperative and demonstrating 
interpersonal sensitivity tends to be positively related to leadership (as shown by Bass 
and Zaccaro et al), agreeable personalities are usually modest and leaders are usually 
not excessively modest.
623
  Also, the necessity for affiliation appears to be negatively 
related to leadership.
624
 
5) Conscientiousness - They state that initiative and persistence which are characteristic 
of conscientious persons have a positive correlation to leadership.  They refer to the 
works of Kirkpatrick & Locke and Goldberg, and conclude that there is an 
expectation that conscientious individuals will be more effective leaders.
625
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In concluding their meta-analysis, Judge, Bono, Ilies & Gerhardt argue that the big-five 
personality dimensions are useful predictors of leadership ability, and they also state 
categorically that Extraversion, Conscientiousness and Openness to Experience are the 
strongest and most consistent positive correlates of leadership.
626
  In stating the limitations of 
their study, they also highlight the need for further research to elicit the exact reasons why 
these traits are better suited to leadership and they also indicate that situational factors may 
affect the validity of personality in predicting leadership ability.
627
  Consistent with the call 
for further research, O’Connor & Jackson628 indicate that there is a need to investigate 
personality and leadership correlations using alternative methods and they have explored a 
psychobiological approach to leadership using Cloninger’s psychobiological model of 
personality.
629
  Biological models of personality tend to focus on the motivational bases of 
behaviour and are more explanatory as against the descriptive taxonomical approach of 
models such as the big-five.
630
  O’Connor & Jackson included personality scales from both 
the big-five model and the psychobiological model in their research in order to significantly 
improve their model of measurement.  They found that Cloninger’s psychobiological model 
of personality could explain some trait-based variance in leadership emergence and their 
results were also broadly consistent with the findings by Judge et al as the same three of the 
big-five personality dimensions were most significantly correlated with leadership ratings in 
at least one situation.
631
  Again, in relation to situational factors, O’Connor & Jackson found 
their results consistent with the proposition by Zaccaro et al that trait-based variance is more 
important than situation-based variance in the prediction of leadership emergence.
632
   
 
The indications from previous research that traits such as extraversion, conscientiousness and 
openness to experience are best suited and most indicative of positive leadership ability is no 
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big surprise because the characteristics of individuals with those dimensions of personality is 
consistent with what is naturally required to achieve effective steering of a group.  
Considering the extraversion trait, an effective leader has to be assertive, active, energetic and 
zealous in order to inspire his/her constituency to achievement.
633
  Leadership is inherently 
more of an exercise in exerting positive influence over others and an individual who cannot 
inspire positivism is in a disadvantaged position as a leader and will probably prove 
ineffective as such.  In relation to conscientiousness, an effective leader must be consistent 
and dependable so as to present a strong focal point for his/her followers.  A leader who 
reneges on his/her duties cannot reasonably be expected to effectively steer his followers into 
a pattern of obedience and conformity.
634
  An effective leader should ideally possess 
characteristics such as self-discipline, responsibility and foresightedness.
635
  Individuals who 
have the personality dimension of “open to experience” will rightly emerge as effective 
leaders because imaginativeness and creativity are traits which are needed in order to harness 
the potentials inherent in leadership positions and maximise the usefulness of different kinds 
of followers.
636
  Neuroticism will have a negative relationship with leadership ability because 
an individual who is disposed to characteristics such as anger, pessimism and anxiety is 
unlikely to elicit respect and confidence as a leader.
637
   
 
Judge et al indicate that there are ambiguities regarding the relationship between 
agreeableness and leadership, tending towards a conclusion that there is a negative 
correlation there.
638
  That result is surprising because ordinarily one would have assumed that 
an effective leader had to be one who could compromise in situations which required 
reasonable compromise and part of that clearly means taking on board alternative viewpoints 
and different opinions.  Interpersonal sensitivity is certainly a characteristic of agreeable 
personality dimension and was illustrated as positively related to leadership.
639
  However, it 
appears that other facets of the agreeable personality such as modesty when exhibited in 
excessive proportions cause a negative correlation to leadership ability.
640
  It then appears 
justifiable to suggest that an agreeable personality may still be an effective leader if traits 
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such as modesty are not exhibited excessively.  In fact, O’Connor & Jackson in their study 
found that co-operativeness was a significant predictor of emergent leadership.
641
  The 
definition of co-operativeness in that study is “the extent to which individuals identify with 
others, and understand the need to work with other people”,642 a definition which tends to 
lean more on the side of agreeableness, even though there is also an indication of  
extraversion inherent in it.   
 
Therefore, considering this definition of co-operativeness and the results of the study, 
agreeableness may indeed be more positively related to leadership than was illustrated by 
Judge et al.  Again, O’Connor & Jackson refer to arguments made by Cloninger et al that 
cooperativeness is correlated with age and they conclude that mature levels of 
cooperativeness are important for leadership.
643
  This “mature” level of cooperativeness can 
be likened to being reasonably modest, which may in addition to other agreeableness traits 
which are more positively related to leadership tweak the equation in favour of a more 
positive correlation between the personality trait of agreeableness and leadership ability.  
This is possible for instance where an individual who is agreeable and exhibits the trait of 
modesty realises that he/she also has to exert considerable influence over his/her followers 
and refrains from acting overly modest.  Maturity might also prevent affiliations, another 
facet of agreeableness which is negatively correlated with leadership,
644
 because a mature 
leader should invariably possess a better understanding of the need to appear neutral in order 
to remain relevant to all necessary constituencies and inspire relatively equal respect and 
confidence amongst all followers.   
  
It is evident from the literature and studies analysed above that certain personality dimensions 
are better suited to leadership roles.  In corporate governance, therefore, if effective 
leadership is desired, then it becomes important to take cognisance of these elements and 
develop mechanisms which ensure that the persons recruited into positions with 
responsibility for corporate governance are those who can be reasonably expected to 
undertake effective leadership roles in the companies they govern.  Where individuals who 
are not appropriately suited to leadership roles are involved in the leadership of companies, it 
could contribute to ineffectiveness in the performance of those roles. The analysis of 
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personality dimensions also shows that personality seldom changes and is actually stable over 
time, and so we can expect, for instance, that a neurotic person who becomes a company 
director would exhibit neurotic tendencies more often than not in clear inconsistency with the 
tenets of good leadership.  There is more of a lower than a higher possibility that such a 
person would become an appropriate leader at any point in time.  The personality risk 
inherent in such a situation should be identified and managed. 
 
5.5.2 PERFORMANCE ROLE    
There has also been considerable research on the correlation between personality dimensions 
and job performance.
645
  The original work done by Barrick & Mount and the work of other 
researchers such as Tett, Jackson & Rothstein and Robertson & Kinder provides evidence 
that personality dimensions do have an impact on job performance.
646
  In subsequent years, 
the works of Mount & Barrick, Salgado and Behling led to conclusions that 
conscientiousness is a valid predictor of job performance and represents the primary 
personality dimension for use in personnel selection.
647
  In their meta-analysis, Hurtz & 
Donovan pointed out methodological and statistical issues with past reviews on personality 
and job performance, and sought to provide a confirmatory meta-analysis of the relations 
between the big five and job performance by including only scales that were explicitly 
designed to measure the big five personality dimensions.
648
  Their overall results were highly 
consistent with the original work of Barrick & Mount because they found that 
conscientiousness had the highest validity amongst the big five dimensions of personality for 
overall job performance.  They also found that emotional stability as against neuroticism; 
extraversion, agreeableness and openness to experience had some validity depending on the 
job criterion.  
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Hurtz & Donovan note that conscientiousness does appear to have the strongest relation to 
overall job performance, and anti-neuroticism shows a consistent impact on job 
performance.
649
  According to them, agreeableness gains importance for jobs that require 
interpersonal reactions and extraversion does the same for jobs that have sales and 
managerial elements.  They also note that in jobs that have a customer service element, 
openness to experience becomes a valid predictor of performance.  Hurtz & Donovan state 
that these theoretically meaningful relations are low in magnitude at the broad dimension 
level of the big five and suggest that the magnitude of these correlations might be enhanced if 
the most relevant specific facets of these broad personality dimensions are specified.
650
  
Again, they suggest a combination of selected facets of the correlated personality dimensions 
in future research in order to enhance and optimize the prediction of job performance 
especially across different types of job criteria.  The importance of adopting alternative 
methods of measurement such as external and observer ratings, as against using just self-
reports, was also highlighted.  In discussing the limitations of their study, they state that so 
little research of this nature has been done using managers and clarification of the impact of 
the big five on this category of persons would be very beneficial for selection research and 
practice.  In summary, Hurtz & Donovan highlight that the conscientiousness personality 
dimension has a moderate impact on performance, but its validity appears stable and 
generalizable across occupations and criteria.
651
  
 
In their original study, Barrick & Mount concluded that the validity of personality as a 
predictor of job performance was quite low, but they conceded that at the time of their study 
there was no well accepted taxonomy for classifying personality traits.
652
  Hurtz & Donovan 
took cognisance of this limitation in their own meta-analysis, but ended up with a similar 
result.
653
  Morgeson et al in their review of literature relating to personality and job 
performance also highlighted that the validity of personality measures in predicting job 
performance is so low that the use of self-report personality tests in personnel selection 
should be reconsidered.
654
  More recently and in response to this concern, Oh et al in their 
meta-analysis drew a conclusion to the effect that the validity of the big-five in predicting 
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overall job performance is higher than previous research had shown and their results 
reinforce the importance of separating the validity of personality traits in predicting 
performance from the method of measurement of the traits.
655
 Oh et al suggest explanations 
for the low validity of self-report such as individuals faking their responses.  They refer to 
evidence that personality assessments made by well-acquainted observers can provide equally 
accurate information about an individual.
656
  Oh et al point out a distinction between self-
reports and observer ratings in the sense that self-reports assess the internal dynamics that 
shape the behaviour of an individual, whereas observer ratings capture the reputation of an 
individual.
657
  Interestingly, they also state that “because reputations typically are based on 
the individual’s past performance, and because past performance is a good predictor of future 
performance, reputations are likely to be more predictive of behaviour in work settings than 
the internal dynamics of one’s personality”.658  However, they also point out some obvious 
limitations of observer ratings such as the fact that observers have limited opportunity to 
observe a target individual’s behaviour across times and situations, and some personality 
traits are indeed private to the target individual and would not be easily observable externally.  
In conclusion, Oh et al state that observer ratings have substantial incremental validity over 
self-reports and consistent with previous research, they also found that conscientiousness has 
the highest validity in predicting overall job performance.
659
   
 
5.6 PERSONALITY TRAITS AND SPECIFIC JOB PERFORMANCE 
From the foregoing analysis of research and literature, some key concepts emerge.  Firstly, 
there is a definite, albeit a moderate, correlation between personality and job performance.  
More recent research has shown increased validity in this respect in cases where observer 
ratings are utilized.
660
  Secondly, all of the research undertaken highlights the prominence of 
the conscientiousness dimension of personality as the highest, strongest and most stable 
predictor of job performance.  Hurtz & Donovan indicate that other dimensions such as anti-
neuroticism, agreeableness and openness to experience also have some validity depending on 
the job criteria with conscientiousness and emotional stability (which is essentially anti-
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neuroticism) showing the most stable influence on performance across most job criteria.
661
  
Thirdly, some of the researchers reiterate the place of general cognitive ability as the single 
best predictor of overall job performance, but they still allude to the fact that personality 
dimensions have an impact on job performance.
662
  Fourthly, there are concerns about the low 
validity of the correlations between personality and job performance, but subsequent research 
has also illustrated that the problems might lie in the methods of measurement, and so 
adopting self-report methods in conjunction with observer ratings or external rating would 
increase the validity of the results in substantial measures.
663
  Based on the arguments above, 
it is evident that personality has an impact on job performance.   
 
Regardless of the controversy surrounding the exact level of influence exerted, in 
consideration of the risks involved in employing persons with personalities which might not 
be suited to effective job performance, and mindful of the fact that risks which are adjudged 
low might actually have high impact (as evident in risk analysis and assessment measures), it 
becomes important to take cognisance of personality dimensions in recruiting company 
directors into corporate governance.  Hurtz & Donovan noted in their work that persons of 
managerial level had not been used in most of the published research on the subject of 
personality and job performance,
664
 but the results which are obtained from workers in other 
job criteria can generally be extended to managers because they are also human beings with 
personality dimensions which are assessable along similar lines as other workers.  The 
relationship between personality and job performance would become more or less significant 
depending on the particular job role, and the personality traits which exert a positive or 
negative influence on that role.
665
  Again, the fact that managers are seldom used in 
personality researches also indicates that personality issues in job performance are rarely 
directed at high level officers but mostly on lower level employees.  But, lower level 
employees usually take instructions from high level officers such as managers and the 
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possibility is higher that they would ordinarily obey the instructions emanating from the 
managers because the managers are in a position of authority.   
 
If managers are not persons with the potential to issue appropriate instructions, then the 
instructions they project could be reflective of their personality and so the employees may 
take actions that are inappropriate based on instructions that are inappropriate.  The fact that 
some research has shown that trait-based variance is generally more important than situation-
based variance also supports the argument that a manager’s personality and its influence on 
job performance may not necessarily differ in a situation where he/she is not a manager.
666
  
That means that a neurotic personality is likely to exhibit the same traits of neuroticism in 
both lower level employee roles as well as in managerial roles. Again, the conscientiousness 
personality dimension was particularly shown to be valid and stable across different job 
criteria.
667
  This is an indication that the conscientiousness personality traits are such that are 
compatible with effectiveness in job performance roles involving varying aspects.  The 
important element would undoubtedly be to adopt robust means of measuring these 
personality dimensions in order to arrive at accurate and substantial results in relation to 
correlations between personality and job performance. 
 
Personality tests based on the work of psychology researchers have been used in employee 
selection for many years.
668
  Company directors may not always be grouped as employees in 
that sense of the word and they are more likely than not the group of people who authorise 
the conduct of personality tests on other lower level employees.
669
  It is doubtful whether they 
actually subject themselves to the same tests as other employees, especially considering as 
Hurtz & Donovan pointed out that they have not even been the subject of personality 
researches in most cases.  In reality, company management activities could also be delegated 
to the management team by the company directors, and so it is a valid argument that 
corporate governance mechanisms should be extended to the management personnel who are 
involved in the day to day operations of the company and from whom other employees take 
direct instructions.  It is quite possible that some companies evaluate the personality of their 
management employees at the point of recruitment, as they might do all other employees, but 
                                                          
666
 See Schultz & Schultz, (note 13); see also O’Connor & Jackson, (note 628); see also Zaccaro et al, (note 623). 
667
 See Hurtz & Donovan, (note 645); see also Mount & Barrick, (note 647); see also Behling, (note 647). 
668
 See Hurtz & Donovan, Ibid 869. 
669
 Some directors such as the CEO may be employees as well.  Other directors may simply have a directorship 
with the company.   
155 
 
it is more doubtful that the same process is undertaken for company directors.  Again, the 
management team usually act upon the instructions of company directors, a situation which 
underscores the necessity to pay more attention to the personality of company directors.   
 
The UK Corporate Governance Code does not make recommendations in relation to 
personality assessments and the recruitment of company directors has had a tradition of being 
undertaken on the basis of the “old boys club” syndrome.670  Therefore, except in cases where 
internal company policies require a personality check, or a company in the UK which is 
subject to the authority of the financial services regulator which conducts some level of 
personality checks under its approved person’s regime,671 there is a risk that a company could 
recruit directors whose personalities are largely unchecked and unknown.  This is certainly a 
personality risk for the corporate governance process considering that there is a correlation 
and an impact of personality on both leadership and job performance.  Recruiting persons 
who have the potential to contribute to corporate failures as a result of their personalities 
increases risks in corporate governance because such persons cannot be reasonably expected 
to exhibit appropriate leadership and performance behaviour which engenders a higher 
expectation of corporate success.  It is therefore useful to identify personality risks on the part 
of company directors by applying personality assessments alongside other considerations 
which might be useful for determining the appropriateness of a director for that role. 
 
One relevant question that emerges from the analysis above is what kinds of personality 
dimensions are best suited to corporate governance?  It is evident that certain personality 
types are best suited to leadership roles and these are extraversion, conscientiousness and 
openness to experience.
672
  It is also obvious that as regards job performance, conscientious 
and anti-neurotic personalities are the strongest and most stable dimensions.
673
  In fact, it has 
been argued that in no case would conscientiousness and agreeableness become a liability in 
an organisation because those personality dimensions are organisational virtues.
674
  It means, 
therefore, that a combination of these positively correlated personality types would be best 
suited to corporate governance.  However, it may not always be possible to obtain the most 
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appropriate combination of these personality types. So, it becomes important especially for 
increased effectiveness and practicality to decipher which dimensions of personality are so 
vital for governance that they should always be present if a reasonable expectation can be 
made as regards effective corporate governance.  In this regard, an analysis of the common 
denominator of appropriate personality dimension as it relates to both governance roles of 
leadership and performance is relevant and that personality dimension is conscientiousness. 
   
The correlation of various personality types to governance roles has already been discussed, 
and the impact of each of them has been analysed.  Therefore, even though there is a positive 
relationship between some other personality dimensions and the governance roles, the 
conscientiousness dimension is singled out here as the most important dimension for the 
reason that a conscientious person would be an appropriate leader as well as an appropriate 
performer on the job.  For reasons of efficiency at least, if there is one personality dimension 
which if present in corporate governance would reasonably create increased assurances of 
effective governance and contribute towards mitigating personality risks, that personality 
dimension would be conscientiousness.  Part of mitigating personality risks would involve 
ensuring the presence of persons with the potential to perform effectively in corporate 
governance. One of the first steps in this direction is the identification of these persons.  The 
conscientious personality is one essential personality dimension which is suited to all the 
facets of corporate governance.     
 
5.7 CONSCIENTIOUSNESS 
This is the fifth domain of personality dimension in the NEO PI-R test and assesses the 
degree of organisation, persistence, control and motivation in goal directed behaviour.  A 
high score in this regard identifies individuals who tend to be organised, reliable, hard-
working, self-directed, punctual, scrupulous, ambitious and persevering.  According to the 
Five-Factor Model, the traits or facets that define the conscientiousness dimension of 
personality are as follows:  
1) Competence- Belief in own self efficacy. 
2) Order- Personal Organisation. 
3) Dutifulness- Emphasis placed on importance of fulfilling obligations. 
4) Achievement Striving- Need for personal achievement and sense of direction. 
5) Self-Discipline- Capacity to begin tasks and follow through to completion 
despite boredom or distractions. 
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6) Deliberation- Tendency to think things through before acting or speaking. 
 
An analysis of the import of these traits illustrates why the conscientiousness dimension of 
personality has proven to be a valid and stable predictor of both leadership and performance 
roles.
675
  The other positive personality dimensions are of importance no doubt, but, as 
regards goal directed tasks such as corporate governance, the most vital personality 
dimension would be conscientiousness.
676
  More importantly, as there is evidence to support 
the fact that some major corporate failures occurred as a result of disobedience to established 
principles and regulations,
677
 and conscientious personalities are more likely than not to be 
dutiful by obeying principles and regulations, having conscientious personalities involved the 
governance of companies would increase the likelihood of obedience to principles and 
regulations, thereby preventing the kind of corporate failures that can occur for reasons of 
disobedience.  Examples of corporate failures analysed in the previous chapter highlight this 
thread of disobeying recommendations and regulations. Hartman, in analysing the practical 
perspectives of the trait theory, states that models like the five-factor model should help us 
anticipate events and perhaps intervene.
678
  In a summary of results obtained from various 
studies and presented in a tabulated form, he highlights the predominance and recurrence of 
conscientiousness in job related functions, and states that the knowledge obtained through 
personality assessment can help to shape and change lives for the better, both for the 
individual and for society in general.
679
  This is certainly true and relevant in the area of 
corporate governance.   
 
The knowledge that certain personality dimensions have the potential to be better suited to 
governance if utilised appropriately in selecting, recruiting and retaining company directors 
would help in creating effective corporate governance and preventing corporate failures.  In 
particular, the knowledge that conscientious personalities are most likely to succeed at 
leadership and job performance should inform the decisions regarding the recruitment of 
company directors, alongside other considerations such as cognitive ability.  It has been 
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asserted that “it is quite presumable that high values of conscientiousness lead the most vivid 
corporate decision makers to centralize structures and decisions, as well as to assume pro-
active behaviours within their competitive environment.”680  It is certainly a risk to the entire 
corporate governance process to have personalities who are not conscientious involved in 
corporate governance because as much as some of the other personality dimensions are also 
positively correlated to leadership and performance, conscientiousness appears to be the most 
vital personality dimension due to the goal oriented nature of corporate governance.   
 
In the management of personality risks, ensuring that individuals who are conscientious are 
recruited and retained will help ensure the overall effectiveness of the corporate governance 
system because that personality dimension is valid across both leadership and performance 
roles.
681
  Individuals may possess personality traits which embrace the five domains of 
personality, but (as analysed in earlier sections of this chapter), the salient issue is the 
frequency of occurrence of particular traits as a determinant of personality dimension, and the 
important factor in this case is that individuals who possess higher levels of 
conscientiousness would be  suited to corporate governance.
682
  Again, researchers such as 
Paunonen & Ashton have argued that it is important to narrow down the particular facet or 
trait within a personality domain which actually contributed to the prediction of specific 
behaviours.
683
  For instance, if a conscientious individual obeys principles and regulations, 
then it would be narrowed down to the dutifulness facet or trait.  Christopher, Zabel & Jones 
in their work on conscientiousness and work ethic ideology highlight that amongst the 6 
facets of conscientiousness, dutifulness and achievement striving were the two most 
consistent predictors of seven dimensions of work ethic ideology.
684
  Achievement striving 
predicted the belief that hard work yields desirable outcomes, the centrality of work, the 
avoidance of wasting time and the delay of gratification.  Dutifulness on the other hand 
predicted self-reliance and morality/ethics.
685
  This knowledge would be particularly helpful 
in cases where specific behavioural tendencies are desired and more accurate judgments can 
be made as to predictions of behaviour.   
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The UK Corporate Governance Code consists essentially of principles and recommendations 
which operate on a voluntary basis.  Based on the spirit of free enterprise, entrepreneurs, 
company directors and managers have preferred voluntary codes as against statutory 
intervention in the running of businesses.
686
  It is therefore important to have company 
directors who have the tendency to obey these voluntary corporate governance principles and 
recommendations as this act of obedience is clearly one of the foundations of a successful 
and effective governance regime.
687
  Even in cases where statutory regulations exist, it is 
important to ensure that company directors have a sense of obligation and are able to abide by 
these regulations.  As was argued earlier in relation to internal controls, the fact that rules can 
be circumvented is a risk to an entire governance regime.  Taking cognisance of this, it 
becomes evident that the most important facet of conscientiousness as it relates to corporate 
governance would be dutifulness.  An individual may have many varying traits which may or 
may not be positively correlated to corporate governance, but, if corporate governance 
mechanisms have already been established in the form of governance codes and regulations, 
and this individual is a dutiful person who is likely to obey the code and regulations, then 
effective corporate governance could still occur.
688
  In other words, the action and resolve of 
obedience to established corporate governance principles and compliance with regulations 
will help ensure the successful governance of a company by individuals who are dutiful even 
though the same individuals may have other personality facets which are not necessarily 
positively correlated to corporate governance.   
 
In the imperfect world, where people may not necessarily possess all the required personality 
traits which are adjudged to be most conducive to corporate governance, ensuring that people 
who are allowed into the corporate governance system possess at least the most vital 
personality trait of dutifulness becomes a critical issue.  This way,  there is an increased 
opportunity to have differing calibres of persons in governance who would bring on board 
their  varying strengths to the process, but the common denominator would be that most vital 
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personality trait which is determined as a constant in order to ensure better governance.  For 
instance, if there is an extrovert personality on the board of directors of a company, as well as 
an agreeable personality, these two different personalities may contribute to the management 
of the company in different ways due to their personality dimensions.  Whereas the extrovert 
personality would most likely be able to interact socially with the necessary constituencies in 
order to get things done, the agreeable person would also be most likely to engage in 
necessary compromises which would be required to move the company ahead.  As long as 
both personalities are able to obey and abide by established corporate governance principles 
and regulations, it becomes more likely that effective governance would be achieved and 
corporate failures could be prevented.  In fact, Witt argues that there is a significant 
interaction between extraversion and conscientiousness to the effect that the relationship 
between extraversion and performance was positive in cases where there was also a high 
level of conscientiousness but became negative in cases where the individual was low in 
conscientiousness.
689
  Therefore, an individual who is conscientious and particularly 
possesses the dutiful trait would have adequate potentials to undertake effective corporate 
governance.  In the case that a company director does not possess this trait, there is an 
increased personality risk in the corporate governance process.  In any case in which persons 
with the potential to behave inappropriately are recruited into the governance process, there 
should be an awareness of the risks associated with their personalities and it becomes 
important that adequate measures are taken to manage these risks.   
 
Trevino has argued for a person-situation interactionism model, which essentially posits that 
one’s actual behaviour, particularly as it relates to ethics, would be determined by two 
factors: the individual ( personality) and the situation (job context, organisational structure 
etc.).
690
  This is true because the interactions which occur are essentially between personal 
and situational variables.  However, even though situational variables are relevant, the 
personality variables are more stable and indicative of outcomes in behaviour.
691
  In corporate 
governance, if principles and regulations have already been established to take care of 
varying anticipated situations, and certain actions have been mandated in response to those 
situations, then the other element which happens to be the most vital one is the actual ability 
of company directors to respond to the situation by adopting or complying with the required 
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action as mandated.  This most vital element is determined by the personality variable.  So, 
for example, if the corporate governance regulations mandate that systemic risk should be 
managed in a particular way, using particular processes, the pertinent issue becomes whether 
the directors would obey these regulations and actually manage systemic risk in the particular 
way that has already been mandated.  The management of the systemic risk is the situation, 
but the eventual outcome in relation to that situation is determined by whether the directors 
are dutiful and manage the systemic risk as prescribed.   
 
Most situational issues in business might already be catered for because with experience, 
most situations are planned and systems put in place to regulate outcomes.  There is no doubt 
that there may be unplanned and unforeseen situations at some points, however, the presence 
of  persons with the potential to behave appropriately on corporate boards should engender 
more effective and positive responses to even unplanned and unforeseen situations based on 
the fact that they would have a better sense of duty towards achieving corporate success and 
this should inform their decisions and actions at all times.  Recruiting company directors who 
are most likely to abide by corporate governance principles and regulations regardless of the 
situation at hand is one means of creating effective corporate governance and helping to 
promote the prevention of corporate failures.  Recognising and managing the personality 
risks which accrue from having directors who have the potential to disobey corporate 
governance principles and regulations is also another means of engendering effective 
corporate governance, more so because corporate governance is an exercise in risk 
management.   
 
In relation to the influence of appropriate individual personality dimensions on collective 
personality and performance, Hofmann & Jones note that collective personalities emerge and 
develop as individuals come together and begin to interact.
692
  They argue that leadership is 
one factor which is capable of influencing collective personality and they cite the example of 
a leader who consistently emphasizes creativity as being able to engender collective routines 
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which would be consistent with the openness to experience personality dimension.
693
  
Likewise, one can then expect that in corporate governance, a leader who consistently 
emphasizes dutifulness would eventually engender the same sense of dutifulness in the 
organisation as a collective group.  It has been argued that personality has more direct and 
powerful effects on group processes than other composition variables such as age, race, 
gender and information distribution.
694
  This is all the more reason why it is important to 
ensure that the company directors who are at the helm of affairs in companies are 
conscientious and dutiful.  For the reason that these persons are also in leadership roles, they 
are better able to influence others through to the bottom of the corporate ladder.  There can 
then be a reasonable expectation that corporate governance would be improved 
collectively.
695
  
 
Despite the existence of corporate governance codes and corporate law which are 
promulgated to guide the behaviour of company directors, examples of corporate failures as 
discussed in the previous chapter illustrate that directors continue to fail to obey the tenets of 
corporate governance codes and recommendations in statutory regulations.  The pertinent 
question is whether every kind of individual would actually have the natural ability to obey 
these corporate governance principles and statutory regulations?  An analysis of the literature 
on personality dimensions would indicate the answer as negative.  Personality risk is 
therefore introduced into the corporate governance process by the presence of individuals 
who are not accustomed to obedience by virtue of their personality, and so, cannot therefore 
be reasonably expected or guaranteed to always obey corporate governance principles and 
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statutory regulations.  Considering the impact of corporate failures on companies and society 
as a whole, it becomes important to give serious consideration to these issues and develop 
mechanisms for mitigating these personality risks.  As it is evident from psychological 
research that there is a significant relationship between personality and behaviour, and 
considering that behaviour in corporate governance is a contributory factor to the failure of 
companies, in the case that less failure is desired, one clear means of helping to achieve the 
desired result is to ensure that the persons who are allowed into corporate governance  have 
the potential to behave appropriately, and are particularly persons who are prone to abiding 
by principles and obeying regulations. This way, there is an increased likelihood that these 
persons will govern the companies more effectively because they are more likely at the least 
to abide by the established principles and regulations which are put in place to help guarantee 
effective corporate governance.  In a situation where  persons who have the potential to 
behave inappropriately are recruited as directors, it becomes imperative to identify the 
inherent personality risk and institute effective risk management processes in that regard so 
as to prevent corporate failures.   
 
5.8 CONCLUSION  
This chapter has explored the meaning of personality and its relationship to behaviour.  It has 
established that personality has a significant impact on behaviour, and can therefore 
constitute a risk in relation to behaviour.  The chapter has also illustrated that personality 
dimensions can be identified, and this connotes that personality risks can therefore be 
identified and managed.  As corporate governance is essentially concerned with leadership 
and performance functions, there was also an analysis of how the facets of personality impact 
on leadership and job performance roles.  Based on an analysis of the different personality 
dimensions and how they function, this chapter presented arguments regarding the 
personality traits which are best suited to the achievement of effective corporate governance.  
Again, based on the examples of corporate failures and an observation of the fact that one of 
the major contributory elements to the failures was the lack of dutifulness on the part of 
corporate officers, this chapter also argues that the dutifulness trait is the most essential in 
relation to corporate governance.  It is the knowledge of what effective corporate governance 
entails and the fact that there are personality dimensions most appropriate to achieving this 
and a consciousness of the risks associated with inappropriate personalities in the corporate 
governance process, as well as an examination of relevant corporate and regulatory theories 
which leads to the development of the personality risk management model proposed in this 
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thesis, beginning with a conceptual framework for personality risk management discussed in 
the next chapter.                                                        
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR PERSONALITY RISK 
MANAGEMENT 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
The two chapters preceding this have established an understanding of the problems that can 
emanate from personality and behavioural issues.  Chapter four illustrated that personality 
and behavioural issues have contributed to corporate failures and in chapter five, the linkage 
between personality and behaviour was discussed.  The conclusion reached from both 
chapters and a reflection on the discussions in chapter three is that personality risk impacts on 
behavioural risk.  Therefore, in order to prevent the occurrence of corporate failures which 
are attributable to personality risks, there have to be mechanisms in corporate governance 
regimes which are instituted to manage these risks.  This chapter discusses what needs to be 
achieved in the management of personality risks, presents some possible approaches to 
achieving this aim, indicates the preference for a hybrid regulatory approach and discusses 
the justification for adopting that approach in the development of the personality risk 
management model suggested in this thesis.  
6.2 WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE? 
Risk management is a process which entails the recognition, identification and assessment of 
risk, and the development of strategies to mitigate it.
696
  As with the fundamentals of risk 
management as a concept in itself, managing personality risks involves recognising, 
identifying, assessing and mitigating risks associated with personality.
697
  Recognition of 
personality risks entails an awareness of the potential risks associated with personality traits.  
Identification entails obtaining a clear definition and parameter regarding personality traits so 
as to enable an effective judgment regarding what constitutes personality risk.
698
  It also 
means deciphering the aspects of personality which are relevant to the recognition of 
personality risks.
699
  Therefore, identifying personality risks means seeking to discover the 
personality traits which contribute to risk issues.  For this to be achieved in the case of 
personality risks in relation to effective corporate governance, it would involve adequate 
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knowledge of what personality entails in relation to corporate governance processes and 
knowledge of the risk issues in corporate governance which are affected by personality 
traits.
700
  Regarding the identification and recognition of personality, the discipline of 
psychology provides the required information as the issue is essentially one of human 
psychology, and that is the school that has studied personality the most with tried and tested 
methods and can best explain what personality entails.
701
   
The personality risk issues which affect corporate governance can be identified by analysing 
debates, problems and approaches undertaken in corporate governance.
702
  For instance, an 
analysis of various corporate failures illustrates that company directors disobeyed principles, 
rules and regulations, and so it can be deciphered that disobedience is a personality trait 
which can constitute risks in corporate governance.
703
  Assessing personality risks involves 
analysing the information obtained from the identification process and evaluating its potential 
effects in relation to corporate governance processes and outcomes.  It means identifying the 
elements of personality which are likely to impact on the achievement of corporate objectives 
and result in a negative consequence, such as corporate failure.  The assessment process 
provides a basis for the adoption of choices in relation to managing identified risks.  
Mitigating personality risks, as with the approaches involved in mitigating other categories of 
risks, could take various forms including avoiding the risk entirely, or taking steps and 
developing mechanisms to minimise its occurrence, its effects, or its impact.
704
   Avoidance 
of risks is an approach of risk management, however, it is also conceded that there are 
situations in which risks should not be avoided in their entirety;
705
 therefore, taking steps to 
impact on the occurrence or effect of risks becomes the most appropriate form of risk 
management in those situations.  
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6.3 APPROACHES TO MANAGING PERSONALITY RISKS 
Some of the ways in which personality risks in corporate governance may be managed to 
varying degrees are as follows: 
1) Hard Law/Criminal Law: Processes to manage personality risks could be 
entrenched in statutory provisions.  For instance, legislation could mandate the 
identification and mitigation of personality risks, specifying the manner in which 
companies are to apply the provisions and providing sanctions for non-
compliance.  One disadvantage of such an approach would be that it would have 
to provide for every situation which it intends to cover, and that would prove 
onerous when it relates to processes for managing personality risks in different 
companies.  This is because by the very nature of the subject, personality can 
differ and corporate governance needs can also differ, and change over time, 
depending on the company in question.  Therefore, flexibility is necessary.  Again, 
the processes involved in the promulgation of hard law are such that the law may 
not readily keep up with changing developments.
706
  Nevertheless, hard law in the 
form of statutory provisions can be of utility in cases where flexibility is not a key 
concern.   
As a way of managing personality risks, provisions can also be entrenched in 
criminal laws which prohibit certain behaviours.  Criminal laws refer to the body 
of rules and statutes that define conducts prohibited by the government because 
they threaten and harm public safety and welfare; and establish punishment to be 
imposed for the commission of such acts.
707
  Crime is generally defined as an act 
which is an offence against the community and attracts legal punishment.
708
  This 
means that behaviour is considered criminal only if it contravenes the criminal law 
and attracts punishment.
709
  Criminal law can originate from different sources 
such as the common law, statute, or regulatory provisions emanating from 
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delegated legislation.
710
  Persons may be deterred from behaving in ways which 
contravene the criminal law by the fact that the law prohibits such behaviours and 
also the possibility of criminal sanctions which result from being caught in such 
behaviours.
711
  Criminal law can, therefore, be used as a means to manage 
personality risks to the extent that particular behavioural tendencies which result 
from personality traits are specified as prohibited under criminal law.  If 
behavioural tendencies are not viewed as crime, then criminal law is limited to the 
extent that it manages the risks emanating from personality traits resulting in such 
behaviours.  An example would be the RBS case in which none of the company 
executives were charged with criminal offences simply because even though their 
behaviour contributed to the problems which occurred at the bank, there were no 
laws under which such behaviour could be judged.
712
   
Criminal law which specifies prohibited behaviour and punishment for the same 
would manage the personality risks which contribute to those behaviours to the 
extent that individuals are deterred from exhibiting such behaviours, either 
because the law prohibits it or because of the fear of punishment.  In the event that 
individuals are not so deterred, one possible reason for the lack of deterrence 
being their personality, then criminal law fails in the management of such 
personality risks.  Criminal law could also in certain instances provide for 
situations which are speculative to the extent that crime has not actually occurred 
but there is an assumption that it might occur.
713
  In this way, criminal law can be 
                                                          
710
 See Crowther, (note 304) 20. 
711
 There are various arguments as to why criminal laws are obeyed and disobeyed.  Criminologists argue that 
crime is simply behavioural responses to social conditions, see C. Sumner, ‘The Social Nature of Crime and 
Deviance’ in The Blackwell Companion to Criminology (Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2004) 9.   Tyler 
argues that people obey the law if they believe it is legitimate and not because they fear punishment, see T.R. 
Tyler, Why People Obey the Law (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press 2006).  Psychology 
literature indicates that some personality traits, such as the dutifulness trait in conscientious personalities, 
portray a higher propensity to abide by moral obligations such as obeying laws, see Christopher, Zabel & Jones, 
(note 380).  Crowther states that psychological theories of crime begin with the view that individual 
differences may make some people more predisposed than others to commit criminal acts, see Crowther, 
(note 304) 281. 
712
 See the RBS example in chapter four, section 4.3.7. 
713
 See for instance the provisions under s 1 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984; s 60 of the Criminal 
Justice and Public Order Act 1994; s 44 of the Terrorism Act 2000 which deal with the powers conferred on the 
police to stop and search persons upon reasonable suspicion that a crime might be committed, note that the 
European Court of Human Rights delivered a judgment in the case of Gillan and Quinton v United Kingdom 
[2009] ECHR 28 (12 January 2010)  which declares the application of s 44-47 of the Terrorism Act 2000 illegal 
stating that it contravened the provisions of Art 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights which deals 
with privacy. 
169 
 
described as a means of managing personality risks because the provisions operate 
on the basis of the potential for a crime to be committed, even though the actual 
crime may not have been committed.  This means that criminal law can provide 
for pre-emptive situations and this is a form of risk management.
714
  
Likewise, in respect of corporate governance mechanisms, there could be 
provisions in criminal law specifying that individuals with certain personality 
dimensions should not be recruited as company directors based on their potential 
to mismanage companies, or that certain safeguards should be put in place if such 
personalities are recruited.  However, it is important to note that incorporating 
such provisions into criminal law would also depend on issues such as a society’s 
view of behaviour that should be criminalised.
715
  Again, as discussed earlier, in 
relation to managing personality risks and the processes involved in doing so, it 
might be challenging for criminal law provisions to provide for every possible 
situation.  In conclusion, criminal law could be utilized as an approach to 
managing personality risks only to the extent that the provisions of the law specify 
specific prohibited behaviours and individuals are influenced in their behaviour by 
the provisions of the law.  Also, any legislation which seeks to manage personality 
risks must incorporate the essential risk management processes of recognition, 
identification, assessment and mitigation of risks.         
2) Insurance: A contract of insurance is one in which one party in consideration of 
the price paid to him proportionate to the risk provides security to the other party 
that he shall not suffer loss, damage or prejudice by the occurrence of certain 
specified events.
716
  Insurance provides economic protection against losses that 
may be incurred due to chance events that may or may not occur during the 
effective time of the insurance contract referred to as a policy.
717
  Insurance 
policies can manage personality risks to the extent that specific risks are identified 
and evaluated, with an economic cost attached to the crystallisation of such risks.  
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Therefore, the policy influences the impact and effect of the risk after the event 
has occurred.  However, it is ineffective in relation to influencing the occurrence 
of the risk in question which in this case entails managing personality risks in a 
manner that prevents the occurrence or reduces the chances of occurrence of the 
risk events.  For instance, the Lehman Brothers company took out insurance 
policies to offset liabilities and settle law suits which might be filed against its 
executives.
718
  These insurance policies would help the company recover 
economic losses resulting from law suits in relation to the corporate failure.  But, 
the impact of the failure on the rest of society still remains, and the insurance 
process did not prevent the failure.  The insurance policies only compensated for 
the economic losses which were specifically addressed by the policies.   
To the extent that the exact economic losses that might possibly result from the 
occurrence of an event such as a corporate failure remain unknown, and there are 
possibilities of losses which might not be economically quantifiable, then 
insurance would not be the most appropriate approach to managing personality 
risks.  Again, if the aim of a risk management process is to adopt proactive means 
of influencing the occurrence of risk events, and not just to influence risk 
outcomes after the event, then insurance policies would not achieve the aim. In 
corporate governance for instance, if the objective is to take steps which manage 
personality risks in order to reduce the occurrence of corporate failures resulting 
from personality risks that cause inappropriate behaviour, then taking out an 
insurance policy to compensate for losses which would occur in the event of such 
corporate failures is hardly an effective approach towards preventing the 
occurrence of such failures.  Another issue is that if insurance is the option 
selected for managing personality risks, and companies are allowed to approach 
different insurance companies to obtain policies in that regard, then it means that 
insurance companies would become risk assessors as they have to evaluate the 
risk which is sought to be insured.  In the absence of a standard measure, different 
companies would arrive at varying perceptions of personality risks and this is 
bound to influence the premium on the policy.  If the cost of insurance is viewed 
as too high, then companies may decide not to take out policies.  Again, if risks 
are viewed as too costly, insurance companies may decide not to offer policies in 
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those respects.  In any case, insurance impacts on personality risks only to the 
extent that it helps minimise the effects of the occurrence of events associated 
with these risks.  It is not an effective risk management tool from the perspective 
of preventing the occurrence of events and losses.    
3) Soft Law/Self-Regulation: A framework for personality risk management could 
utilize soft law recommendations and could in fact be incorporated into existing 
corporate governance codes and guidance, or other soft law regulatory 
mechanisms.  An advantage of this approach would be the flexibility afforded by 
the nature of soft law provisions.
719
  However, in areas where effectiveness would 
be undermined if there is scope for non-compliance, then the soft law approach 
becomes inadequate.
720
  One fundamental concern in relation to corporate 
governance codes in the UK relates to the “comply or explain” approach, as it 
creates a risk that the framework may not be followed with consequential impact 
on its overall effectiveness.
721
  The level of discretion inherent in the application 
of soft law mechanisms such as corporate governance codes is such that they 
would not be the best vehicles through which regulatory provision which are 
considered most effective as mandatory provisions should be deployed.
722
  
Nevertheless, soft law approaches may be suitable in cases where flexibility 
would aid the effectiveness of the provisions, or inflexibility would undermine the 
overall aims of the provisions, such as where different approaches may need to be 
adopted considering varying circumstances.  For instance, in the event that 
companies in different sectors of the economy require different dimensions of 
personalities to govern the companies effectively, these companies would need to 
adapt their personality risk management processes to suit their needs and this 
would be achieved better with the provision of soft law mechanisms which allow 
room for flexibility.  Providing mandatory requirements for all companies in a 
blanket manner and irrespective of their peculiar circumstances might undermine 
the effectiveness of some regulatory provisions.
723
  In these cases, soft law 
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approaches may suffice as long as the essential aims of the regulatory provisions 
are still met, which in this case would be the institution of a personality risk 
management process in every company.  
4) Professionalization/Certification: Directorships could be professionalised to the 
extent that only appropriate personalities depending on agreed criteria are 
accredited to govern companies.  This process would involve an identification and 
assessment of personality risks which are considered acceptable or unacceptable 
for becoming a company director.  There could be an established agency or 
agencies, or bodies which are accredited to conduct personality tests and issue 
certification based on approved criteria.  These agencies or bodies may be 
governmental or external to the State, such as professional bodies.  
Hypothetically, a person who wishes to be recruited as a company director would 
be required to present a certificate from an approved body indicating that his/her 
personality is such that is appropriate for corporate management.  Some of the 
issues which may arise with processes such as this include standardisation of the 
accreditation process and sustainability of the process.  It would be most effective 
if similar high standards are applied in the test issued by every accrediting body, 
and no circumventions are allowed.  In the case that there is a single accreditation 
body, standards may be sustained, however, it might be challenging to have only 
one accreditation body considering the number of persons who may need to access 
the services.  Again, directors who are not accredited would stand the risk of being 
excluded from corporate governance entirely, even if they possess some other 
useful skills, knowledge and experience.  
This accreditation process would therefore manage personality risks mostly from 
the basis of avoiding the risk.  As was noted earlier in the chapter, in section 6.2, 
there are some situations in which avoidance of risks in its entirety may not be the 
most advantageous approach towards managing personality risks and attaining 
corporate goals at the same time.  Therefore, if the process simply excludes 
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directors who do not “qualify”, then it may also be excluding other positive 
potentials and the overall personality risks in relation to achieving corporate 
governance objectives might have been managed more effectively under a more 
flexible risk management process.  In the case that the accreditation process serves 
as a mere risk identification activity, and the shareholders are still allowed to 
select directors as they deem fit regardless of whether they “qualify” or not, then 
the process only succeeds in managing personality risks from the perspective of 
risk identification.  There would still be a need to institute risk management 
processes for those identified risks, if effective risk management is to be achieved.   
5) Information and Disclosures: As an alternative to regulation, information 
regarding personality risks, such as the personality dimensions best suited to 
corporate governance, potential risks which exist in relation to different 
personality dimensions as well as processes for managing personality risks, could 
be made available by the State to companies and the market, and shareholders and 
companies could be left to utilise this information in the selection and risk 
management of company directors.  However, there will still be a need to identify 
the personality dimension of individual company directors as it is only when the 
identification exercise is carried out that any information relating to their potential 
personality risk becomes meaningful.  This is because having knowledge of the 
import of personality risks and risk management processes can only be utilised in 
practical terms as it relates to specific companies when the personality dimension 
of the company directors in question are known.  Therefore, simply providing 
information regarding personality risks will not achieve the aims of personality 
risk management.  Moreover, if shareholders and companies are not obliged to act 
upon the information provided, it further defeats the aims of the risk management 
process.  The provision of information regarding personality risks will only 
manage the risks to the extent that shareholders and companies are made aware of 
the existence of such risks, and they can now elect to actively engage in processes 
which identify and manage the risks as it relates to their companies. 
6) Economic Incentives and Detriments: Flowing from the provision of information, 
the State could provide economic incentives for companies that act upon the 
information regarding personality risks by selecting directors who are best suited 
to corporate governance and adopting personality risk management processes in 
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cases where directors that are not best suited to corporate governance are selected.  
Economic detriments could also be provided for companies that do not act on the 
information provided.  This approach will manage personality risks to the extent 
that the incentives and detriments might encourage companies to act upon the 
information and engage with personality risk management processes.  Under this 
approach, companies could be given tax rebates for the reason that they have 
decided to act in accordance with the information provided by the State.  Also, 
companies could be surcharged in taxes for deciding not to adopt any personality 
risk management processes.  Some level of regulation will be required in order to 
establish these economic incentives and detriments, however, the level of 
regulation is not likely to be as detailed as would be required in the case that the 
State decides to regulate directly on the issue of personality risk management.  
One reason why this approach will not be effective in terms of ensuring that 
personality risks are managed across companies is that the companies are allowed 
to make their choices as to whether to act upon the information provided, and if 
the economic incentive or detriment does not make any meaningful difference to a 
company, it can decide to ignore the information relating to personality risks and 
select its directors as it deems fit.  Therefore, this approach will manage 
personality risks only to the extent that companies are influenced by the economic 
incentives and detriments and are encouraged to embark on the identification of 
personality risks and to engage with personality risk management processes.               
7) Hybrid regulation/Mix of hard and soft law: There could be a hybrid regulatory 
model developed to manage personality risks.  This process would involve 
identification, assessment and mitigation of the risks.  An advantage of such an 
approach is that hard law provisions can be applied where necessary and they 
would stand a higher chance of being adhered to as they would have the force of 
law.  Essentially, hard law would be the most appropriate approach in situations 
where the aim is to enforce minimum standards.
724
  Considering the utility of 
flexibility in certain cases, soft law recommendations can be applied in situations 
where it is deemed necessary,
725
 especially in recognition of the preference for 
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soft law approaches in corporate governance.
726
  As with similar 
recommendations in corporate governance codes, these soft law provisions would 
be viewed as best practice.
727
   Such a hybrid approach could cater for different 
circumstances under generalised provisions, a situation which might not ordinarily 
be obtainable under strict hard law provisions which are usually made to provide 
for specific situations.  As was noted earlier, behaviour can only be criminal if it is 
specifically provided for as such under the criminal law.
728
  A regulatory 
mechanism which provides blanket provisions which are then capable of being 
applied to different circumstances would prove better at managing personality 
risks because a wider range of potential behaviour could be captured into the spirit 
of its provisions, and it would not matter that each specific behavioural issue had 
not been spelt out.
729
   
The ability to incorporate both mandatory and flexible provisions in a hybrid 
mechanism makes it the most attractive approach in personality risk management 
because there are various issues which can result from the existence of various 
personality dimensions and different companies may have different needs, as well 
as goals and objectives.  If the aim is to adopt an approach which would prove 
most effective taking cognisance of the fact that in corporate governance one size 
does not fit all, then a mixture of regulatory instruments which mandates 
behaviour where necessary in order to aid effectiveness and allows flexibility 
within reason would be the better approach.  In discussing regulatory design, 
Gunningham & Grabosky argue that adopting a mix of regulatory instruments and 
applying only the minimum required to achieve the purpose of the regulation is 
the best approach.
730
  They indicate that hard law is dependable and predictable 
but could also be inflexible and inefficient, whilst soft law is cost effective and 
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flexible but could be unreliable.
731
  Therefore, the best way to overcome the 
disadvantages of these different regulatory approaches is to combine both 
approaches in the best way that achieves the regulatory purpose.
732
 
Also, the EU Better Regulation agenda provides that in designing policies, laws 
and regulations, governments are looking to employ the most appropriate 
regulatory tools which will maximise benefits and minimise negative effects.
733
 A 
hybrid mechanism which utilizes the minimum regulatory intervention required to 
achieve the purpose is therefore the better option in relation to managing 
personality risks.  The most important aspects of personality risk management in 
which compromise should be avoided, because those aspects represent the 
minimum standards in relation to personality risk management, are the 
identification process and the requirement to institute a personality risk 
management mechanisms.
734
  In regard to these aspects, hard law is 
recommended.  This is because hard law is the best approach to utilize in the 
setting of minimum standards for reasons of clarity and conformity.
735
  However, 
considering the peculiarities of companies as discussed earlier, soft law 
mechanisms are recommended in relation to provisions for managing personality 
risks in companies for reasons of flexibility and efficiency.
736
   
6.4 INDICATORS OF EFFECTIVENESS 
The idea of managing personality risks in the best way possible is simply to ensure the 
effectiveness of the process and increase the likelihood of the process achieving its aims.  It 
would make little or no sense to expend efforts towards managing personality risks and at the 
end of it all, the risks being managed still lead to an unwanted negative outcome.  In relation 
to judging the effectiveness of risk management regimes, the COSO Framework gives an 
indication of what that entails.  Essentially, in order to adjudge a risk management process 
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effective, eight elements have to be present and functioning effectively.
737
  These eight 
elements are internal environment, objective setting, event identification, risk assessment, 
risk response, control activities, information and communication, and monitoring.
738
  
Therefore, an effective personality risk management process is one that takes cognisance of 
these issues and ensures that these elements are present and functioning.  This means that in 
order to attain an effective personality risk management process, personality risks must be 
identified in an appropriate environment in which clear objectives are set, there must be 
processes in place to assess and respond to the risks, with adequate information being made 
available, as well as the risk management activities being monitored.   
Taking account of the requirements needed to demonstrate effectiveness; this thesis proposes 
a hybrid regulatory model for the management of personality risks in corporate governance.  
It argues that mandatory provisions should be adopted in situations where, as discussed 
earlier, the issues at stake are fundamentally important and conformity is necessary in order 
to aid effectiveness.  Soft law recommendations are then proposed in cases where differences 
in circumstances exist and flexibility is essential in order to achieve the overall aims of the 
model which is the identification and management of personality risks.  Mandatory 
provisions are considered necessary in situations where compromises could undermine 
effectiveness.  For instance, health and safety regulations are usually mandatory because it is 
not reasonable to compromise on conformity in life threatening situations such as those.
739
   
The impact of corporate failures on individuals and society as a whole would illustrate that 
corporate governance is an important area of activity, with life threatening implications in 
certain cases where corporate governance mechanisms fail.
740
  The most effective solutions to 
personality risk management would be those which engender higher levels of effectiveness 
across the entire corporate governance process, and these solutions should begin with the 
identification and recruitment of the most appropriate company directors, and provide for an 
effective risk mitigating process in the case that inappropriate directors are recruited.  The 
hybrid regulatory regime proposed in this thesis is aimed at achieving this.       
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6.5 WHY A REGULATORY REGIME? 
A starting point in respect of the justification for regulatory intervention is a discussion on 
corporate and regulatory theories.  These theories enable an understanding of the approaches 
adopted in practice as it relates to regulatory intervention in the management of companies.  
The contractual theory of the firm posits that State intervention in the form of regulation 
should not occur except in cases of market failure, where the regulation should be aimed at 
correcting market failures.
741
  The concession theory argues that companies are open to State 
regulation.
742
  One problem with the contractual theory is that it seeks to rely on private law 
mechanisms as against public law mechanisms and the danger inherent in that is that the 
public might not be adequately protected because individuals and firms would usually only 
seek to enforce rights in cases where expected benefits to themselves exceed expected costs 
and thereby creating the risk that some legitimate claims would be ignored.
743
  This means 
that profit maximisation could get in the way of protecting public interest.  Accordingly, 
Riley argues that certain constraints should be satisfied before profit maximisation decisions 
are taken and the goal of the company is actually unchanged by the constraints imposed by 
society’s norms.744  Therefore, since the company exists within society, it should conform to 
minimum standards which support its existence within that society.
745
  It means that the 
pursuit of profit should not be an excuse to infringe on societal norms.   
The elements of corporate existence which are beneficial to society as a whole should form 
some basis for the norms which society should impose on companies.  It should mean that 
companies have to abide by certain constraints aimed at protecting the public interest.
746
  It 
has also been argued that State regulation is viewed as justifiable in cases of market 
imperfections, particularly information asymmetries, which make it difficult for market 
participants to accurately assess the risks they take in dealing with companies.
747
  Cheffins
748
 
explains the perfect market as one in which actors “act rationally, are numerous, have full 
information about the products on offer, can contract at little cost, have sufficient financial 
resources to transact, can enter and leave the market with little difficulty, and will carry out 
                                                          
741
 See Ferran, (note 215) 387. 
742
 See Dine, (note 49) 29. 
743
 See Ogus, (note 197) 27. 
744
 See C. Riley, ‘Understanding and Regulating the Corporation’ (1995) 58 Modern Law Review 595. 
745
 Ibid. 
746
 See Dine, (note 49) 29. 
747
 See Ferran, (note 215) 387. 
748
 See Cheffins, (note 375) 6. 
179 
 
the obligations which they agree to perform”.749  Based on Cheffins’s explanation of the 
perfect market scenario, a number of conclusions can be reached: 
1) Market participants would be acting rationally when they seek to create benefits 
for themselves within acceptable rules in the market transactions and avoid losses; 
2) Market participants need adequate information to be in the best position to make 
adequate decisions regarding their participation in the market; 
3) Market participants need baseline rules which enable them achieve their aim 
within the market at the least cost;  
4) Market participants need the market to function effectively with minimal losses so 
that there can be sufficient financial resources available in the market; 
5) Market participants need to carry out any obligations which they agree to perform.  
Some further observations arise out of the issues listed above.  First, inadequate information 
is an issue which reflects imperfection in the market and it becomes relevant in relation to 
understanding the utility and justification for mechanisms suggested in this thesis to address 
the problems of inadequate information in markets.  Second, there is a justification founded 
on the contractual theory for State regulatory intervention to ensure markets are functioning 
effectively with minimal losses, as ineffective and loss prone markets also depict 
imperfection.
750
  Third, in a perfect market, it is vital for participants to actually undertake 
any agreed obligations.
751
  It becomes important therefore for these participants to be persons 
who are capable of undertaking such obligations.  In a situation where market participants are 
persons who do not have the ability to carry out their obligations, the market is inherently a 
failure,
752
 and a need arises for mechanisms to correct this failure.  The above cases represent 
some of the issues which the regulatory model proposed in this thesis seeks to address, and 
provides justification for the selected approach.   
Cooter highlights the difference between economic perspectives of regulation and the legal 
perspectives of the same by pointing out that economists ignore the internalisation of norms 
which leads to the “rational” behaviour which they consider to be inherent in free market 
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participants.
753
  He argues that economics does not explain how people acquire their goals 
when in fact a person acquires values by internalising them.  This internalisation of norms in 
a community occurs by cooperation to acquire a local public good and once this behaviour is 
seen as valuable it becomes a norm of that society, and therein is the role of law.
754
  The law 
exerts influence on behaviour over a period of time.  Therefore, if there is to be an actual act 
of rationality amongst market participants at some point, then it must be as a result of the 
internalisation of requisite norms over time.
755
  This means that if the law helps in the 
internalisation of norms, then there is a vital place for State regulation within the markets.  
Again, if the view of the contractual theorists is that the principal purpose of a company is 
profit maximisation, it follows that State regulation would have to be aimed solely at 
supporting this proposition and enabling companies to maximise profit, even if it is to the 
detriment of society.
756
  This position of contractual theorists would lead to minimal restraint 
on managerial power and would also leave room for expropriation by majority shareholders 
who can manipulate the company’s constitution.757  It also ignores the position of the 
company within society and that companies serve to enhance interests other than those of its 
shareholders.
758
  Therefore, even though the principal purpose of a company may be profit 
maximisation from the perspective of its shareholders, regulation in the interests of the 
company should take cognisance of the other factors which may have an impact on this 
principal purpose of the company.
759
   
The contractual theory argues that the shareholders should be assigned the major role of 
regulating companies so as to align the interests of management with their interests.
760
  That 
seems reasonable, because the shareholders are the owners of the company in principle, but 
then these interests still differ and problems arise, which is one of the reasons why corporate 
governance became an issue in the first place; as shareholders had to find means of aligning 
and monitoring these interests on a continual basis.
761
  But, can shareholders be expected to 
align the interests of company management boards with that of the public or stakeholders? 
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That is not very likely because company boards might be focused on profit maximisation, to 
the detriment of stakeholder interests.  Again, where shareholders themselves are focused on 
profit maximisation, they might not be in the best position to take cognisance of the interests 
of the public which might not contribute towards their own goals.
762
  Therefore, there must be 
mechanisms for protecting the interests of the public and other stakeholders.
763
   
The State intervenes in the regulation of companies presumably to serve both the company’s 
interests and the public interest as the company being a creation of the State and functioning 
within society is essentially fulfilling roles which go beyond the goals of its shareholders.
764
  
The company indeed fulfils roles far and beyond the interests of its shareholders, including, 
for example, the provision of jobs, economic capital, essential services and its continued 
existence in the market itself promotes confidence in capitalism.
765
  A vibrant market for 
goods and services is a necessity in a society especially where the government does not 
provide all the goods and services needed by the populace.  A commercial entity has to 
generate profit in order to sustain its existence in the market place.  Therefore, State 
intervention by way of regulation should actually be in the interests of the company in terms 
of aiding its survival and also in the interests of the public in terms of protecting societal 
goals.
766
 The profit maximisation goal of a company is not necessarily a mutually exclusive 
issue from the protection of public interest, because the public can only benefit from a 
company that is in existence in the market.
767
  However, the State appears to be in a better 
position than shareholders to protect the interests of the public, as it would be a more 
objective stakeholder, and part of the public interest is also to support profit maximisation 
because a company which does not make profit would not continue to exist in the commercial 
sphere, thereby limiting the possibility of that company to fulfil its other roles to the 
public.
768
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The salient issue is that a company that is managed effectively is more likely to generate 
profit for its shareholders especially in the long term, and so any regulation which supports 
the effective management of companies is invariably fulfilling all the tenets of acceptable 
regulatory intervention as argued by both the contractual and the concession theories.
769
  
Ineffective management is a sign of market imperfection as was noted above,
770
 so regulatory 
intervention to remedy that situation should be acceptable according to the contractual theory.  
Also, the concession theory supports the intervention of the State in matters of public interest 
and it is clearly in the interest of the public that companies are properly managed.
771
  Where a 
proposed regulatory intervention is in keeping with the underlying philosophies of both the 
contractual and concession theories, as is the case of regulation which is aimed at enabling 
effectiveness in the management of companies in other to achieve whatsoever might be their 
corporate goal, then the question of differences in ideology between both theories becomes 
less important.  Considering these theoretical perspectives on regulation in the corporate 
sphere, it is evident that regulatory intervention is justifiable in cases which are supported by 
the tenets of the theories, especially when it is an effective option as regards achieving the 
desired outcome.
772
 
6.6 CORPORATE AND REGULATORY THEORIES IN THE MANAGEMENT OF 
PERSONALITY RISKS 
Taking account of the various corporate and regulatory theories discussed in the previous 
section,
773
 the following arguments indicate, from a practical perspective, the desirability, 
necessity, modality and acceptability of a regulatory intervention in the management of 
personality risks in corporate governance.  These analyses also highlight the influences drawn 
from these theories in the development of the regulatory model in this thesis. 
1) Contractual / Concession theory:   
The reasoning behind the contractual theory is that a company is a creation of contract 
between the owners and the managers and should be regulated by the creators and 
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allowed to operate freely within the market.
774
  However, there are justifications for 
the State to intervene in cases where the market has failed.
775
  Accordingly, it has 
been stated that “the preferred remedy is to improve the operation of the market by 
reducing or eliminating imperfection”.776  The lack of mechanisms to identify and 
manage personality risks constitutes a form of market imperfection, therefore, 
regulation that aims to achieve this end and is applied at a level and style which is 
commensurate with the market failure which it seeks to address should be considered 
necessary and adequate because it conforms to corporate and regulatory theories.
777
  
In the concession theory, the State intervenes in the regulation of companies as the 
company is a creation of the State, acquiring its being from a State concession.
778
  
Regulation of companies is then viewed as a necessary part of the grant of that State 
concession.  It is undoubtedly in the interest of the State as representative of the 
public that personality risks in companies are managed, so any regulation in this 
regard is desirable.    
2) Market failure/ Risks/ Public interest: 
The market failure theory argues that in a liberal-capitalist society, the State will be 
pressurized to restrict its interventions to the minimal level necessary to correct 
market failure, and market failure is widely considered as a rational basis for 
regulatory intervention.
779
  If investors in the market place do not have adequate 
information regarding the personality of company directors, as their personality 
contributes to their behaviour in corporate governance, these investors buy into the 
company with no knowledge of an aspect of the risks they undertake in their 
investments, which is hinged on the personality of company directors as managers of 
their investment.  These risks range from a depletion of their investment to an outright 
failure of the company.  Risk may be an essential element of business undertakings,
780
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but the inherent risk which accrues to the entire governance process by virtue of the 
personality of company directors is a vital piece of information which should be made 
available to the market participants because it has a profound effect on the prospects 
of their investments.  Having directors whose personalities are high risk without 
adequate personality risk management procedures in place is likely to increase the risk 
of corporate failure.   
A company may fail due to business risks which were clearly and rationally 
undertaken.  However, if the company directors were people with appropriate 
personality dimensions for corporate governance, the chances are higher that they 
would have taken on those risks with clarity of purpose and in compliance with the 
measures established for such business dealings.  It may then be assumed that such a 
company failed because of the natural propensity of business risks to result in 
negative outcomes in some instances.  The failure would not have occurred merely 
because of the fact of having less than appropriate personalities taking on business 
risks which were not thought through because they did not have the ability to think 
things through, or for the reason that the company directors took actions which run 
contrary to established processes of governance because they are not the kind of 
personalities that are dutiful and abide by rules and regulations.  In the latter case, it 
would be said that the company failed because of the personalities of the company 
directors who took on decisions and actions which contributed to the failure and not 
merely the natural propensity of business risks to make or break a company.   
Examples of corporate failures examined earlier illustrate the considerable impact of 
personality and behaviour in actions and decisions which can contribute to corporate 
failures.  Therefore, investors need to know the nature of the personality of company 
directors in the companies in which they are investing.  The availability of this 
category of information is as important as the availability of other pieces of 
information which are mandatorily made available to enable the effective functioning 
of the market under the contractual theory.  For instance, company directors are 
required to send their shareholders the annual accounts of the company, which should 
represent a true and fair view of the company.
781
  One of the underlying principles 
behind this disclosure is that the shareholders need to know how the company is 
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performing, so as to determine the prospects of their investments.  As it is argued that 
the personality of company directors plays a role in their ability of to manage the 
affairs of the company effectively, then information relating to their personality is 
equally one which is essential for the market as it also aids investors in determining 
the prospects of their investments.  This piece of information is in the sphere of 
knowledge which is needed to create an effectively functioning market in which 
decisions are made based on full and adequate knowledge.  It is therefore important 
that regulatory measures are taken to address this information asymmetry and in 
accordance with the contractual theory, any regulatory measure in this regard should 
be acceptable.   
Also arising is the issue of the appropriate level of regulatory intervention.  
Contractual theorists argue that the State should intervene in the most minimalistic 
manner required to address the issue of market failure.
782
  The least that the State can 
do in this case is to mandate companies to make the required information available as 
any other mechanism which does not create a definitive obligation on the part of the 
company to provide this piece of information will not address this market failure.  The 
State has a duty to develop and protect the market by underpinning informed choices.  
In the case that companies do not as at yet see the need to volunteer this information 
as a necessary part of corporate disclosure, it then makes sense that it should be 
mandated.   There is a need to create uniformity and similar standards across the 
board of public listed companies and so it becomes important to ensure that all such 
companies are undertaking the process and making the necessary disclosures 
regarding the personality of its directors.  Transaction costs are also reduced when 
regulatory intervention creates similar standards across companies.
783
  This is because 
companies are expected to abide by the default regulatory rules already established 
and they are saved the process of determining what mechanism might achieve the 
same purpose and seeking to incorporate these mechanisms individually.  
Having an effective market is beneficial for both the companies and the market 
participants who represent the entire public.
784
  There are negative consequences for 
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society as a whole when a public company experiences failure.
785
  These 
consequences range from capital losses, job losses, negative social effects, loss of 
confidence in the markets and capitalism, loss of availability of goods and services for 
the wellbeing of the populace.  Corporate failures would usually also create a loss of 
confidence in the associated regulatory environment.
786
  This is so even in cases 
where there existed no direct State regulation in the sphere of corporate activities 
which caused the corporate failure because the public simply trusts the State to protect 
it from afflictions of every kind.
787
  Therefore, the public expects the State to ensure 
that companies are governed effectively in order to minimise losses especially of the 
kind that affects the general public negatively.  The personality of company directors 
is a risk issue.  If company directors are persons with personalities which are high risk 
and therefore not the most appropriate for governance and there is no measure put in 
place to effectively manage the risks which accrue by virtue of the presence of these 
personalities, the risk of corporate failure is increased across board.  The State, in 
fulfilling its responsibility to safeguard the society from public losses and in ensuring 
that markets are functioning effectively in order to promote corporate existence, has a 
role in creating mechanisms which foster effective corporate governance.  It has been 
argued that “a good legal environment protects the potential financiers against 
expropriation by entrepreneurs; it raises their willingness to surrender funds in 
exchange for securities and hence expands the scope of capital markets.”788   
3) Responsive Regulation/Smart Regulation: 
The principles of responsive and smart regulation are relevant in the development of 
statutory regulatory regimes especially as the contractual theory promotes self-
regulation.
789
 This means that companies would inherently be more accepting of 
regulation which reflects their needs and peculiarities.  Any regulation which does not 
take cognisance of the architecture of the end users as well as their needs may prove 
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ineffective.
790
  Responsive regulation suggests that the State must regulate in a 
manner which is in consonant with the recipients of the regulatory measure if a higher 
level of effectiveness is to be achieved.  Smart regulation posits that the State must 
engage with the peculiarities of the regulated if enhanced effectiveness is to be 
achieved. The arguments and propositions of Ayres & Braithwaite
791
 and 
Gunningham & Grabosky
792
  are relevant and instructive here because any regulatory 
measure which is aimed at creating effectiveness within a sphere of activity should 
take into consideration the principles which are likely to contribute towards the 
effectiveness of that regulatory measure.  Also, it has been argued that it is important 
for regulation to confer benefits as well.
793
  A regulatory regime which provides 
adequate information on the personality risks accruing from the recruitment of 
directors is likely to be beneficial to the shareholders as well as the public.   
The idea of a regulatory intervention is to bring about improvement in the regulated 
sphere, and so it makes little sense to undertake the regulatory activity from its design 
to its implementation in a manner which does not ensure its potential effectiveness 
when deployed to end users.  In the UK, the Better Regulation Task Force in 1997 
devised the Five Principles of Good Regulation namely: proportionality, 
accountability, consistency, transparency and targeting.
794
  Therefore, in the 
development of a regulatory model to address the market failure occasioned by the 
lack of information about the personality of company directors, and the management 
of personality risks in corporate governance, it is important to engage with the 
developmental theories of effective regulatory design and to reflect on those 
principles in the design of the regulatory model.  This way, there are increased 
chances of acceptability and effectiveness of the model.   The model suggested in this 
thesis has adopted a hybrid approach in order to limit the mandatory provisions to the 
instances in which those are the most effective option, and allow room for flexibility 
in necessary areas. In this way, the model engages with the proportionality principle.  
The model is transparent and accountable as its provisions are clear in purpose and are 
justifiable.  It is consistent and targeted because it is applicable to a specific cadre of 
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companies and is directed at solving an identified problem in relation to those 
companies.  Also, effective regulatory principles such as engaging with the regulated 
and applying levels of sanctions as necessary has been adopted in the development of 
the model.   
6.7 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND PERSONALITY RISK MANAGEMENT 
The UK Corporate Governance Code 2010 states clearly in its preamble that the 
purpose of corporate governance is to facilitate effective, entrepreneurial and prudent 
management that can deliver the long term success of the company.
795
  Considering 
this assertion, it becomes important to evaluate existing corporate governance 
mechanisms in the light of how successful they are in delivering effective governance.  
There should be an appropriate balance of all the facets of effective governance aimed 
at generating sustainable long-term success for the company.  It is also imperative to 
engender a governance ethos which takes cognisance of prudence and effectiveness in 
the pursuit of entrepreneurial goals, as this is the way in which profit can be generated 
for shareholders alongside minimising losses for them on the long run.
796
  It is also the 
way in which the future of a company is reasonably guaranteed for the fulfilment of 
its societal goals.  Companies that are listed on the stock exchange are public 
companies with numerous shareholders who may not be involved in the management 
of the companies and may also change over time.  For these companies to be managed 
effectively, the directors should necessarily be persons who are able to do so.  In order 
for the market to be functional, the shareholders need to know what type of company 
they are investing in, and the company’s prospects.  Part of the knowledge required is 
for investors to be able to decide that the management of the company they are 
investing in is such that is likely to actualise their goals.  When information as to the 
personality of company directors is made available to shareholders, they can decide 
what type of management team they desire for their company. Shareholders then have 
the appropriate information as to what type of persons would be more likely to 
manage their company effectively.   
In the event that the shareholders decide that they would rather not select the most 
appropriate persons to govern their companies, based on the contractual theory, they 
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should still be able to choose whomever they desire.  Shareholders could make their 
choice of directors based on other considerations which they deem relevant, as well as 
on the basis of skills, knowledge and experience of the directors, even when the 
personalities of such directors are not the most appropriate for effective corporate 
governance.  But, in the interests of the general public who may be affected by the 
activities of a company, the State should mandate shareholders to manage these 
personalities as risk assets under a clearly defined risk management mechanism.  
Adopting this option of risk managing persons who are not adjudged to be the most 
appropriate company directors would help in protecting the shareholders themselves 
and the society as a whole.  Even in cases where shareholders are focused on the short 
term, there is still a strong case for the company to succeed beyond those 
shareholders.  Therefore, the focus on creating effective management is mostly for the 
long term success of the company as a facet of the society.  In the case of companies 
with dispersed shareholders listed on the stock exchange, shareholders may come and 
go, and rightfully so as the goals of shareholders may differ, but the company should 
be allowed to survive and provide a viable market for future shareholders in addition 
to fulfilling its goals to its stakeholders, of which the entire society is one.    
6.8 AIMS OF THE PERSONALITY RISK MANAGEMENT MODEL 
Taking cognisance of what needs to be achieved in the management of personality risks 
as discussed earlier, which is to identify, assess and mitigate the risks; and considering the 
indicators of effectiveness; the regulatory model proposed in this thesis aims to achieve 
the following: 
1) Provide information regarding the most appropriate personality traits for corporate 
governance as well as the relationship between personality traits and governance 
ability 
This would enable shareholders to make informed choices as to the level of 
personality risk they undertake in selecting company directors; 
2) Identify the personality of company directors  
This is the first step in any risk management model and is necessary in the bid to 
manage personality risks;  
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3) Provide information on the personality of directors to shareholders and regulators  
This is an essential part of the risk management process, in order to aid informed 
choices of investment in the market and also to facilitate regulatory intervention in 
cases where it is required; 
4) In cases where shareholders decide to elect directors who are not in the category of 
appropriate persons for governance, the model mandates the company to embark on a 
personality risk management regime which would help mitigate personality risks; 
5) In the long term, the model should help to develop qualifying criteria for company 
directors based on appropriate personality profiles amongst other relevant factors such 
as skills, knowledge and experience;
797
 and help to create a corporate governance 
regime which is more effective, efficient and sustainable. 
It is argued that a hybrid regulatory model is the better approach to achieve the aims 
of the personality risk management model as it takes cognisance of corporate and 
regulatory theories, and encompasses all the elements which would aid the 
management of personality risks such as an identification and assessment process as 
well as risk mitigating processes.
798
  Also, this model recognises the need to enhance 
effectiveness whilst retaining the flexibility which has been the hallmark of regulation 
in corporate governance by incorporating mandatory as well as voluntary provisions.  
The model also stands a high chance of being embraced by the business community 
and the public as it aims to address the problems of personality risks using regulatory 
approaches which are viewed as acceptable and justifiable, as well as being adaptable 
to peculiar circumstances.   
6.9 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has presented a conceptual framework for the management of personality 
risks, highlighting the factors that need to be considered.  The chapter also suggests 
possible approaches to achieve this aim, with a discussion on the merits and demerits 
                                                          
797
 It is argued that over time, shareholders and company directors would come to understand more clearly 
the kinds of personalities that are best suited to corporate governance.  This is because companies might have 
selected directors based on the appropriateness criteria in relation to personality, and if corporate governance 
in these companies proves more effective as literature suggests, then that should facilitate more rational 
decision making in the selection of company directors.  
798
 The justification for selecting a hybrid approach is discussed earlier, and will be discussed in more detail in 
the next chapter alongside approaches for achieving the aims of the model. 
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of these approaches.   It then indicates a preference for a hybrid regulatory regime as 
an option which can achieve the aims whilst taking cognisance of corporate and 
regulatory theories, as well as the need to create effectiveness. Considering corporate 
and regulatory theories, arguments are then made in justification of a regulatory 
regime in relation to companies, and further arguments are made regarding the 
desirability and necessity of such a regime in the management of personality risks in 
corporate governance.  The import of personality risk management in corporate 
governance is discussed, in support of the justification for regulatory intervention.  
The chapter then discusses the aims of the model with a view to enhancing an 
understanding of the provisions of the model as would be outlined in the next chapter.  
In the development of this model, regard has been had to the theories discussed in this 
and previous chapters, as well as current realities in relation to the regulation of 
companies.  The next chapter presents the suggested model in detail, discussing 
possible approaches to achieving the aims of the model, limitations in present 
corporate governance regimes, details of the hybrid approach suggested, specific 
provisions in the model, and other relevant considerations in relation to the suggested 
model.     
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE MODEL 
7.1 PRELIMINARY ISSUES 
In this section, the aim is to examine present corporate governance mechanisms in order to 
determine the extent to which they address the problems associated with personality risks. 
The public listed companies operating within the UK are governed by the provisions of the 
Companies Act 2006, the UK Corporate Governance Code, and Directors Disqualification 
Act 1986.  Companies operating in the financial services sector are regulated by the Financial 
Services Authority.  The EU directives on company law will also be discussed, as the UK is 
an EU jurisdiction, and these directives form part of UK corporate law.  These regulatory 
mechanisms will be examined with illustrations as to their inadequacies with regard to 
managing personality risks, and the issues considered are the extent to which these 
mechanisms identify company directors with high risk personalities, if the information in 
relation to personality is provided to the markets, and whether effective personality risk 
management processes are developed to mitigate identified personality risks. 
7.1.1 REVIEW OF EXISTING MECHANISMS 
The following table illustrates the extent to which existing corporate governance mechanisms 
address the issue of personality risks in corporate governance.   
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Table 1 
LAW/REGULATION/
CODE 
APPLICABILITY PROVISIONS WHICH MANAGE 
PERSONALITY RISKS  
LIMITATIONS 
UK Companies Act 2006 All companies -None as regards initial evaluation of 
company directors to determine 
personality 
-Age limit specified under section 157 
-Directors’ Duties under sections 171-
177, particularly section 172 aimed at 
influencing the behaviour of directors 
-Directors’ accounting and reporting 
functions for example in sections 386-
414 and  sections 415-436 
-Provisions relating to 
shareholders/members influence for 
example in sections 160, 188, 197, 439, 
476 
There is no initial evaluation requirement for 
company directors under the Act.   
Shareholders are free to appoint whosoever 
they choose to act as a director subject only to 
the age requirement. 
As regards mitigating personality risks by 
influencing the behaviour of a director, the 
consequences outlined in the Act for breach of 
duties and reporting provisions only sets in 
after the harm has been done, and therefore 
only mitigates personality risks to the extent 
that the provisions act as deterrence, and this 
may not be so in some cases.  
The requirement under section 172 is 
particularly subjective and the duties of 
directors generally require the presence of 
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 persons who are dutiful, otherwise, there is 
still the risk of disobedience of the duties 
under the Act. 
799
 
Where the consequence of acting contrary to 
the provisions of the Act is the imposition of 
fines as in the example of section 414, if the 
gains of disobedience outweigh the losses of 
fines, there is still a risk that deterrence would 
not be achieved.
800
 
 
UK Corporate 
Governance Code 
All companies listed 
on the London Stock 
Exchange 
-Nominations Committee functions under 
Provision B.2 
-Evaluation provisions under Provision 
B.6 
-Risk management and internal control 
provisions under Provision C.2 
-Audit Committee and Auditor functions 
There is no specific provision for personality 
assessment at the point of recruitment of 
directors. 
The Nominations Committee focus is on the 
balance of skills, knowledge and experience 
required by the board of directors. 
Evaluation provisions are post recruitment and 
                                                          
799
 See Fisher, (note 245); see also Okoye, (note 419); see also Christopher et al, (note 380). 
800
 See Brammertz, (note 302); see also Wilson & Hernstein, (note 303); see also note 711. 
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under Provision C.3 
 
mostly undertaken as internal self-assessment 
by the directors. 
The available provisions are not mandatory, as 
the code is applied on a “comply or explain” 
basis, leaving room for discretion and thereby 
creating an inherent risk of non-compliance. 
If personality risk is not mitigated from the 
onset, then the procedures put in place for risk 
management, internal control and audit have a 
higher possibility of being circumvented and 
the entire governance system becomes prone 
to failure. 
Company Directors’ 
Disqualification Act 
1986 
All Companies -Sections 1-9 and particularly section 6 
relating to unfit directors 
Becomes operative after the damage has been 
done. 
The provisions are mostly invoked when a 
company is already insolvent. 
The provisions can act mostly as a deterrent, 
but considering the theories of personality, 
persons who are not prone to compliance 
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might not be deterred by rules or 
consequences, especially where the gains of 
non-compliance outweigh the losses.  
The Financial Services 
Management Act 
(FSMA) 2000 & FSA’s 
Approved Persons 
Regime 
Companies in the 
financial services 
sector 
-Section 59 providing that no person may 
perform controlled functions except on 
approval by the FSA 
-Sections 61, 63, 66 empowering the FSA 
to administer the “fit and proper” regime 
-The FSA’s Statements of Principle and 
Code of Practice for Approved Persons 
(APER) & The Fit and Proper test for 
Approved Persons (FIT) Provisions 
Applies only to companies operating in the 
financial services sector. 
Information derived from the evaluation 
process is not mandatorily made available to 
the shareholders. Only available in FSA 
Register. 
Deals with aspects of personality such as 
honesty and integrity in retrospect, but not 
personality profile in its entirety proactively as 
it relates to governance and leadership 
potential and ability. 
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EU DIRECTIVES ON COMPANY LAW AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
In relation to company law and corporate governance, an important objective as indicated by 
the EU is to provide adequate protection for shareholders and the public who are invariably 
potential shareholders as well and to foster efficiency and competitiveness in business 
operations within Europe.
801
  There are no EU directives which deal directly with the issue of 
evaluating company directors at the point of recruitment whether as a means of mitigating 
personality risks in corporate governance or otherwise.  Directive 2003/58/EC which deals 
with disclosure requirements in respect of certain types of companies only contributes to 
making already mandated information available to the shareholders.
802
  Therefore, if there is 
no mandatory requirement for the identification of personality dimensions amongst boards of 
directors, and the disclosure of information relating thereto, the directive is unlikely to be 
effective in making that piece of information available to shareholders.  Directive 
2006/43/EC relates to qualifications for statutory auditors and audit firms, and the 
requirement for public entities to have audit committees and establish risk management 
processes.
803
  Directive 2006/46/EC requires listed companies to include a corporate 
governance statement in their annual report which should include a description of the 
company’s risk management and internal control processes.804  There are also 
recommendations on the role of audit committees and disclosure requirements in relation to 
corporate risks.
805
  These directives highlight the importance of risk management in 
companies even though there is no direct focus on the management of personality risks.   
In the Report of the Reflection Group on the Future of EU Company Law published in April 
2011,
806
 it was stated that an argument against introducing risk management devices is that 
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 See the EC Website http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/index_en.htm (accessed 15th June 
2012). 
802
 See EU Council Directive 2003/58/EC of  15 July 2003 amending Council Directive 68/151/EEC as regards 
disclosure requirements in respect of certain types of companies [2003] OJ L 221/13.  
803
 See EU Council Directive 2006/43/EC of 17 May 2006 on statutory audits of annual accounts and 
consolidated accounts, amending Council Directives 78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC and repealing Council 
Directive 84/253/EEC [2006] OJ L 157/87. 
804
 See EU Council Directive 2006/46/EC, (note 350). 
805
 See EC Recommendation 2005/162/EC of 15 February 2005 on the role of non-executive or supervisory 
directors of listed companies and on the committees of the (supervisory) board [2005] OJ L 52/51; see also 
Council Directive 2004/109/EC of 15 December 2004 on the harmonisation of transparency requirements in 
relation to information about issuers whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market and 
amending Council Directive 2001/34/EC [2004] OJ L 390/38. 
806
 See the Report in the EC Website 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/modern/reflectiongroup_report_en.pdf (accessed 15th 
June 2012). 
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viable companies have a market incentive to engage in all cost effective risk control devices 
both formal and informal, and so to impose a legal duty to adopt such devices, and as a 
consequence restricting them to formal and verifiable ones, is unjustified for listed 
companies.
807
  However, contrary to this argument, it was also highlighted in the report that 
as much as controlling shareholders would possess an interest in the long term success and 
viability of their company, market forces did nothing to prevent the financial crisis of the 
recent years and proved inadequate in ensuring effective risk management.
808
  The report also 
indicates that whilst there is no absolute guarantee that increased risk management and risk 
disclosures would produce better governance, it is hoped that they contribute towards this 
end.
809
  One reason to agree that increased risk management and disclosure through the 
imposition of regulatory requirements is necessary is because the markets which had operated 
largely on a voluntary basis proved inadequate in preventing corporate failures,
810
 and 
therefore, it becomes appropriate to institute regulation in order to redress the inadequacies of 
the market.
811
  The report indicates that it is still a valid notion that public listed companies 
warrant regulation because their shareholders are usually dispersed and subject to frequent 
change, and traditional agency problems exist.
812
  Therefore, regulation which addresses the 
problems surrounding the issue of companies having dispersed shareholders is relevant and 
justified.
813
    
Again, controlling shareholders might have an incentive to ensure the long term success of 
their companies, but, the same might not be said of dispersed non-controlling shareholders 
who might only be interested in the short term results of their investments.
814
  These short-
term focused shareholders may not be engaged in the operations of the market in ways that 
ensure effective management of the companies they have invested in, because their interest is 
likely to be on profit maximisation and they might be too dispersed to be influential.
815
  
These companies nevertheless need to be effectively managed for the good of others far and 
beyond the shareholders.
816
  Therefore, regulation which is aimed at improving the effective 
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 Ibid at p 40. 
808
 Ibid. 
809
 Ibid. 
810
 Ibid 
811
 See Ferran, (note 215). 
812
 See the report, (note 806), at p 10. 
813
 Ibid. 
814
 See Dine, (note 49), see also Webb et al, (note 58). 
815
 Ibid. 
816
 See Freeman, Wicks & Parmar, (note 77) 364-366; see also Letza, Sun & Kirkbride, (note 67) 250; see also 
Donaldson & Preston, (note 77) 65-91.  
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management of public listed companies is essential.  Aside from cost effectiveness as an 
economic principle of business, and the quest to improve efficiency by limiting processes, the 
institution of risk management processes in areas where risks have remained unmanaged can 
contribute to higher levels of effective risk management in companies.  Therefore, a risk 
management process which takes cognisance of issues such as cost and efficiency, whilst still 
improving the entire risk management atmosphere in a company, should be embraced if 
overall effective risk management is to be achieved.  Again, there are situations where the 
benefits of a mechanism developed to create improvement in a process out-weigh the cost of 
its deployment, and in such cases as is the one envisaged by the suggested model which is 
aimed at preventing corporate failures, the issue of cost should become less material.
817
  Also, 
overall enhancement in efficiency in the long term is important and should override any 
inconvenience which results as part of taking on an additional improvement process.   
7.1.2 POSSIBLE APPROACHES TO ACHIEVING THE AIMS OF THE MODEL 
A pertinent issue that arises is as regards approaches through which the aims of the regulatory 
model can be actualized and the arguments made here are in favour of incorporating both 
mandatory mechanisms and soft law mechanisms into the model.  The next table outlines 
possible approaches for addressing the issue of personality risk management with an 
indication as to persons responsible, the cost implications and the limitations of each 
approach.  The reasons for choosing the particular approach adopted in the model are then 
discussed. 
                                                          
817
 See the UK Better Regulation Executive (BRE) Annual Review 2009 Striking the Right Balance at 
http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/biscore/better-regulation/docs/10-578-striking-the-right-balance-bre-annual-
review-2009.pdf  p 20  (accessed 15th June 2012) where it is stated that each regulation is intended to deliver 
benefits and though there is a price attached, well-designed regulation will always have a positive net impact 
for society. 
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Table 2 
APPROACH FOR MANAGING 
PERSONALITY RISKS 
MECHANISM RESPONSIBILITY& COST LIMITATIONS & CONCERNS 
NO LAW 
Companies are allowed to recruit 
whosoever they choose as 
directors, without any personality 
evaluation. (The status quo) 
Existing company law provisions 
and corporate governance code 
principles as well as company 
internal recruitment processes. 
Directors, Shareholders, Market 
for corporate control. 
 
No additional cost implications 
because no new requirement is 
introduced. 
Personality risks remain 
unidentified and unmitigated, with 
grave implications for corporate 
success and failure; and 
possibility of negative impact on 
society. 
SOFT LAW 
Personality evaluation is 
propagated as a principle of best 
practice, and evaluators are 
recommended. 
 
Companies decide whether or not 
to adopt the recruitment evaluation 
process. 
 
Disclosure of findings of the 
evaluation exercise is also 
Recommendations and principles 
are embedded in corporate 
governance codes or other 
voluntary mechanism such as the 
Turnbull Guidance. 
 
Personality evaluation for 
directors and necessary 
disclosures forms part of the 
functions to be carried out by the 
nominations committee, or any 
other body responsible for 
Directors, Shareholders and 
Market for corporate control-same 
as all other code provisions. 
 
Cost is borne when companies 
decide to take on the evaluation 
exercise using the recommended 
evaluators. 
 
Additional disclosure costs may 
be borne in cases where the 
company decides to disclose the 
Because the provisions and 
recommendations are voluntary, 
personality risks remain 
inherently unidentified and 
unmitigated, thereby reducing the 
overall effectiveness of the 
provisions. 
 
The “comply or explain” basis of 
codes such as the UK code means 
that the provisions may not be 
complied with. 
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recommended as a principle of best 
practice. 
 
Recommendations are made as to 
processes for managing high risk 
directors. 
 
Companies decide whether or not 
to adopt the recommendations. 
recruiting company directors. 
 
Managing high risk directors 
forms part of mechanisms such 
as the company’s Enterprise Risk 
Management process. 
findings of the evaluation exercise 
and to manage the high risk 
company directors in the 
recommended manner or any 
other adequate manner. 
Discretion in the voluntary nature 
of soft law provisions leads to 
varying standards across board, 
which defeats the aim of risk 
management. 
 
When companies decide not to 
comply with any or all of the 
recommendations, knowledge gap 
in the market as to the personality 
of directors still exists.  Even if 
companies disclose non-
compliance, that still does not 
disclose the personality of 
directors. 
MIX OF SOFT LAW AND 
HARD LAW-“HYBRID” 
Companies are mandated to 
undertake the personality 
evaluation process in order to 
identify the personality of company 
Mandatory provisions may 
originate as amendments to the 
Companies Act or a new 
statutory instrument. 
 
Voluntary recommendations may 
Directors, Shareholders, Market 
for corporate control. 
 
External Authority which ensures 
the objectivity of the evaluation 
process; receives and evaluates 
Additional requirements for 
company management. 
 
Cost implications. 
 
Where companies decide to take 
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directors, thereby identifying 
potential risks. 
 
Companies may then voluntarily 
choose to recruit whosoever they 
wish as a director. 
 
Companies are mandated to make 
the necessary disclosures. 
 
Companies are mandated to 
manage high risk directors using 
the recommended processes or any 
other which achieves the same 
purpose and render reports on the 
process. 
become additional provisions in 
corporate governance codes or 
other regulation. 
reports and monitors compliance. 
 
Costs to be borne by companies 
for the process, same as is the 
case for registration and reporting 
obligations. 
 
Costs to be borne by the external 
authority for the process. 
on high risk directors and not to 
adopt the recommended risk 
management mechanism, external 
authority has to ensure that 
company’s own risk management 
processes are adequate. 
 
Creating amendments to existing 
company law provisions and 
corporate governance codes. 
 
Burden of promulgating new 
statutory regulations or codes. 
 
Acceptability of the mandatory 
provisions by corporate leaders. 
HARD LAW 
Companies are mandated to 
undertake personality evaluation of 
company directors. 
 
Provisions embedded in 
Companies Act as amendments 
or in any other statutory 
regulation. 
Directors, Shareholders and 
External Authority. 
 
Costs to be borne by company and 
external authority for the process. 
Excludes potential directors who 
might be high risk but possess 
other essential characteristics 
required for company 
management. 
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Companies are mandated to recruit 
only company directors who are 
low risk. 
 
Companies are mandated to 
manage high risk directors using 
mandatory provisions. 
Exert pressure on companies to 
recruit only directors who are low 
risk as well as possessing all the 
other essential requirements for 
effective company management. 
 
Practically goes against the 
contractual theory of the 
corporation under which company 
owners reserve the right to 
appoint company managers. 
 
Inflexible, ignoring the potential 
for effective personality risk 
management. 
 
Ignoring the one size does not fit 
all principle as regards mandatory 
provisions for managing 
personality risks. 
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Higher cost implications. 
 
Additional requirements for 
company management. 
 
Acceptability of mandatory rules 
by corporate leaders. 
 
Burden of promulgating new 
statutory regulations. 
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7.1.3 JUSTIFICATION FOR A HYBRID APPROACH 
The model proposed in this thesis is a hybrid approach to regulation; a mix of soft law by 
way of recommendations and hard law by way of mandatory provisions.  The reasons for 
adopting this approach are highlighted in chapter 6, section 6.3, but they are also 
discussed in greater detail below, particularly in relation to the provisions suggested for 
inclusion in the model. 
1) Regulatory theories: 
An examination of the dominant regulatory theories as discussed in previous chapters 
evidences support for the argument that regulatory provisions which adhere to the 
principles of responsive and smart regulation are most likely to be effective.
818
  The 
rationale behind the suggested regulatory model is to utilise hard law in cases where that 
is the only option which is most likely to engage with the problem appropriately, and in 
this case, the identification of the personalities of directors, disclosures to shareholders 
and regulators, and developing a personality risk management process require the 
adoption of hard law as that is the most effective means of managing those aspects of 
personality risks.
819
  These issues are the primary bases of the personality risk problem in 
relation to public listed companies.  If these issues are left in the arena of soft law, the 
associated discretion and the voluntariness would defeat the aims of the entire regulatory 
process and leave personality risks inherently unmitigated because there will be a 
possibility that companies may choose not to comply with the recommendations.  The 
history of corporate failures evidence the effects of ignoring personality risks and the 
potential adverse consequences of continuing to do so for public listed companies 
specifically is the fundamental reason for the arguments in this thesis in support of hard 
law where necessary, particularly as regards awareness and identification of personality 
risks.  Then, considering the contractual theory of companies, shareholders are still 
allowed to select the directors of their companies, but the model ensures that they do so 
with the full knowledge of the risks they undertake.
820
  Also, this approach of allowing 
shareholders make their selection of company directors recognises the acceptability of 
soft law approaches in corporate governance, and the importance of engendering the spirit 
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 See Ayres & Braithwaite, (note 178); see also Baldwin & Cave, (note 186); see also Gunningham & 
Grabosky, (note 203). 
819
 See Fuller, (note 724); see also Gunningham & Grabosky, ibid. 
820
 The contractual theory argues that company managers are agents of the shareholders, see Jensen & 
Meckling, (note 29); see generally the discussions on corporate theories in chapter two, section 2.2. 
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of self-regulation which has been argued as an element that ensures better co-operation 
from regulated companies.
821
  Mandating the identification of directors, and then allowing 
the company the discretion of making its choice based of the disclosed piece of 
information regarding the personality of directors is an approach which balances 
regulation in the public interest and the contractual theory of the corporation.   
Responsive regulation argues that the regulator engages with the peculiarities of the 
regulated,
822
 and arguments have also been made that regulation is more effective when a 
regulator has a relationship with the regulated and offers a degree of discretion.
823
  A 
degree of discretion is essential in this case because a company is formed its members, 
the shareholders, even though the public have a peculiar interest in companies whose 
activities affect the populace.  Smart regulation principles as propounded by Gunningham 
and Grabosky also indicate that the adoption of a mixture of regulatory instruments, 
applying the least interventionist measure to achieve the aim and creating regulatory 
pyramids, are essential for the creation of effective regulation.
824
  Taking account of these 
principles, the indicative hybrid approach proposes a mixture of hard law and soft law, 
the hard law being applied in specific areas as the least necessary measure to obtain an 
effective result at mitigating personality risks.  Soft law approaches are then adopted for 
the areas in which the aim of personality risk mitigation can be achieved through various 
means and the least interventionist method is proposed.  The hybrid model provides 
specific recommendations in relation to managing personality risks, as well as the option 
for companies to adopt internal or other procedures which would achieve the same 
objectives.  The reason for this approach is that personality risk management would differ 
from company to company, depending on the peculiarities of the companies, and so, 
flexibility is required in order to engender effectiveness.
825
   
The hybrid model proposes the utilisation of an external authority as regulators in the risk 
management process, in order to ensure objectivity and standardisation.
826
  It is suggested 
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 See Ayres & Braithwaite, (note 178). 
822
 Ibid. 
823
 See Dine, (note 49). 
824
 See Gunningham & Grabosky, (note 203). 
825
 This would be one reason why corporate governance codes are developed as soft law mechanisms, because 
one size might not fit all companies.  See the UK Corporate Governance Code 2010, p 2 & 4, which provides 
that boards have a lot of room within the framework of the Code to make decisions and that there are 
instances where departure from the provisions of the code would be justifiable if good governance can be 
achieved by other means. 
826
 The external authority is discussed in more detail later in section 7.2.5. 
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that this authority will monitor compliance with the regulatory provisions, and intervene 
where necessary in order to secure compliance.  The external authority will adopt the 
principle of regulatory pyramids and interventions will be graduated depending on the 
levels of non-compliance.  The provisions of the model operate on the basis that where 
the personalities of directors have been identified, the essential risk is considered 
identified.  This has to be a mandatory exercise because if it is not carried out, there is 
nothing to evidence the personality of directors and the risk remains unidentified and the 
question of risk management would not even arise.  If shareholders already have the 
appropriate information regarding the personality of directors, then the foundational risk 
has been identified; and it seems appropriate to allow some level of discretion in the 
actual selection of directors based on the fact that the shareholders would now be 
presumed to be in a better position to make rational choices in this regard; and in the 
selection of personality risk management processes which suit the company’s needs, 
subject to the minimum standards recommended by the model.  
According to the provisions of the suggested model, in relation to selecting directors, two 
mechanisms come into operation.  First, there is a mandatory mechanism which ensures 
the disclosure of the information regarding the personality dimensions of the prospective 
directors to shareholders.  This mechanism has to be mandatory because disclosing the 
information is essential for the market and is also a risk management exercise to the 
extent that it allows shareholders decide whether they want their companies to be 
managed by high or low risk directors, thereby identifying the risks they are undertaking.  
There is no option of a voluntary mechanism in this situation because if the disclosure is 
not made, the risk is left unidentified.  There is either an obligation to disclose or an 
option not to disclose.  In the cases where directors are selected by the nominations 
committee, the information regarding the personality of prospective directors is disclosed 
to that committee for the same purposes.  The shareholders are subsequently provided 
with the same information at the point of ratification of the directors’ appointments.827  
Second, there is the mandatory mechanism of adopting a personality risk management 
process.  Here, the aim of the mechanism is to manage the already identified personality 
risk.  The company is mandated to manage the personality risk, but the actual risk 
management process can be undertaken in various ways.  That is why a soft law approach 
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 See s 160 of the UK Companies Act 2006 which provides that shareholders are required to vote on the 
appointment of directors of public companies. 
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is essential.  It aids and supports the possibilities of managing the risks in the best 
possible way suited to individual companies.  The most appropriate regulatory method is 
then a soft law one with recommendations and the option of departing from the 
recommended provisions in the case that another approach would achieve the same aim.  
This would be consistent with the “comply or explain” mechanism of the UK Corporate 
Governance Code. 
2) Current Trends: 
Under the contractual theory of the company upon which companies in the UK are 
historically founded, the State is not expected to intervene in the regulation of companies 
except to the extent that regulation is needed for the effective functioning of the 
market.
828
  Therefore, recommendations for the adoption of hard law in this regulatory 
model have been restricted to those aspects of personality risk management which are 
most essential for the effective functioning of the market, for instance the mandatory 
identification of personality risks, the disclosure of information to the market, and the risk 
management of high risk company directors.  Based on Cheffins’s definition of the 
perfect market as one in which actors “act rationally, are numerous, have full information 
about the products on offer, can contract at little cost, have sufficient financial resources 
to transact, can enter and leave the market with little difficulty, and will carry out the 
obligations which they agree to perform”,829 it becomes evident that statutory regulation 
is desirable for the purposes outlined above as a means of regularising an imperfect 
market.  This is because it is important that market participants have adequate information 
regarding the risks which accrue from the personality of company directors, and also to 
evaluate whether the directors are persons who are capable of carrying out the obligations 
which they agree to perform.  Again, it is essential that corporate failures and associated 
financial losses are prevented so that there will be sufficient financial resources available 
for transactions in the market.  These are issues which have not been addressed 
sufficiently by existing mechanisms and contribute to imperfections in the market.  In 
keeping with the tenets of soft law in the regulation of companies, voluntary 
recommendations are proposed in the areas in which discretion can be allowed with 
minimal adverse effects on the market.  Therefore, adopting hard law in the most critical 
                                                          
828
 See Du Plessis, (note 50) 48; see also Ferran, (note 215); see also Hood et al, (note 779). 
829
 See Cheffins, (note 375). 
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areas where conformity is essential and retaining soft law in the areas where flexibility is 
required is an optimal regulatory approach which accords with present day realities.   
An example of the current thinking in this regard is reflected in the efforts being made by 
the European Commission to ensure that regulation is smart and better.  In the 
communication from the European Commission on Smart Regulation in the European 
Union issued on 8
th
 October 2010, some salient and pertinent issues were highlighted.
830
 
There was a reiteration of the importance of markets as sources for the deliverance of 
sustainable prosperity for “ALL” (emphasis mine).831  Again, the communication stated 
that markets would not always be able to deliver this purpose on their own and therefore 
regulation has a positive and necessary role to play.
832
  However, the crux of the 
communication is that regulation must be better by being smart.
833
  In another document 
on better regulation, it was stated that in an era of globalisation, citizens expect their 
governments to ensure their safety and welfare, and businesses expect public authorities 
to ensure a level playing field and boost competitiveness; and regulation is key to meeting 
these challenges.
834
  Public administration needs to be effective, flexible and focused; and 
better regulation is one of Europe’s core priorities.835  It is these principles of 
effectiveness, flexibility and focus that have informed the choice of a hybrid regulatory 
approach in addressing the problems associated with the personality risks of company 
directors.  The European Commission acknowledges the possibility of different 
regulatory instruments and the use of self-regulation and co-regulation in cases where 
those approaches would be more effective.
836
 As regards the suggested model, the choice 
to regulate is borne out of the importance of regulation in addressing the anomalies within 
the market considering how the operations of the market impacts on the citizenry, and the 
method of regulation is influenced by the need to take cognisance of the form of 
regulation that is most likely to achieve the desired aim.  Also, aligning regulatory 
                                                          
830
 See The Communication Document at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2010:0543:FIN:EN:PDF  (accessed 15th June 2012). 
831
 Ibid, p 2. 
832
 Ibid. 
833
 Ibid, p 2-3.  The communication indicates that smart regulation means ensuring the highest quality possible 
across the whole policy cycle from design to implementation, enforcement, evaluation and revision. 
834
 See the Better Regulation Document at 
http://ec.europa.eu/governance/better_regulation/documents/brochure/br_brochure_en.pdf , at p 3 
(accessed 15th June 2012). 
835
 Ibid, preface by Jose Manuel Barroso, President of the European Commission. 
836
 See the EU website http://ec.europa.eu/governance/better_regulation/instruments_en.htm (accessed 15th 
June 2012). 
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methods with currently acceptable approaches to regulation is a means of engendering 
effectiveness and sustainability, because the issues that are viewed as acceptable in the 
development of effective regulation are taken into consideration.      
3) Cost: 
Regulation can generate costs, and these costs are a real concern to companies especially 
in a challenging economic climate.
837
  A company is an economic entity and the issue of 
regulatory costs is a pertinent one.
838
  Regulation is often viewed as a barrier, consuming 
valuable time and money, and taking company directors away from the primary task of 
running companies.
839
  Striking the right balance between the benefits that regulation 
delivers to society and the costs it imposes on businesses is vital to ensure a healthy 
economy.
840
  Achieving the right balance means adopting a level of regulation that 
promotes competition and stability without impinging on companies’ ability to operate.841  
It is therefore important to avoid unnecessarily burdensome regulation.
842
  The idea of 
adopting a hybrid mechanism accords with the tenets of achieving the regulatory aims at 
the least cost to the companies and to the State.  It has been argued that regulation is 
never cost-free, both for the regulated and the State, and so the pertinent issue is 
delivering effective regulation at the least cost.
843
  Ayres & Braithwaite argue that the 
State should only regulate when it is the cheapest option of addressing the issue at 
hand.
844
   
A hybrid approach ensures that the cost of statutory regulation is incurred only in the 
areas in which it is absolutely necessary to utilise hard law, and self-regulatory 
mechanisms are adopted where they can achieve the aims of the regulation, thereby 
contributing towards cost reduction for the regulated entities and the State.  The 
mandatory provisions in the suggested model are proposed as such because that 
regulatory approach is the least required to actually achieve the desired purpose and 
outcome.  Providing necessary information and disclosure, and leaving the room for 
                                                          
837
 See the UK Better Regulation Executive (BRE) Annual Review 2009, (note 817) p 3 & 21.  
838
 See Ribstein, (note 248).   
839
 See the UK Better Regulation Executive (BRE) Annual Review 2009, (note 817) p 5. 
840
 See the UK Better Regulation Executive (BRE) Annual Review 2009, (note 817) p 28.  
841
 See the HM Treasury Report Reducing Regulation Made Simple 
http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/biscore/better-regulation/docs/r/10-1155-reducing-regulation-made-simple.pdf 
section 1 (accessed 15th June 2012). 
842
 Ibid. 
843
 Ibid, section 3. 
844
 See Ayres & Braithwaite, (note 178) 103. 
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actors in the market to use their initiative in undertaking and managing personality risks is 
intended to be an efficient regulatory combination.  Again, smart regulation is about 
regulating in cases where it is absolutely necessary to do so whilst keeping costs at a 
minimum.
845
  Therefore, the suggested model takes cognisance of economic realities and 
presents the option of internal self-regulation in the areas where there exists the 
possibility of that approach being effective in achieving both its specific aim and the 
overall objective of the regulatory mechanism.  Under the provisions of the model, 
companies would have the option of applying the cheapest available approach which 
would meet the regulatory objectives.   
  
                                                          
845
 This was stated in the EU Better Regulation website 
http://ec.europa.eu/governance/better_regulation/index_en.htm  (accessed 15th June 2012). 
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7.1.4 THE HYBRID APPROACH 
The regulatory approach adopted in this model combines hard law provisions and soft law 
provisions as follows: 
Table 3 
 PROVISIONS RESPONSIBILITY 
HARD LAW Identification of personality 
dimensions of directors 
 
Disclosure of personality of 
directors selected 
 
Risk management of high risk 
directors 
Shareholders, Directors, External 
Authority  
 
Shareholders, Directors and 
External Authority 
 
Directors and External Authority 
 
SOFT LAW Selection of directors based on 
information on personality 
risks 
 
Risk management of high risk 
directors using recommended 
or other adequate provisions 
Shareholders and Directors 
 
 
 
Directors and External Authority 
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The sphere of activities is illustrated in the following diagram:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 above illustrates the flow of hard law and soft law provisions in the personality risk management 
cycle. 
 
7.2 THE MODEL IN DETAIL 
7.2.1 APPLICABILITY 
The regulatory model presented in this thesis is applicable to company directors.  These are 
the persons charged with the management of companies on behalf of its shareholders and 
these shareholders may or may not be on the board of directors.
846
  The UK Companies Act 
2006 reiterates the position of directors as managers of companies.
847
  There is no distinction 
                                                          
846
 See Formoy, (note 87); see also O’Donnell, (note 87); see also Gevurtz, (note 87) 925. 
847
 See s 20, UK Companies Act 2006; see also Art 3 of the Model Articles for private limited companies and 
public companies.  It is also noteworthy that in the UK, both non-executive directors and executive directors 
have the same legal duties, see A. Belcher & T. Naruisch, ‘The Evolution of Business Knowledge in the Context 
of Unitary and Two-Tier Board Structures’ (2005) Journal of Business Law 443-472 at 470. 
 
SOFT LAW 
PROVISIONS FOR 
RISK 
MANAGEMENT 
PERSONALITY RISK 
MANAGEMENT 
HARD LAW 
IDENTIFICATION 
OF PERSONALITY 
SOFT LAW 
SELECTION OF 
DIRECTORS 
HARD LAW 
DISCLOSURE AND 
RISK 
MANAGEMENT 
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made in this model between executive and non-executive directors because the UK 
Companies Act 2006 does not recognise such a distinction even though in the UK Corporate 
Governance Code there is an elucidation of different roles for both categories of directors.
848
  
The main issue which the model aims to address is the risk associated with the personality of 
these persons who make decisions and act on behalf of companies, and the associated 
mitigation of these risks by ensuring that the persons who manage companies are in the best 
position to contribute to effective governance within companies.  The objective of the model 
is to provide information which will enable informed choices as regards the selection of 
individuals with the most appropriate personalities to engage in corporate governance, and 
also to enable the management of the risks associated with the selection of persons who are 
not the most appropriate personalities for engagement in corporate governance functions.  A 
succinct explanation of the role of company directors in corporate governance is summed up 
in Para 2.5 of the Cadbury Code and replicated in the UK Corporate Governance Code 2010 
which states as follows:  
Corporate governance is the system by which companies are directed and 
controlled. Boards of directors are responsible for the governance of their 
companies. The shareholders’ role in governance is to appoint the directors 
and the auditors and to satisfy themselves that an appropriate governance 
structure is in place. The responsibilities of the board include setting the 
company’s strategic aims, providing the leadership to put them into effect, 
supervising the management of the business and reporting to shareholders on 
their stewardship. The board’s actions are subject to laws, regulations and the 
shareholders in general meeting. 
This provision demonstrates the importance of the directorship function and illustrates the 
key role of the directors in being responsible for the success or failure of a company.  
Consistent with this position, it is important to ensure that company directors are persons 
who are capable of fulfilling their role.
849
  Although management executives also act on 
behalf of the company, the core of corporate governance activities is that the directors 
supervise the management team and set the strategic direction of the company.
850
  The 
                                                          
848
 See the UK Corporate Governance Code 2010, Principle A.4 which indicates that the role of non-executive 
directors is that of oversight, scrutiny and contribution to strategy in respect of company operations. 
849
 See the discussions in chapter five which indicate that some personality dimensions are better suited to 
corporate governance than others. 
850
 See the UK Corporate Governance Code 2010, A.1 Supporting Principle. 
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management team are expected to develop the strategies already set by the directors and 
make decisions around those strategies.  Therefore, if the directors are persons who are 
capable of making appropriate decisions and taking appropriate actions, then, it can be 
expected that company management should fall into similar tendencies.
851
  As discussed 
earlier, the recruitment process for company directors is not usually as formal as that for 
other company employees, and so there are higher risks of recruiting inappropriate persons 
as directors.
852
  Under existing corporate governance recommendations, the nominations 
committee deal with the recruitment of directors, and there are no specific requirements for 
personality assessments.
853
  The directors are the uppermost cadre of corporate officers, and 
have no higher level of supervision within the company.  In the interest of cost implications 
and necessity, a personality risk management mechanism for company directors is the more 
important element and a good starting point in the management of personality risks in 
companies as a whole.   
Company directors are the group of company managers recognised by law under the 
Companies Act as evidenced in provisions such as those relating to the requirement of a 
company to have directors and directors’ duties to the company.854  Again, the shareholders 
appoint the directors, but do not necessarily appoint the management team.
855
  Article 5 of 
the UK Model Articles of Association grants the power of delegation to directors, and so 
they may delegate their duties and powers to management executives.  However, the 
primary responsibility of company management rests with company directors and it is for all 
the reasons above that this model of personality risk management in companies is applicable 
to company directors.  There is no doubt that considering the fact that personality affects 
behaviour across all levels of roles, a valid argument exists in support of applying 
personality risk management processes to all the participants in the corporate governance 
process, including the regulators, in order to ensure the effectiveness of the entire process.  
                                                          
851
 See Hofmann & Jones, (note 692); see also Harrison et al, (note 692); see also Stewart, (note 693); see also 
Moynihan & Peterson, (note 694). 
852
 See Cadbury, (note 225); see also Dulewicz & Herbert, (note 224). Personality tests are often utilised in 
employee selection in companies and has demonstrated predictive validity across a variety of occupational 
groups and performance criteria, see S.D. Risavy & P.A. Hausdorf, ‘Personality Testing in Personnel Selection: 
Adverse Impact and Differential Hiring Rates’ (2011) 19(1) International Journal of Selection and Assessment 
18-30. 
853
 See the UK Corporate Governance Code 2010, Provisions B.2.1 and B.2.2. 
854
 See s 154-156 and s 171-177 of the UK Companies Act 2006. 
855
 The shareholders appoint the first directors and company secretary as specified under s 12 (1) of the UK 
Companies Act. The directors may make subsequent appointments based on the powers delegated to them by 
the shareholders. 
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However, in particular relation to managing personality risks as it concerns the governance 
of companies, the directors are the most important persons as they engage with the actual 
risks and processes which can result in corporate failures.  Other participants, such as the 
regulators are not involved in the actual processes of governance, so their personality risks 
in relation to the governance of companies is minimised.   
7.2.2 TIMING 
The process should commence at the point of recruitment with an evaluation process which 
identifies the personality of directors.  Directors could be appointed as first directors of a 
company by its shareholders or subsequently by the existing board of directors subject to the 
approval of the shareholders, but in any case, the evaluation of the director’s personality 
dimension should be undertaken at the point of selection of that director.  The model is 
applicable to public listed companies,
856
 and so for a new company, the provisions come 
into effect at the point of listing.
857
  There should be a requirement for a disclosure statement 
to be included in the listing particulars to the effect that the provisions of the regulatory 
model have been complied with in relation to the company directors, and indicating the level 
of personality risk ascribed to each director.  The UK Listing Rules in section 6.F.2 already 
mandates the disclosure of information relating to issues such as unspent convictions, 
disqualifications and bankruptcies.  Information relating to personality risk is one which can 
be argued to fall into similar categories, because it gives an indication as to the director’s 
potential behaviour in corporate governance.  The underlying reason for requesting 
information such as those mandated by the listing rules is so as to identify potential risks, 
because the existence of such situations indicates the potential for certain behavioural 
tendencies.  It is in the same manner that the evaluation of directors in relation to their 
personality indicates the potential for certain behaviours, although they may not have 
occurred.
858
  
 
                                                          
856
 See the discussions on the scope of the research undertaken in chapter one, p 5-7.  The problem which the 
thesis addresses originates in the functioning of public listed companies, and the regulatory model suggested 
in response to the problem is targeted at the same type of companies because there is a justification for State 
interference in the governance of such companies on account of market failures and in the interests of the 
public.  Again, the shareholders of public listed companies are usually dispersed and the companies essentially 
trade with public funds.   
857
 A public company may decide not to be listed, see the UK Listing Rules s 1.4 which refers to application for 
listing. 
858
 As argued in chapter five, behaviour is the outward evidence of personality as personality is the inward 
evidence of behaviour, see Hartmann, (note 542). 
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7.2.3 PROCEDURE 
The suggested procedure for the application of the model is as follows: 
1) The State should issue a document containing the following elements: 
a) The different personality dimensions and the requisite personality 
dimensions most appropriate for effective corporate governance: Based 
on personality research and psychological analysis, a comprehensive and 
authoritative document can be drawn up on the different personality 
dimensions and their influences on behaviour as it concerns corporate 
governance.  This document would be made available to shareholders and 
they would be advised to study it as part of their preparations in setting 
up a new public listed company and investing in an already existing one.   
b) A list of requirements for acceptability of personality evaluators in the 
case that the State decides not to be the sole personality evaluator for 
companies: The State could decide to establish a regulatory authority (the 
external authority) to deal with the evaluation of directors for reasons 
such as maintaining similar standards across all companies, ensuring 
objectivity, independence and enhancing effective supervision of the 
entire process.  On another hand, if the prospects of a sole authority as 
evaluator will affect the expediency of the process, the State could 
establish certain standards and requirements, such as the criteria for 
determining objectivity and expertise, which if met by any private 
evaluator can enable that evaluator undertake personality evaluation of 
directors and issue acceptable results.  The salient issue is that these 
evaluators have to meet the requirements set down by the State.  It would 
be important for both the external authority and private evaluators to have 
adequate resources which would enable the attainment of appropriate 
standards in the evaluation process.  Again, in consideration of data 
protection and privacy issues, the State could restrict the accreditation for 
the conduct of evaluation processes to a limited number of evaluators.     
c) A list of accredited private evaluators in the case that the State decides to 
publish the list of evaluators whose services must be used by the 
companies: This approach may be necessary in order to clarify and 
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streamline the activities of personality evaluators and provide companies 
an easier access to appropriate evaluators.  Here, the State would have 
undertaken the responsibility of ensuring that the accredited evaluators 
have met the minimum requirements and standards.  An example of this 
process can be seen in the requirement for companies to utilise the 
services of particular accounting firms who are accredited for audit 
purposes.  In the case that private evaluators are utilised, their reports 
should be sent to the external authority which is the regulatory authority 
for the model.  The external authority subsequently makes the 
information available to the relevant parties.
859
 
2) The prospective directors of a public listed company are evaluated in relation to their 
personality dimensions:  Based on the personality traits which are adjudged as most 
suitable for corporate governance, a selection criteria can be derived which would 
determine the level between low risk and high risk at which a director can be placed 
depending on the results of the evaluation exercise. 
3) Shareholders of a company are allowed to select directors: 
a) If selected directors fall under the category of personalities most suited to 
corporate governance (low risk directors), the normal governance 
principles and corporate law regulations continue to apply and the 
company need not embark on a personality risk management process. 
b) If selected directors fall under the category of personalities not suited to 
corporate governance (high risk directors), the mandatory risk 
management requirement of the model becomes operational in respect of 
those directors.  The shareholders or directors are also required to explain 
their choice of high risk directors with justifications for such selections.  
The purpose of this provision would be to help address their minds to the 
risks they are undertaking and reassure themselves of the necessity to 
assume such risks.   
                                                          
859
 These parties are the shareholders as company owners and selectors, directors as company managers and 
selectors, and the stock exchange as the regulators of the market.  The external authority represents the State 
and the society in the regulatory process. 
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c) Shareholders would be provided with information regarding the most 
appropriate personality dimensions for corporate governance and it is 
assumed that they would make rational choices in the selection of 
directors.  It would be more rational to select directors who are low risk 
because they would be more capable of appropriate behaviours.  
However, for the reason that shareholders have the prerogative under the 
contractual theory to choose the managers of their company, they should 
have the choice to select anyone irrespective of his/her personality 
dimension.  Again, for purposes of flexibility, persons who are 
considered high risk should be accommodated in the governance process 
if they have some positive contributions to make, the only caveat being 
that the risks accruing from them must be managed effectively in order to 
prevent corporate failures.  This flexibility is also necessary in 
consideration of the fact that the risk issue in question is based on the 
potential of a director to behave inappropriately and as indicated in 
psychology literature, personality might not be conclusive proof in 
absolute terms regarding the prospective behaviour of an individual.  
However, it should be noted that in the case that shareholders decide to 
select high risk directors, and depending on the balance between low risk 
and high risk directors, it would necessitate an increased involvement of 
shareholders in the governance process because they would have a stake 
in ensuring that these personality risks are managed.  This is not 
necessarily a negative situation because shareholders ought to be as 
involved as possible in the management of their companies.
860
    
d) Where directors have made subsequent appointments to the board, at the 
point of ratifying such appointments, shareholders should be provided 
with information regarding the personality dimensions of the directors.  
4) Disclosure of information on the personality of directors selected: Information 
regarding the personality risk level ascribed to a director should be disclosed to the 
external authority which is to act as the regulatory authority for the process.  The 
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 See the UK Stewardship Code for Institutional Investors 2010, Principle 3 which provides that investors 
should monitor companies and seek to satisfy themselves to the extent possible that the investee company’s 
board and committee structures are effective.   
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shareholders would then be provided with the information to aid the selection of 
directors.  The directors would also have access to the information to enable 
effective risk management and in the case of subsequent appointments.  The 
information would be disclosed to the Stock Exchange as part of listing requirement 
and as they are regulators of the stock market.  The annual reports and other publicly 
available corporate governance reports made by the company should state simply 
that the company has complied with the provisions of the regulatory model.  The 
reason for this is so as to comply with the principles of data protection and privacy 
rules which would be discussed in detail in subsequent sections and which specify 
that personal data should be processed only to the extent necessary to achieve the 
purpose for which it is intended.  Annual reports can be accessed by the world at 
large in this era of internet publications, and so there is a need to ensure that 
information made available there is for public consumption, and does not contravene 
individual privacy rights. Essentially, the information regarding the personality of 
directors is most relevant to, and should be made available to the regulator as 
representatives of the State and society, the shareholders as owners of the company 
and appointees of directors, the board of directors as managers of the company, and 
the Stock Exchange as regulators of the market. 
5) The State through the external authority should provide recommendations on how 
best to manage personality risks in a general framework: Considering that one size 
may not fit all, and different companies would be involved in different spheres of 
operations and activities, the companies should be allowed to either adopt the 
baseline recommended personality risk management framework, or develop a 
framework of their own which would achieve the same purpose.  In the case that the 
company elects to use its own framework, details of this should be made available to 
the external authority in order to ensure its efficacy.  The State should provide a 
document or statement containing minimum standards of reasonable personality risk 
management which the companies have to adhere to in the case that the companies 
chose not to adopt the recommended framework for personality risk management.  
The company should adopt a personality risk management framework at the point in 
which it selects a high risk director.   
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7.2.4 MONITORING AND REPORTS 
Reports should be made to the external authority upon the recruitment of any new 
director stating as follows: 
1) That the personality evaluation process has been complied with. 
2) That the shareholders or directors have completed the selection of directors 
after studying the document on the most appropriate personality dimensions 
for corporate governance. 
3) The personality dimensions of the selected directors and the balance of 
personality risks across the board. 
4) In the case of high risk directors, that the company has agreed to adopt the 
recommended personality risk management framework, or 
5) That the company will manage the high risk director under its own choice of 
risk management procedure, and 
6) Details of the risk management framework which the company has chosen to 
adopt. 
7.2.5 THE EXTERNAL AUTHORITY 
In order for regulation to be effective, it has to be enforceable.  This thesis suggests 
the use of an external authority backed by law as the regulator for the model so as to 
ensure the objectivity of the process and also to act as a legitimate source for the 
enforcement of the mandatory statutory provisions.  An example of an evaluation 
mechanism in the UK which utilises an external authority is the FSA’s Approved 
Persons Regime, backed by the FSMA 2000 and applied by the Financial Services 
Authority.  The independence of the authority from companies it regulates no doubt 
contributes to the effectiveness of its framework of regulation.
861
  A government 
established authority would be expected to be more devoid of capitalist motives, in 
the case that the State is focused on ensuring that companies are governed 
effectively, and would be best positioned to ensure fairness, equality and appropriate 
standards for a process of evaluation such as the one proposed in this model.  The 
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 See Dewing & Russel, (note 148). 
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Registrar of Companies in the UK and the Prudential Regulatory Authority
862
 are 
examples of external authorities that could be used as the regulator for the model.  In 
their principles of smart regulation, Gunningham & Grabosky highlight the need to 
engage interested second and third parties in the regulatory process.
863
  They argue 
that the State can create efficiency by involving parties who are interested in the 
regulatory outcome to act as surrogate regulators.  Therefore, institutions such as the 
Stock Exchange should be involved in the regulatory process because as regulators 
of the market, they have an interest in ensuring that companies are governed 
effectively.   
 
Other establishments such as the Institute of Directors could also be utilised in the 
actualisation of the purposes of the model because as the professional body which 
provides service and support to company directors, they should be interested in 
ensuring that company directors are effective in their roles.  The challenges of such 
surrogate regulators however would be that there has to be an enabling law which 
provides the institution with the authority to act in place of the State, and issues of 
objectivity, adequate resources and independence would also have to be dealt with 
and met.  In any case, as it relates to this model, the important factor is the 
establishment of an authority independent from the companies which would be 
effective in actualising the objectives of the regulatory model by enforcing the 
mandatory provisions and overseeing the application of the self-regulatory 
provisions.  As regards funding, it is suggested that companies will pay a fee for the 
evaluation process, and both the State and companies would contribute towards the 
administrative and operational costs of the external authority.  The reason behind this 
is that companies and the State have stakes in the actualisation of the purposes of the 
model, and there should be financial commitments from both parties.  The pattern of 
companies funding the functions of regulatory authorities can be gleaned from the 
FSA which charges annual fees from regulated companies.  As with the funding of 
the FSA, it is suggested that companies make annual fee payments for the regulatory 
                                                          
862
 The Prudential Regulatory Authority (PRA) is the authority which will take over the regulatory functions of 
the FSA in relation to companies operating in the financial services sector.  The FSA do not receive funding 
from the government and charge fees to all the firms that they regulate as well as other bodies such as 
investment exchanges, see the FSA website http://www.fsa.gov.uk/about/who/funded (accessed 15th June 
2012). 
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 See Gunningham & Grabosky, (note 203). 
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functions of the external authority in the suggested model.  Another relevant 
example in which companies are made to fund the regulatory activities of regulators 
is as regards Environment Agencies which are allowed under section 42 of the 
Environmental Act 1995 to set up charging schemes for their functions and issuance 
of licences. 
 
However, the State has also been involved in funding regulatory authorities, even for 
new legislative issues, as is evident under section 24 of the Gangmasters (Licensing) 
Act 2004 which provides that the Secretary of State may make financial provisions 
to the Gangmasters Licensing Authority.  This means that the Authority is essentially 
funded by the State even though it can charge for its functions such as the issuance 
of licences, but, all monies realised from these regulatory charges are paid to the 
Secretary of State.  In this scenario, the State contributes to the funding of the 
Authority.  The Gangmasters Licensing Authority was created under the 2004 Act in 
response to the death of Chinese immigrant workers in the Morecambe Bay cockling 
disaster.  The Act aims to regulate the functioning of recruitment agencies for 
workers in the agricultural sector in order to safeguard the rights and well-being of 
the workers, a cause which is in the public interest.  The effective functioning of 
public listed companies and the prevention of corporate failures is essential for a 
healthy economy and the provision of goods and services.  There are also positive 
social implications for well-governed companies such as the availability of jobs and 
the boost of capitalism.  This is beneficial to society as a whole, and contributions to 
regulation which enhances these prospects is a worthy investment for a State in the 
public interest.  It might be the case that the companies and shareholders who are the 
direct causes of the regulatory intervention and recipients of the regulatory benefits 
would have to contribute more, but, it is necessary that the State contributes as well 
in order to ensure the sustainability of the regulatory process and lessen the financial 
burden of the regulation on companies. 
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7.2.6 RECOMMENDED PROVISIONS FOR INCLUSION IN THE MODEL 
The model would present recommended provisions for personality risk management.  
Some of the issues which would be important to include in such a recommendation 
are as follows: 
1) Management of high risk directors under the company’s Enterprise Risk 
Management framework:   
Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) has emerged and developed as a new 
paradigm designed to increase boards’ and senior management’s ability to 
manage the portfolio of risks facing an enterprise.
864
  It differs from traditional 
risk management techniques in which risks are managed individually, and 
instead uses a holistic top down approach to manage risks across an 
enterprise.
865
  ERM is essentially the identification and assessment of the 
collective risks that affect firm value and the implementation of a firm-wide 
strategy to manage those risks.
866
  The rapid proliferation of ERM is driven by 
provisions in corporate governance codes, stock exchange rules and legislation 
which have been interpreted as requiring an increased need for the 
management of risks beyond the fundamental financial risks (examples 
include the UK Corporate Governance Code Principles C.2.1 and C.3.2; the 
NYSE Corporate Governance Rules 2004; Sarbanes-Oxley Act [2002] Section 
409). ERM is focused on a correlation between risk management and strategy 
in an enterprise-wide structure.  
 
In an effort to give some flesh to the ERM drive, in September 2004, the 
Committee of Sponsoring Organisations of the Treadway Commission 
(COSO) issued an integrated framework to provide a model for ERM. That 
framework defines ERM as “a process effected by an entity’s board of 
directors, management and other personnel, applied in strategy setting and 
across the enterprise, designed to identify potential events that may affect the 
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entity, and manage risks to be within its risk appetite, to provide reasonable 
assurance regarding the achievement of entity objectives”.867  As much as the 
COSO Framework was tested with selected companies, there is still limited 
practical knowledge about the intricacies of an ERM infrastructure, but one 
salient issue is the fact that it is a tool used to elevate risk discussions to 
strategic levels.
868
  ERM is well established in larger organisations such as 
companies in the banking and insurance sectors where there is a link to asset 
risk management and actuarial research, but in some other sectors, ERM is 
still in the early stages of development and implementation.
869
  Also, due to 
non-existent or ineffective risk management processes, non-financial risks 
have not been viewed as priority in some boardrooms.
870
  However, there is a 
need for companies to embrace the principles of ERM because many corporate 
failures have arisen due to the traditional methods of managing risk in silos, 
causing important risk elements to escape management attention in situations 
where for instance unacceptable risk parameters may exist in component parts 
even when the whole of the firm is functioning on a comfortable risk 
balance.
871
   
 
The numerous benefits of ERM include reducing inefficiencies originating 
from a lack of coordination between various risk management departments; 
saving costs due to a concentration of risk management efforts; optimizing 
resource allocation strategy and improving capital efficiency as a result of 
prior knowledge of risk outcomes; and improvement of transparency because 
firms can better inform outsiders of their risk profile, which is a signal of their 
commitment to risk management, thereby reducing the costs and efforts of 
regulatory scrutiny.
872
  Considering all that ERM seeks to achieve and its 
benefits, there would be increased effectiveness if the personality risks 
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associated with directors were also managed as a risk category under a 
company’s ERM framework.  This way, the personality risk portfolio would 
constantly be on the board’s agenda as a strategic issue, and the risk analysis, 
risk management discussion and decisions would be undertaken at the level of 
top management, thereby giving it the attention and seriousness it deserves.  
Also, in order to save cost, reports of personality risk management can be 
rendered alongside reports on the entire ERM framework, instead of 
generating separate reports on personality risk management.  Again, investors 
and interested parties can analyse the risk management processes of the 
company in a single framework, making it faster and easier to make decisions 
concerning the risk management potential and procedures in a particular 
company.  The COSO Framework defines risk as “the possibility that an event 
will occur and adversely affect the achievement of [entity] objectives”.873  
Clearly, having directors who are inappropriate personalities in corporate 
governance is a risk because it has the inherent possibility of adversely 
affecting the achievement of corporate objectives to the extent that those 
directors have the potential to make decisions and take actions which would be 
detrimental to the success of the company.  Since ERM seeks to manage all 
the possible corporate risks, personality risks should naturally be incorporated 
into the ERM framework. 
 
2) Enshrining specific provisions which would be aimed at mitigating personality 
risks of high risk directors, examples include the following: 
a) Vetting of all major transactions of high risk directors by shareholders:  In 
the case that shareholders have selected high risk directors, then the 
shareholders would have to vet their major decisions, and this would entail 
more shareholder involvement in the management of companies.  It might 
be the case that shareholders in certain situations might not be 
knowledgeable and experienced enough to take on this task, so an option 
that would be open to them is to have recourse to experts who can vet the 
decisions on their behalf.  This might result in cost implications and time 
wasting, and appear to negate the whole idea of having company directors, 
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but, it is an essential task in the management of high risk directors.  
Ordinarily, shareholders are required to vet and approve certain actions 
and decisions of directors under company law, so paying particular 
attention to the transactions undertaken by high risk directors might result 
in added responsibilities for the shareholders.
874
  The UK Listing Rules 
under Sec 10 provides a classification of transactions and specifies as 
Class 1 any transaction with a percentage ratio relative to the company of 
25% or more.  Under section 10.37, the directors are required to issue an 
explanatory circular to shareholders and obtain their prior approval in 
respect of such transactions.  It is suggested that in cases like this, there 
should be an added disclosure on such a circular indicating the balance of 
personality risks on the board so as to address the minds of shareholders as 
to the potential risks and enable them to consider enhancing their level of 
scrutiny over such transactions if need be;   
b) Preventing high risk directors from being chair persons of committees so 
as to reduce the possibility of such directors exercising overriding powers.  
In the case that it becomes inevitable that a high risk director must chair a 
committee, then there should be increased scrutiny by shareholders on the 
activities of that committee; 
c) Ensuring that high risk directors are up for re-election on an annual basis 
so as to give shareholders the opportunity as often as possible to review 
their performance and make changes if desired; 
d) Taking account of the influence of leadership on collective behaviour, it 
would be advisable to recommend that the board chairman is a low risk 
director so as to set the appropriate tone for the entire governance process; 
e) Regular evaluation of the performance of high risk directors by the 
external authority: this can be achieved by analysing the reports rendered 
by companies and requesting specific information on the activities of high 
risk directors where necessary; 
f) Specifying that a company in which all the directors or a majority of them 
are high risk directors should not be allowed as a director of yet another 
public company; 
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g) Requiring companies with a majority of directors in the high risk category 
to submit quarterly accounts in cases where they would have submitted 
only half-yearly and annual accounts;
875
 
h) Requiring companies with high risk directors to submit intermittent reports 
to the external authority stating that they are complying with personality 
risk management procedures.  One aim of this provision would be to 
constantly address the minds of the directors as to the potential risks 
existing within the corporate governance process.  Also, the directors 
should include a declaration undertaken by them stating that they agree to 
be personally liable in the event that it is discovered that the company is 
not complying with the agreed personality risk management process; 
i) Ensuring that internal control measures take adequate cognisance of 
personality risks in framing control measures aimed at the management of 
corporate risks across the company; 
j) Setting a financial threshold above which an individual high risk director 
cannot go in his dealings in committing the company. 
 
3) Recommendations as to reasonable standards of personality risk management: 
In cases where a company decides to use its own internally developed 
personality risk management procedure or adopt an externally developed one 
other than the one recommended by the model, it would be important to create 
minimum standards and ensure that all companies are adhering to procedures 
which are reasonably acceptable and adequate to manage personality risks.  
Therefore, even though companies are allowed to select the procedure they 
wish to use, it is important for the procedure to be in accordance with certain 
minimum standards and these standards can be specified in the model.  
Companies can then develop their own risk management procedure from the 
minimum standards and customize the procedure in line with the peculiarities 
of the company.  The directors are responsible for risk management in 
companies, and so they must also manage the risks accruing from their 
personalities.  In the case that other officers and auditors are involved in some 
of the risk management processes, the essential strategic risk management 
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framework adopted by the directors would usually set the tone for the 
management of all other risks including operational and compliance risks. 
4) Requirements for reports to be issued in cases of corporate failures, which 
indicate the personality dimensions of the directors and the specific 
personality risk management processes utilised by the company.  This is to 
enable a review of the effectiveness of the model in the long term and 
facilitate the development of improved processes in relation to personality risk 
management. 
 
7.2.7 THE RISK MANAGEMENT PYRAMID  
 
This model envisages a graduated level of response to the engagement of companies 
in the personality risk management exercise by the external authority.  The pyramid of 
processes is illustrated below: 
 
 
 
HIGH ALERT 
MEDIUM ALERT 
LOW ALERT 
Figure 3 above shows the levels of responses  
 
 
In instances where a company adopts the recommended framework for risk 
management, the monitoring function of the external authority is easier because there 
will be no need to analyse and ensure the efficacy of the procedure.  If the company 
elects to adopt its own framework either internally developed or transplanted from 
another external entity, the external authority would have to ensure that it is fit for the 
purpose of personality risk management and once this is ascertained, the monitoring 
 
RECOMMENDED PROVISIONS 
COMPANY’S PROVISIONS 
NO PROVISIONS 
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function continues.  Should a company decide not to adopt a personality risk 
management framework, it contravenes the mandatory provisions of the regulatory 
model, and the external authority would have to apply sanctions to elicit compliance. 
 
7.2.8 SANCTIONS 
The existence of a strong incentive to comply with regulatory provisions is a key 
element in any regime aimed at deterring unacceptable behaviour. Regardless of the 
type of enforcement mechanism employed as regards corporate governance 
regulations, be it subtle or forceful, the overall effectiveness of such enforcement 
mechanisms definitely contributes to the sustenance and enhancement of that 
regulatory regime.  In 2005, Sir Phillip Hampton undertook a review of the UK 
regulatory system and made recommendations seeking to achieve a regulatory system 
which was risk-based, consistent, proportionate and effective.
876
  Some of the 
proposals in the final report which are of the most relevance here are as follows: 
1) Reducing regulatory inspections where risks are low but increasing them 
where risks are high. The risk management pyramid above supports this 
principle; 
2) Applying the use of advice. The use of recommendations in this model is a 
form of advice to companies on the best mode of achieving the aims of the 
regulatory model; 
3) Applying tougher and more consistent penalties where necessary. The use of a 
mix of soft law and hard law in this model helps to achieve this aim; 
4) Requiring new policies and regulations to consider enforcement using existing 
structures wherever possible. The suggestion to utilise authorities such as the 
PRA and institutions such as the stock exchange is in keeping with such 
recommendations.  
 
In 2006, the UK government also commissioned a report from Professor Richard 
Macrory which sought to address issues on improving regulatory compliance amongst 
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UK businesses.
877
  The Macrory Report examined the main reasons for non-
compliance and recommended improvement mechanisms.  The recommendations 
were primarily aimed at ensuring that regulators had a set of modern and flexible 
sanctions to apply in the enforcement of regulation.
878
  These sanctions needed to be 
proportionate and appropriate to the regulatory risk in question.
879
  In the Macrory 
review consultation document, it was noted as follows: 
 
Sanctions are an important part of achieving compliance in 
supporting the enforcement activities of regulators. In some 
instances, the threat of a punishment can act as a catalyst 
towards improved outcomes and greater compliance. It can do 
this by providing a signal to the firm that has offended (and 
others who are contemplating offending) that the offence will 
not be tolerated and that there will be a reprimand or 
consequence. Other times, the imposition of a sanction can 
provide a non-compliant firm with an opportunity to better 
understand what is required of it under the law and improve the 
firm’s competence and performance, as well as ensuring better 
compliance with regulatory obligations.
880
 
 
Macrory noted that a heavy reliance on criminal sanctions for regulatory offences can 
lead to compliance deficit originating from a regulator’s reluctance to pursue non-
compliance due to the expense and time required to do so.
881
  He also stated that 
criminal sanctions may be disproportionate to the offence and may not address the 
needs of the victims.
882
  He suggested principles for effective sanctions which were 
also noted in the final report as follows:
883
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1) Sanctions should aim to change behaviour; 
2) Sanctions should aim to prevent financial gains from non-compliance; 
3) Sanctions should be responsive taking cognisance of what is appropriate for 
each offence and each offender; 
4) Sanctions should be proportionate to the nature of the offence and the harm 
caused; 
5) Sanctions should include an element of restoration; 
6) Sanctions should aim to deter future non-compliance. 
The Macrory Report stated that administrative sanctions should be employed widely 
and recommended options such as fixed and variable monetary penalties, cessation 
notices, stop notices, discretionary requirements, enforcement undertakings etc. and 
also recommended the publication of enforcement activities on a regular basis.
884
   
 
The recommendations made by the Hampton and Macrory reviews were incorporated 
in the Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Act 2008 which deals with the 
establishment of the local better regulation office, reduction and removal of regulatory 
burdens and creation of civil sanctions for regulatory offences amongst other 
issues.
885
  In the consultation on the draft Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Bill, 
the Minister for the Cabinet Office particularly noted that the way in which regulation 
is enforced can make a major difference to businesses and society.
886
  Although the 
Act deals mostly with local authorities, the provisions encompass the principles of 
better regulation and are relevant examples of avenues for achieving effective 
enforcement and sanctioning in regulatory regimes.  In regard to levels of sanctions, 
the UK Planning Act 2008 is instructive as it makes provision for information notices 
and enforcement notices.
887
  Information notices are issued in order to provide 
information regarding a breach of the provisions of the Act.  Enforcement notices 
require an offender to take steps as specified under the notice to remedy a breach of 
the provisions of the Act and must specify the time period within which the required 
steps are to be taken.  
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The sanctions proposed for non-compliance with the model suggested in this thesis is 
consistent with the principles outlined above, taking cognisance of the need to 
minimise cost and maximise effectiveness.  The reports highlighted above all 
illustrate the need for sanctions in order to enhance effectiveness of a regulatory 
regime and the salient issue then is the manner of sanctions to be employed.  
Suggested approaches are as follows: 
 
1) NOTICES: 
The external authority can issue written notices of non-compliance with the 
provisions of the regulatory model where such breaches come to its attention. The 
notice would state the matters which constitute non-compliance, what actions need to 
be undertaken by the company in regularising the cases of non-compliance, and the 
time frame within which it is required to do so.  This approach is similar to that 
undertaken in planning law in relation to enforcement notices.
888
  Section 172 of the 
UK Town and Country Planning Act 1990 provides that a local planning authority 
may issue an enforcement notice where it appears to it that there has been a breach of 
planning control.  Section 173 of the same Act provides that an enforcement notice 
shall state the matters which constitute the breach of the planning control, and specify 
the steps which the authority requires to be taken in order to remedy the breach and 
the time period within which such steps are to be taken.  The UK Planning Act 2008 
also supports this approach in its section 169 (4) & (5) which deal with notices of 
unauthorised development.   Another example of support for this approach can be 
seen in section 156 of the UK Companies Act 2006 in relation to breaches of sections 
154 & 155 under which the Secretary of State may give the defaulting company a 
direction specifying the breached statutory provision, what the company is required to 
do and the period within which it must do it.  In relation to the suggested model, if a 
company fails to undertake the mandatory personality evaluation of its directors or 
fails to institute a risk management process for high risk directors, an enforcement 
notice can be issued which specifies that the company has breached the provisions of 
the model and is required to comply with these provisions within a specific time 
period.  If the company complies with the provisions of the regulatory model and the 
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external authority is so notified, the enforcement process ends at that stage.  If, 
however, there is continued non-compliance, the regulator can then issue a further 
notice stating its intention to apply other sanctions available to it and that the directors 
would not be recognised as such and should cease to act on behalf of the company 
until the provisions of the regulatory model are complied with.  It is recommended 
that notices should be the first available sanction as they also serve to inform and 
advise the company of the regulatory provision, thereby providing a basis, depending 
on the company’s response, from which to ascertain the company’s willingness to 
comply with the regulatory provisions.  This knowledge is essential for the purposes 
of responsive regulation and applying appropriate graduated sanctions. 
 
2) FINES: 
Negative financial implications can operate as an effective form of sanction, but there 
are also limitations in this regard.  One of the findings of the Hampton Review was 
the inadequacy of monetary penalties as deterrent to regulatory non-compliance, and 
the fact that fines do not often reflect the economic implications of non-compliance 
with regulatory provisions.
889
  For example, if a regulatory provision specifies that 
companies must meet certain requirements for an operating licence and compliance 
with the regulation would cost the company £1,000 annually, if the company does not 
comply with the regulation in a year, it has saved £1,000.  If a fine is prescribed for 
non-compliance, any amount less than £1,000 may not be adequate to deter non-
compliance because a company may prefer to default and pay the fine and still save 
money against compliance costs.  Inappropriate financial penalties could be viewed as 
acceptable risk by companies that have chosen to be deliberately non-compliant.
890
  
Therefore, in relation to securing compliance through the imposition of fines, it 
becomes important that fines are such as to give rise to negative financial implications 
for the company or defaulting corporate officers.  In some cases, fines do not also 
reflect the harm done to society.
891
  To be meaningful as a form of sanction, fines 
should be reflective of the nature of non-compliance.  In the model suggested in this 
thesis, there should be a requirement for a company which defaults in undertaking the 
evaluation process, rendering reports on the evaluation process or adopting a 
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personality risk management process to be fined an appropriate and optimal sum.  In 
addition, and in order to secure personal liability, there should also be a provision for 
the defaulting directors to be fined in their personal capacity.
892
  So, for instance, the 
members of a nomination committee who select directors without adhering to the 
provisions of the regulatory model would be fined.  Again, it is recommended that 
fines should not take the place of specific performance.  The company and directors 
should still be required to comply with the regulatory provisions even after the 
payment of the fines. 
 
3) DISQUALIFICATION: 
In a case where a company director/s fail to comply with the provisions of the 
regulation and after notices and fines have been issued, the external authority should 
be able to prosecute such a director/s and there should be provisions for a 
disqualification order to be made against the defaulting director/s.  The reasoning 
behind this sanction is that a director who cannot comply with regulatory 
requirements is not fit to be a director as company management is predominantly an 
exercise in complying with regulatory requirements established to ensure 
effectiveness in corporate governance.
893
  If such a defaulting director is disqualified, 
then there is no opportunity for that director to be selected as a director by any other 
company, and so the risk of that director flouting the regulation again would be 
mitigated.  Also, if all the directors of a company are disqualified under this 
provision, as would be the case if the responsibility for recruiting directors rests on 
the board as a whole, then the shareholders would have to appoint new directors and 
the possibility of the regulation being flouted subsequently should be minimised if the 
shareholders consider the drawbacks and costs of making new selections and ensure 
that the nomination committee abide by the regulatory provisions.  The regulatory 
model suggested in this thesis aims at advising companies to select the most 
appropriate directors for the delivery of effective corporate governance, and mandates 
the companies to manage the personality risks of directors who are high-risk, but does 
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not ordinarily aim to disqualify any persons from company management.  However, 
in the case that company directors persistently fail to comply with the provisions of 
the model, disqualification orders would be appropriate.  This provision is based on 
the fact that directors are empowered to appoint subsequent directors, after the initial 
appointment of the first company directors by the shareholders.  Directors are also the 
persons who are to engage with the personality risk management processes. 
 
4) PUBLICITY AND DE-LISTING: 
The Macrory Report recommended that enforcement efforts should be publicized on a 
regular basis.
894
  This is in the interests of the regulatory regime as the regulated entity 
would have sufficient information on the application of sanctions to non-compliant 
entities and this should serve as evidence that non-compliance would not be tolerated 
by the regulator.  Likewise, in the proposed model, the regulator can undertake to 
publicize information on companies that are failing to comply with the regulation and 
the sanctions levelled against such companies.  This form of publicity can aid the 
regulatory regime to the extent that intending investors know which companies are 
complying and they can also influence compliance in a deviant company perhaps as a 
condition for investment.  This process of publicity can also invariably aid the market 
for corporate control as shareholders can make better informed decisions when they 
have appropriate information regarding a company’s activities.  Compliance with 
regulatory requirements is an important aspect of corporate governance,
895
 and 
shareholders can act on information provided by regulators in their publicity.  This is 
similar to the effect of the “comply or explain” principle of the UK Corporate 
Governance Code, because the shareholders are expected to make judgments as to the 
position and effectiveness of a company based on information regarding if and how 
the company has complied with the code and the explanations for non-compliance.
896
   
Peer pressure and pressure from shareholders and prospective investors may then 
serve as a form of deterrent as well as a force to secure compliance with the 
regulatory provisions.  This approach is used by regulatory models such as the FSA’s 
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regime which publicises its enforcement efforts and results.
897
 The reputation of a 
company should be an asset to it and so the threat of any form of negative publicity 
may serve to secure compliance. 
 
In the extreme scenario that a company refuses to comply with the provisions of the 
regulation and continues to default after all other sanctions have been applied, it is 
recommended that such a company should be delisted.
898
  The provisions of the 
regulation are aimed amongst other issues at protecting the public from corporate 
mishaps as a result of having high-risk directors on the boards of public companies.  
Private companies face similar personality risks no doubt, but the financial 
implications and negative results of the corporate failure of a privately owned 
company would not have the same public and societal impact as the failure of a 
publicly owned listed company.
899
  One of the major justifications for regulatory 
intervention in the identification and management of personality risks for directors of 
public companies is the fact that public companies trade with public funds and their 
failure results in the loss of public funds amongst other negative implications.  The 
general public who are potential investors in public companies ought to be protected 
by the government and this regulatory model is one way to achieve that purpose.  If a 
company decides not to comply with the proposed regulatory provisions, then that 
company should lose the right to trade with public funds and can carry on its business 
with private funds and abide by regulations applicable to a private company.    
 
5)  REQUIREMENT FOR LISTING: 
For new companies, the model should specify the requirement to comply with its 
provisions as part of listing procedures.  This would ensure that all new public listed 
companies comply with the relevant regulatory provisions or risk the refusal to be 
listed to trade on the stock exchange.  As with the provisions of section 9 of the UK 
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Companies Act 2006, for instance, which deals with the documents which must be 
submitted in an application for registration of a company, there could also be a 
requirement stating that a statement of compliance with the provisions of the 
regulatory model must be submitted to the listing authority.  The directors of the 
company should also be required to sign statutory declarations in this regard for 
which they would be made personally liable in cases of non-compliance.
900
  The 
statutory declaration is aimed at securing the personal liability of directors as 
essentially the regulators would be in a position to know when a default has occurred 
because companies will be monitored to ensure that they are complying with the 
regulatory provisions.    
 
It is noteworthy that Macrory stated in relation to his principles for effective sanctions 
that fundamental to these ‘penalties principles’ is the notion that the underlying 
regulation is fit for purpose and provides for a greater social purpose such as the 
protection of consumers, workers, or the environment. When regulatory non-
compliance occurs, these protections are compromised. The overriding purpose of 
sanctions is therefore to ensure that these protections are maintained and 
safeguarded.”901  Therefore, at the heart of every mode of sanction should be the 
essential objective of achieving the safeguards which the regulation seeks to do in the 
first place.  Consistent with this principle, the sanctions recommended above are 
principally aimed at ensuring that personality risks are managed and that the public is 
protected from the activities of high risk directors who have the potential to 
mismanage public companies.  The notices and fines option should be triggered to 
elicit compliance.  The disqualification, publicity and de-listing options serve to 
safeguard the regulatory aims by eliminating persistent defaulters.  The listing 
requirement primarily serves to prevent default at the outset and secure compliance 
based on the overriding desire of a company to be listed.   
 
It is also recommended that the regulatory model specifies that sanctions are not 
restricted to those contained in the provisions and that the external authority may from 
time to time incorporate sanctions which may be more appropriate in addressing the 
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 Similar provisions exist under s 656 of the UK Companies Act 2006 which provides that directors are 
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 See the consultation document, (note 880) 19. 
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regulatory breach in question taking cognisance of changes in the regulatory 
atmosphere.  The aim of this provision would be to enable regulatory assessment of 
the impact of available sanctions, and the adoption of necessary changes in keeping 
with responsive regulation. 
 
7.3 THE MODEL AND THE PRESENT UK BEHAVIOURAL RISK MANAGEMENT 
MECHANISMS: LIMITATIONS IN THE STATUS QUO 
 
The aim of this section is to highlight the areas in which the provisions of the model differs 
from the provisions in existing mechanisms which seek to manage personality and 
behavioural risks, particularly the FSA Approved Persons Regime and the UK Companies 
Act 2006. 
 
7.3.1 THE FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY (FSA) REGIME 
The FSA conducts an approval regime for companies operating in the financial services 
sector which it regulates.
902
  The process for approval involves applicant firms submitting an 
application to the FSA in respect of individuals.
903
  Each firm is expected to have carried out 
its own internal due diligence, interviews and recruitment processes to assure it that the 
candidate being presented to the FSA for approval is a fit and proper person to perform a 
significant function.  The candidate confirms the authenticity of the information on the 
application form by countersigning on the application form that he/she has provided the 
correct information throughout the process to the applicant firm.
904
  The applicant firm is 
required to verify the accuracy of the information provided before making the application to 
the FSA.  It is the firm making the application to the FSA; hence the onus lies on the firm to 
provide sufficient information to satisfy the FSA that an individual is a fit and proper 
person.
905
  The firm has to provide details of its basis and rationale for reaching the 
conclusion that the candidate is fit and proper.  The firm is required to disclose all matters 
relating to a candidate’s fitness and propriety.  If a candidate discloses adverse information to 
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 See the FSA Approval Process at their website 
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903
 For more on the regulatory activities of the FSA, see J. Dine & M. Koutsias, Company Law (6th ed., England: 
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the firm, or the firm learns of some adverse information through another means, it has a duty 
to disclose that information to the FSA.
906
  As part of the approval process, the FSA would 
normally interview candidates for the posts of Chair, CEO, Finance Director, Risk Director 
and some Non-Executive Director posts in high impact firms.  The FSA may, at their 
discretion, interview candidates for other significant influence functions and for posts in low 
impact firms.  In the case that the FSA proposes to refuse an application, a warning notice is 
given to both the firm and the candidate.
907
   They have the option of withdrawing the 
application or making oral or written representations to the Regulatory Decisions Committee 
of the FSA.  Upon refusal of the application after this process, the firm and/or the candidate 
reserves the right to refer the refusal to the Financial Services Tribunal.
908
    
A thorough analysis of the approval process as outlined above elicits an understanding of the 
limitations of the FSA regime in relation to the model suggested in this thesis.  The points to 
be noted and in which the models differ are as follows: 
1) The FSA regime is applicable only to companies in the financial sector.  It is 
understandable that companies in the financial sector should be protected as their 
activities have the potential to impact highly on the functioning of the economy as a 
whole.  However, this thesis argues for an extension of personality risk mitigating 
mechanisms to all public companies trading with funds from the public because of the 
potential impact of failures in companies such as those, and the fact that the society as 
a whole has a stake in the survival of such companies.  
2) The applicant firms under the FSA regime are expected to undertake their own due 
diligence and processes in order to satisfy themselves that a candidate is fit and 
proper.  However, companies are not given any specific guidelines as to how to 
achieve this aim.  Firms are, therefore, at liberty to arrive at the conclusion that a 
candidate is fit and proper through any means they choose.  It is right that the FSA 
would still vet that decision, but the issue in this case is that there are no specific 
standards across all the firms in the first instance.  If a particular issue as regards the 
determination of fitness and propriety is sought to be standardised for all public listed 
companies, as is argued in this thesis, then all firms must undertake the vetting 
activity in relation to that specific issue in a manner that ensures similar standards are 
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operated consistently.  For instance, there is no clear indication that all firms would 
undertake a personality assessment of candidates in the manner envisaged by this 
model.  Some may do, but evidence indicates that the top echelons of corporate 
society are seldom subjected to personality tests or formal recruitment processes as 
are the regular employees of companies.
909
 
3) The FSA itself does not undertake personality assessments.  The fitness and propriety 
of candidates is apparently determined from past events as is evident from the 
answers to questions on the application form and other documents presented to the 
FSA, as well as the FSA’s own verification exercise.910  The FSA states that in the 
pursuit of its aim, the most important factors are the candidates’ honesty, integrity and 
reputation; competence and capability; and financial soundness.
911
  A candidate’s 
financial soundness would be discernible from past and present events which point to 
his/her financial dealings.
912
  Honesty, integrity and reputation can also be glimpsed 
from past and present events.
913
  The FSA also states that it must be satisfied that a 
candidate would be open and honest and be able to comply with any requirements 
imposed on him.
914
  This means that the candidate must be a dutiful person.  If the 
literature and empirical evidence available indicate that only certain individuals are 
dutiful, then it becomes imperative in the determination of a candidate’s ability to be 
dutiful, that there should be an assessment of that candidate’s personality.915  
 
Competence and capabilities which relate to skills required to perform a role can be 
ascertained from a candidate’s pedigree and past experiences.  However, competence 
and capabilities which are dependent on a candidate’s ability to perform a role as 
required and specified would involve more than the possession of the appropriate 
skills, even though those are essential and necessary.  Just as indicated by the FSA, it 
is important to have candidates who would be open and honest and can be relied upon 
to comply with requirements in the exercise of their skills.  Honesty and integrity are 
issues which emanate from personality, and the examination of past events alone 
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cannot suffice in the determination of whether a person would exhibit such traits in 
the future.  A personality assessment is equally essential and would provide a broader 
knowledge from which to draw more reasonable conclusions as to the fitness and 
propriety of a candidate.  In fact, a personality assessment provides indications as to a 
candidate’s potential ability.  For instance, a candidate may never have been involved 
in a known case of dishonesty in the past, but if that candidate is of a personality 
dimension which is likely to be dishonest, there is then the risk that he/she might be 
dishonest in the future.  The whole purpose of the approval process is to ensure that 
candidates will perform as expected in the future.  It is therefore a risk to take on a 
candidate who has a high potential to be dishonest due to his personality.  It is a 
greater risk to the entire governance process if the personality of a candidate is not 
even known at all, because the first step in risk management and mitigation is the 
identification of the risk in question.    
4) The FSA states that it interviews candidates for specific positions in high impact 
firms, and would interview other candidates and other firms at their own discretion.
916
  
It is understandable that the FSA might be taking cognisance of cost and time issues 
in not applying the interview process to all possible candidates, but, this situation 
generally leaves the process of determining the fitness and propriety of some 
candidates only to the facts presented by firms to the FSA in the application forms 
and any vetting that may be done by the FSA.  This is a reason why there needs to be 
similar standards imposed across all firms.  An interview process serves its own 
purpose in the approval process as face to face interactions can reveal some issues 
which may not be gained from papers alone, and in that way the interview process is a 
positive addition to the approval process.  The FSA at its discretion decides when the 
interview process is not necessary.  That is not an unreasonable approach in itself as 
an overall risk assessment of a particular situation might indicate that an interview is 
not needed.  However, what it does do is create different standards.  The FSA’s 
regulatory approach is one that is risk based anyway, so one can understand that 
approach.
917
  However, in the case that the same standards are sought to be enforced 
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across all public companies as is the case envisaged in this model, then, if any value is 
to be gained by an interview process, it should be made applicable across board.  A 
major advantage of creating similar standards in cases like this is that the issue begins 
to assume a normative force as it is viewed as applicable to everyone.  
5) The FSA regime is concerned with approving candidates for a role.  If the candidate is 
approved, then that is the end of the process, until the candidate engages in actions 
which are prohibited under the function.  If a personality assessment is not conducted, 
every approved candidate has the potential to be unfit for the role approved.  
Therefore, the situation is one in which a candidate is assumed innocent until proven 
guilty.  That may appear right in a criminal inquiry, but in the quest to prevent 
corporate mishaps, the better approach would be that prevention is better than cure.
918
  
Knowledge of the true potential abilities of candidates would place firms and the FSA 
in a better position to check excesses, as against waiting for the time when the 
candidate gets involved in wrong doing and then applying regulatory sanctions.  
Reviewing a candidate’s past experiences and events is simply not conclusive 
evidence of his/her potential to be fit and proper for a future role.  Personality is a 
phenomenon that impacts on actions and behaviour in different circumstances.  It 
might take a specific circumstance in the future to highlight an individual’s 
personality in relation to honesty and integrity for instance.  Therefore it is essential 
that information regarding personality and its potentialities is known at the outset and 
taken into account in making assessments regarding the potential ability of an 
individual to be fit and proper.  
 
If the test of fitness and propriety is to be founded only based on actual events, then 
there is a flaw in the entire process as it relates to risk management for the reason that 
risk itself is defined as the potential for an event to occur.  Risk management therefore 
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244 
 
involves an identification of the potential for an adverse event to occur and the 
decisions and actions developed towards responding to the occurrence of that event.  
This could involve a decision to eliminate the risk entirely, for instance such as is the 
case when the FSA disapproves of a candidate and denies that candidate a place in the 
governance of a firm.  Risk management could also involve accepting the risk and 
putting measures in place to mitigate its occurrence or the impact of its occurrence.  
The suggested personality risk management model is aimed at identifying risks and 
managing risks, and not excluding any person from company management.  In all 
scenarios of risk management, one basic necessity is the proper identification of the 
risk.  A regime which is aimed at managing personality risks must identify these risks 
properly.  This cannot be done effectively without a personality assessment.  The 
suggested model proposes a personality assessment in addition to all other necessary 
assessments to determine honesty, integrity, reputation, competence, capability and 
financial soundness.  Decisions are then made as to fitness and propriety based on the 
broader knowledge.  For reasons such as the shareholders reserving the right to elect 
corporate officers, they may elect whosoever they desire.  However, because the 
companies in question are publicly traded companies in which shareholders may 
differ from time to time and may not be involved closely in the affairs of the 
companies, the State has a duty to protect the public in relation to their funds.   
 
In order to ensure a more effective management of those companies, if directors with 
less than appropriate personality dimensions are elected, those directors must be 
appropriately risk managed under an approved process as a means of mitigating their 
personality risks.  If the company is a company in the financial sector, its officers 
would still undergo the process of approval established by the FSA in addition to the 
personality assessment process proposed in the model.  Where the FSA approves the 
candidate for the role, but the personality assessment illustrates that the candidate’s 
personality is not appropriate, the company may engage the candidate as proposed in 
the model and the risk management procedure kicks in.  Overall, this process would 
increase the chances of preventing corporate failures.  In addition to providing the 
essential information on the personality dimensions of company directors for the 
benefit of shareholders in order to aid the selection of appropriate directors, the model 
additionally provides a personality risk management procedure to manage the risks 
which accrue from the selection of inappropriate directors.          
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7.3.2 THE UK COMPANIES ACT 2006 
The Companies Act 2006 is the main legislative instrument specifying requirements 
for the origination, management and demise of companies in the UK.  There is no 
precise definition of directors under the Act save in section 250 which states that a 
director “includes any person occupying the position of director, by whatever name 
called”.  The Act does not also distinguish between executive and non-executive 
directors.
919
  Also, there are no provisions in the Act relating to personality 
assessment of company directors at the point of recruitment.  Regarding the 
qualification for directorship in companies, the Act only specifies a minimum age of 
16 in section 157.  However, there are other negative considerations such as the 
Company Directors’ Disqualification Act 1986 which specifies that undischarged 
bankrupts are ineligible to serve as directors except with the leave of the court.
920
  
Therefore, as far as assessments at recruitment are concerned, the Act has no specific 
provisions.  With regard to mechanisms aimed at mitigating issues which may arise as 
a result of personality risks, the Act establishes a statutory code of duties which a 
director owes to the company.  These directors’ duties are aimed at setting standards 
in relation to the behaviour to be expected from company directors in the discharge of 
their functions.  The duties are set out in sections 170-177 of the Companies Act 
2006.   
 
Considering the actions which have contributed to corporate failures, the most 
relevant duty which may impact on the behaviour of directors would appear to be 
section 172.  Section 172 provides that “a director of a company must act in the way 
that he considers, in good faith, would be most likely to promote the success of the 
company for the benefit of its members as a whole, and in so doing the director must 
have regard to a whole range of matters which include the likely consequences of any 
decisions in the long term; the interests of the company’s employees; the need to 
foster the company’s business relationship with suppliers, customers and others; the 
impact of the company’s operations on the community and the environment; the 
desirability of the company maintaining a reputation for high standards of business 
conduct; and the need to act fairly as between members of the company.”  Section 172 
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clearly elucidates the expectations of the law from company directors in terms of 
standards of behaviour in the governance of companies.  However, the pertinent 
question remains whether all company directors are capable of complying with the 
provisions of section 172.  The fact that a director is mandated by company law to act 
in a certain manner is not conclusive evidence that the director can and will act in that 
manner.  If a director decides not to so act, the consequences of breaching the duty 
should follow.  But, the fact would remain that the enactment of the duty does not in 
itself automatically contribute towards ensuring that directors are persons who are 
likely to abide by the duty.  As with all laws with consequences in the form of 
punishment, there is an underlying assumption that the possibility of punishment in 
cases of contravention would act as deterrence, but there are two major arguments that 
count against the utility of consequences as deterrence in this case.  Firstly, 
consequences originate after the harm has been done, so in a case where the more 
important issue is prevention rather than cure, and the gains of contravention 
outweighs the pains of the consequences, there is a risk that the consequences would 
not serve their purpose as a preventive mechanism.
921
  Secondly, in the event that the 
issue in question hinges on capabilities, and there is evidence which supports the 
notion that only certain personality dimensions can be relied upon to be dutiful, it 
does not appear reasonable to expect persons who are not of those personality 
dimensions to always abide by the duties specified in the Companies Act.
922
   
 
It therefore becomes a risk to the entire corporate governance system to recruit 
directors whose personalities are unknown and who may have personalities unsuited 
to the delivery of effective corporate governance.  The duties specified under the Act 
may, therefore, become prone to being disobeyed simply because of the personalities 
of directors.  If there is a mechanism in place which ensures that company directors 
are dutiful persons, then there is an increased probability of the duties being obeyed, 
and the aims of the duties being achieved.  If the personality assessment proposed in 
this model is adopted into company law, and the provision specifies an assessment at 
the point of recruiting directors, with a report on that activity to be filed as part of 
incorporation documents in the case of new companies, or periodic returns in the case 
of existing companies, then company law would go further in terms of the mitigation 
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of personality risks in corporate governance.  Also, if company law incorporated 
provisions mandating the application of personality risk management in cases where 
inappropriate personality dimensions have been selected by company shareholders, 
there will be a higher level of personality risk mitigation than exists in the present 
provisions. 
       
7.4 PRACTICAL IMPORTATION OF THE MODEL IN THE PRESENT UK 
REGIME 
 
Public listed companies in the UK must abide by the provisions of the UK Companies 
Act 2006 and the UK Corporate Governance Code 2010 and so an evaluation of how 
this model might fit into these two regulatory mechanisms is required, particularly in 
the event that these mechanisms are to be utilised in actualising the purposes of the 
model.  First, the mandatory provisions relating to the identification of the personality 
of directors and the adoption of a personality risk management procedure can be 
incorporated into company law.  For instance, the information on the most appropriate 
personalities for corporate governance could be provided under Part 10, Chapter 1 
which deals with the appointment and removal of directors.  Chapter 2 of that Part 
deals with the general duties of directors and the mandatory provisions requiring 
directors to be evaluated can be added into that chapter as that function is most likely 
to be undertaken by existing directors.  The provision could also specify that 
shareholders or company promoters are mandated to undertake the procedure in 
respect of first directors.  Again, in relation to company registration, section 9 which 
deals with registration documents could also be amended to include the requirement 
for a statutory declaration by the directors that the evaluation procedure has been 
undertaken.   
 
Second, the soft law and self-regulatory provisions in the model could easily be 
incorporated into the UK Corporate Governance Code.  The information on the 
appropriate personality types for corporate governance could also be incorporated into 
the code as part of its recommendations under Provisions B.1 which deals with the 
composition of the board.  The functions of the nominations committee under 
Provisions B.2 and particularly under Provision B.2.2 which requires the committee to 
evaluate the balance of skills, experience, independence and knowledge on the board 
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can be extended to include the evaluation of the personality of directors.  Also, the 
personality risk management requirement of this model can be incorporated into 
Provisions C.2 and Provisions C.3 which deals with risk management, internal 
control, auditors and audit committees.  The UK Corporate Governance Code 
operates on a “comply or explain” basis which essentially connotes that its provisions 
may not be complied with and the company may just explain its reasons for non-
compliance.  To the extent that the nominations committee would have the choice of 
selecting whichever directors they want irrespective of the recommendations for a 
company to select the most appropriate type of directors, the “comply or explain” 
approach fits perfectly.   
 
However, in relation to the personality risk management procedure which must be 
undertaken, the company must comply with the regulatory requirement and the 
provisions in the corporate governance code can only relate to the particular method 
of risk management undertaken by the company as it would have the choice of 
adopting the recommendations provided in the model or using its own procedure.  The 
recommended risk management procedure can be incorporated into the code or 
reference can be made in the code to a document which contains the recommended 
provisions.  The code can then contain provisions which require the company to either 
comply with the recommendations or use one of its own, details of which would be 
reported to the regulatory agency.  There could also be recommendations for the 
company to include reports on its personality risk management procedure in its annual 
reports as it would include other relevant reports. 
 
In relation to sanctions, provisions for notices and fines can be included in the 
amended provisions of the Companies Act 2006 and the Directors’ Disqualification 
Act 1986 can also be amended to include provisions stating that a director may be 
disqualified for persistent non-compliance with the provisions of this regulatory 
model.  The options for publicity and de-listing can also be provided for in the 
Companies Act as well as a proviso stating that the sanctions are not exhaustive.  As 
regards administration, the provisions could be administered the same way as the 
other provisions in the Companies Act and Corporate Governance Code.  Advantages 
of incorporating these regulatory provisions into existing structures include a 
reduction in the cost and time of developing new legislation, acceptability of 
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provisions as emanating in the form of amendments to existing and familiar 
regulatory structures, and reduction in administrative burdens.   
 
However, considering the reporting requirements of this model and the suggestion for 
the establishment of an external authority to administer its provisions, incorporating 
the provisions of the model under these existing regulatory mechanisms would require 
additional provisions to be made for the establishment of such an external authority or 
assignment of the administration of the provisions by an existing regulatory authority.  
This is certainly possible under the Companies Act because the Act confers powers on 
the Secretary of State in sections such as 156 & 158, and so it would not be too 
farfetched for the Act to confer powers on an external regulatory authority in relation 
to specific provisions contained therein.  The FSA regime aims to manage 
behavioural risks.  If the regime adopted an identification process for personality risks 
and incorporated a risk management process akin to that envisaged by the model in 
this thesis, then the process of managing personality risks in its entirety could be 
undertaken by the FSA.  The only pitfall would be that it would only be applicable to 
companies in the financial services sector, and the argument in this thesis is that 
personality risks should be identified and managed in relation to directors of all public 
listed companies.        
The alternative approach to incorporating the regulatory provisions in existing 
regulatory structures would be to enact a specific piece of legislation for the purpose.  
For example, an Act might be promulgated to contain the mandatory provisions and 
sanctions whilst the voluntary recommendations might be provided in an advisory 
document or guidance for companies.  The Act enacted for this purpose could be 
titled “The Corporate Governance Act”, and its aim could be stated as providing for 
the evaluation of company directors of public companies and the risk management of 
high risk company directors.  The Act would specify the external authority which 
would administer its provisions, the powers of such an authority and all other 
incidentals.  Likewise, the guidance containing the recommendations could be titled 
“The Corporate Governance Guidance for the Appointment of Company Directors”.   
The guidance would contain all the recommended provisions and could also become a 
reference document specified in the corporate governance code.   
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In relation to evaluating the effectiveness of the model in the long term and 
developing improvement processes for the risk management mechanisms incorporated 
into the model, a provision could be included in the Insolvency Act 1986 to the effect 
that in cases of corporate failures, a detailed report should be prepared as regards the 
personality of the company directors and the risk management process that was 
adopted in relation to their personality status.  The same process can also be 
undertaken when companies are restructured as a result of failure.  In the long term, 
this can help to ascertain the effectiveness of the model in relation to reducing 
corporate failures and the impact of the model on corporate risk management 
processes. 
7.5 CONSIDERATIONS IN RELATION TO THE MODEL 
The following are some further considerations in relation to the model: 
7.5.1 MOST APPROPRIATE PERSONALITY DIMENSION FOR CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 
Considering the literature and discussions in chapter five, it is evident that certain 
personality dimensions are better suited to corporate governance than others.
923
  As 
regards leadership, literature reiterates that the personality dimensions of extraversion, 
conscientiousness and openness to experience are the best suited and most indicative 
of positive leadership ability.
924
  In relation to actual job performance, the personality 
dimension of conscientiousness has been found to have the highest validity amongst 
the big five dimensions of personality for overall job performance.
925
  Extraversion, 
agreeableness and openness to experience were also shown to have some validity 
depending on the job criterion.
926
  As argued in chapter five, a combination of all 
these appropriate traits would be most conducive to corporate governance.  However, 
working on the assumption that these perfect combinations may not always be in 
existence, it becomes important for the sake of personality risk management to 
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decipher which dimensions are so vital to overall corporate governance that it is most 
appropriate to have such personalities on corporate boards.   
A starting point in this exercise would be to reflect on the personality dimension of 
conscientiousness, which is consistent with leadership ability and is also the most 
consistent with overall job performance.
927
  As noted above, other personality traits 
are valid across job performances depending on the job criterion, but 
conscientiousness is valid across all job performances.
928
  The particular job criterion 
required for corporate governance may differ from company to company, but, 
according to the evidence from literature, a conscientious personality is likely to 
perform optimally in any role in any company.
929
  One reason why this is the case is 
because a conscientious personality has the trait of dutifulness.
930
  In any job function, 
there are usually rules and regulations which guide the performance of that function.  
These guidelines are usually formulated to help ensure the achievement of optimal 
performances on that job.
931
  In situations where persons are dutiful enough to abide 
by these established rules and regulations, chances are much higher that the job would 
be performed more effectively than would be the case if these persons were not 
dutiful.
932
  All the traits of conscientiousness as is highlighted in chapter five are traits 
which are naturally conducive to effectiveness.
933
   
Company directors are usually in leadership positions in a company, but nevertheless, 
they are engaged in both leadership and performance roles in the steering of the 
company, and so their personality becomes important in the actualisation of all 
corporate goals.  There is no reason why company directors should not be subjected to 
personality tests in the same way as the employees of some companies are subjected 
to in order to make judgments as to their ability to accomplish the tasks they are to 
undertake if recruited.  It is important to determine the personality dimensions of 
directors and take steps to ensure that if less than appropriate personalities are 
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933
 These traits include self-discipline, competence, dutifulness, achievement striving, personal organisation 
and deliberation. See McCrae & Costa, (note 560); see also Moberg, (note 674). 
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selected as directors, then a personality risk management programme is triggered in 
order to mitigate personality risks.  Evidence from the accounts given of the 
behaviour of corporate officers in some of the major corporate failures that have 
occurred such as Maxwell, HIH, Enron, WorldCom, Lehman Brothers all show a 
recurrent thread of company directors failing to abide by established rules and 
regulations in corporate governance.
934
  One of the major arguments in this thesis is 
that the inappropriate personality of company directors has contributed significantly 
to corporate failures in the past.  For instance in the HIH failure, the report of the 
Royal Commission which investigated the failure stated that whereas the law imposed 
duties on directors to disclose situations which may adversely affect a company, the 
officers at HIH failed to do this and in fact concealed the true state of affairs of the 
company, a situation which contributed directly to the failure of the company.
935
  
Similar situations occurred in other corporate failures.
936
   
As has been highlighted in chapter two, corporate governance reforms in response to 
corporate failures have often focused on creating and enhancing rules, regulations and 
principles pertaining to governance structures, but, these efforts overlook the pertinent 
issue of the persons who are to abide by these reforms and whether they can and will 
do so.
937
   In the Lehman Brothers failure, there were established rules, regulations 
and principles, supposedly reformed after previous corporate failures, but that 
company still failed because some of its directors and officers circumvented 
established rules, regulations and principles.
938
  It is evident that more needs to be 
done in the form of reforms if enhanced effectiveness in corporate governance is to be 
achieved, and this thesis offers one essential reform in that direction, a focus on the 
personality of company directors, as well as the risk management of company 
directors who do not have the potential to always abide by established rules, 
regulations and principles.  In this model therefore, it is suggested that the 
recommendation as to the most appropriate personality dimension for corporate 
governance should indicate that the conscientious personality is the most essential 
                                                          
934
 See Wearing, (note 2); see also Clarke, (note 124); see also Bower, (note 126); see also McLean & Elkind, 
(note129); see also Deakin & Konzelmann, (note 129); see also see also the HIH Royal Commission Report 
2003, (note 128); see also Jeter, (note 130); see also The Lehman Examiners’ Report 2010, (note 131). 
935
 See the HIH Report, ibid. 
936
 See note 934. 
937
 See the discussions in chapter two, section 2.6. 
938
 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act was promulgated in response to the Enron failure in 2002, but the officers at 
Lehman Brothers flouted s 401 of that Act in relation to the disclosure of off-balance sheet items. 
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personality dimension required for the delivery of effective corporate governance.  
Based on the fact that other personality dimensions are suited to specific job criteria, 
for example, extraversion and agreeableness are well suited to jobs which pertain to 
inter-personal relations;
939
 there should also be an indication of the other positive 
personality dimensions and the job criteria which they are best suited to.  However, in 
relation to the decision as to who qualifies as a low risk director, it is suggested that a 
director who has a high score in the conscientiousness dimension and possesses the 
dutifulness trait should be classed as low risk.  The reasoning behind this is that such 
a director is the one most likely to perform effectively as a leader and on the job, and 
particularly because such a director is likely to abide by established rules, regulations 
and principles of corporate governance.   
As was noted in chapter five, the risks of a conscientious director acting contrary to 
the provisions entrenched in corporate law and corporate governance codes are low.
940
  
Likewise, a director who is not conscientious should be adjudged high risk because 
there is a higher possibility that such a director would fail to abide by established 
rules, regulations and principles, thereby contributing higher levels of risk to the 
entire corporate governance process.  It is then suggested that such high risk directors 
should be managed under a personality risk management process which should, 
amongst other issues, monitor them to ensure that they are abiding by established 
rules, regulations and principles.  This way, corporate objective would stand a higher 
chance of being achieved and not truncated.  This model is not focused on the total 
elimination of all possible personality risks because in the nature of risks, that might 
not be feasible.
941
  The overall aim, however, is the mitigation of personality risks 
based on the already established knowledge that certain personality dimensions are 
better suited to corporate governance.  It means that in cases where the personalities 
that are better suited to governance are recruited, then the risk of uncertainty, threats 
and adverse consequences as to the outcome of their performance would be at a lower 
level.  Conversely, where inappropriate personalities are recruited, the situation is 
managed under a personal risk management procedure which still places the company 
                                                          
939
 See Hurtz & Donovan, (note 645). 
940
 See Moberg, (note 674). 
941
 The aim of risk management is essentially to reduce risks to a level acceptable by society, by using 
strategies such as transferring it, avoiding it, reducing its negative effect or accepting some or all of its 
consequences. See Agrawal, (note 165). 
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in a better position in relation to circumstances in which such risks are unidentified 
and unmanaged.  
In relation to evaluation tests, taking account of recent literature which suggests that 
third party observations/observer ratings yield incremental validity over self-reports/ 
personal inventories,
942
 it is suggested that the personality evaluation to be undertaken 
should combine the results obtained from regular personality inventories with that 
obtained from interviews and observer ratings in order to arrive at a more accurate 
and objective picture of the personality in question.  The idea behind this is to 
maximise the advantages and minimise the disadvantages inherent in various 
approaches, for instance, the NEO PI-R self-reports could be inaccurate because of 
reasons such as the respondent being careful of answers.
943
  However, as discussed in 
chapter five, the NEO PI-R remains the most valid and best measuring model in 
existence.
944
  Again, observer ratings capture mostly the reputation of an individual 
and reputation is adjudged a good predictor of performance.
945
  Well acquainted 
observers can provide equally accurate information about an individual.
946
  However, 
one limitation of observer ratings is that an observer may not have the opportunity to 
observe another individual’s behaviour across all times and across all situations; and 
some traits are highly personal to individuals and may not even be observable.
947
  
Therefore, it would be useful to combine various approaches and increase the chances 
of getting accurate results as to the personality dimensions of company directors.   
7.5.2 DATA PROTECTION AND PRIVACY ISSUES 
Taking account of the provisions of the suggested model which mandate the necessary 
disclosure of information regarding the personality of company directors, it is 
essential to consider the provisions of the UK Data Protection Act 1998 (the Act) and 
the EU Draft Regulation on data protection.   The Data Protection Act in part I, 
section 1 defines personal data as “data which relate to a living individual who can be 
identified from those data or from those data and other information which is in the 
possession of, or is likely to come into the possession of, a data controller, and 
                                                          
942
 See Oh et al, (note 612). 
943
 See Hartmann, (note 542) 159. 
944
 See Hartman, ibid; see also McCrae & Costa Jr., (note 560) 510. 
945
 See Oh et al, (note 612) 764. 
946
 See Kolar et al, (note 656).  
947
 See Oh et al, (note 612) 764. 
255 
 
includes any expression of opinion about the individual and any indication of the 
intentions of the data controller or any other person in respect of the individual”.  In 
terms of this definition, information regarding the personality of an individual is 
personal data, and in the hands of a data controller, processing such information is 
subject to the provisions of the Act.  A data controller is explained in the Act as a 
person/s who determines the purposes for which and the manner in which personal 
data is processed.  A data subject is an individual who is the subject of personal data.  
In part I, section 2, sensitive personal data is stated as referring to information relating 
to issues such as racial/ethnic origin, religious beliefs, political opinions, physical or 
mental health or conditions, sexual life and the commission or alleged commission of 
an offence and related proceedings and sentences.  Therefore, the Act does not 
expressly categorise information as to individual personality as sensitive personal 
data.  However, one might argue that the personality of an individual could in some 
sense be categorised as part and parcel of his mental health.  If that argument is 
favoured, then personality information is viewed as sensitive enough to be covered by 
the provisions of the Act in relation to sensitive personal data.   
Of particular interest in relation to personality information would be the provisions of 
part II, sections 7, 10 and 12.  Section 7 deals with a data subject’s right of access to 
his/her personal data.  Section 10 provides that the data subject has a right to prevent 
processing of such information which is likely to cause damage or distress.  Here, the 
individual can prevent the processing of such information on the grounds that it would 
cause substantial damage/distress to him or to another, and that such damage/distress 
is or would be unwarranted.  However, the Act subsequently provides that the above 
provision shall not apply if any of the conditions set out in para 1-4 of schedule 2 is 
met or in such other cases as may be prescribed by the Secretary of State.  Section 12 
provides that an individual has the right to require that no significant decision 
concerning him/her is taken based solely on the automated processing of personal data 
for the purpose of evaluating matters such as his/her performance, reliability or 
conduct.  Sub-sections 6 and 7 provide exemptions to the provision in section 12.  
Sub-section 6 implies that section 12 does not apply if the decision is taken as part of 
steps for the purpose of considering whether or not to enter into a contract with the 
individual or with a view to entering such a contract or in the course of performing 
such a contract; or is authorised or required by or under any enactment.  Sub-section 7 
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provides that section 12 would not apply if the effect of the decision was to grant a 
request of the data subject or steps have been taken to safeguard the legitimate 
interests of the data subject such as allowing him/her to make representations.   
The data protection principles are outlined in schedule 1 of the Act.  These principles 
provide that personal data must be processed fairly and lawfully and must not be 
processed except at least one of the conditions in schedule 2 is met and one in 
schedule 3 for sensitive personal data.  The principles also state that personal data 
shall be adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purpose or purposes for 
which they are processed.  The principles also require that appropriate technical and 
organisational measures shall be taken against unauthorised or unlawful processing of 
personal data and against accidental loss or destruction of, or damage to, personal 
data.  Schedule 2 outlines the conditions relevant for the purposes of processing 
personal data.  Such conditions include that the data subject has given his consent to 
the processing, the processing is necessary for the performance of a contract to which 
the data subject is a party, the processing is necessary for compliance with any legal 
obligation to which the data holder is subject, the processing is necessary for the 
administration of justice, or the processing is necessary for the exercise of any 
functions of a public nature exercised in the public interest by any person.   
In relation to sensitive personal data, schedule 3 outlines the conditions and these 
include the data subject giving his explicit consent, the processing is necessary for the 
purpose of exercising or performing any right or obligation which is conferred or 
imposed by law upon the data holder in connection with employment.  Part IV of the 
Act provides some exemptions to the compliance with certain provisions of the Act.  
One of these exemptions is in section 31 in relation to regulatory activity.  That 
section provides that the provisions of the Act as regards subject information are 
exempted in any case to which the application of those provisions would be likely to 
prejudice the proper discharge of relevant functions designed for the protection of 
members of the public against issues such as financial loss due to dishonesty, 
malpractice or other seriously improper conduct, or the unfitness or incompetence of, 
persons concerned in the provision of banking, insurance, investments or other 
financial services or in the management of corporate bodies.   
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Section 27 explains that the subject information provisions refer to the first data 
protection principle to the extent that it requires compliance with para 2, part II of 
schedule 1 and section 7 of the Act.  Para 2, part II of schedule 1 provides that under 
the first principle in relation to data being processed fairly, the data subject should be 
provided with information regarding the identity of the data controller and any 
nominated representatives, the purpose/s for which the data is processed, and any 
further information which is necessary.  Section 7 deals with the rights of data 
subjects and includes provisions such as the individual being entitled to obtain 
information from the data controller regarding the personal data held for him/her, the 
purposes for which they are being or are to be processed and the recipients or classes 
of recipients to whom they are or may be disclosed.  The individual is also entitled to 
have communicated to him information constituting his personal data and the source 
of such information.  The individual is also entitled under section 7 to be informed of 
the logic involved in any decision making based solely on the result of processing 
his/her personal data by automatic means for the purpose of evaluating matters such 
as his performance, reliability or conduct.   
Considering the above provisions of the Act, the conclusion to be drawn is that as 
long as personal data, even sensitive data, are processed in accordance with the 
principles of data protection, and in compliance with the provisions of the Act, then 
the data controller is not in breach of the law.  The principles generally mandate that 
personal data be processed in a manner that safeguards the rights of data subjects and 
in a situation where at least one of the conditions of schedule 2 or 3 is met.  One of 
the conditions common to both schedules is the consent of the data subject.  This 
means that if the consent of the individual is obtained, then the data controller is 
within the law.  In situations where the individual (the company director), as in the 
suggested model, is aware and consents to a personality evaluation being conducted 
and the information used for the purposes of determining his prospective employment 
in a company, then the conditions stipulated in the Act are met.  The Act specifically 
provides in section 12 (6) that decisions can be made utilizing personal data for the 
purpose of considering whether to enter into a contract with a data subject.   
In the case of recruiting company directors, the company as represented by its 
shareholders enter into contracts with the directors to manage the company, and so in 
this situation, the Act sanctions the utilisation of personal data in the decision making 
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processes in relation to these contracts.  In relation to disclosing personal data, the Act 
also makes certain exemptions in relation to regulatory functions as discussed above.  
The import of those provisions is that personal data which is held and disclosed in the 
course of discharging functions such as those stated in the Act would not be subject to 
the rights of the data subject as provided for under the subject information provisions 
of the Act.  So, for instance, in the case of the suggested model, if a government 
authority is the data controller, and has other representatives, this information does 
not have to be disclosed to the data subject.  Also, the data controller is not entitled to 
disclose the recipients or classes of recipients to whom the personal data can be 
disclosed.  In these cases, the processing of the personal data is not to be viewed as 
unfair in contravention of the first principle of data protection.  However, the 
provisions of the suggested model indicate that the directors will be aware of the 
recipients of the personality information, which are the shareholders, the board of 
directors, the stock exchange and the external authority.   
In relation to personality information, it might be argued that personal data is subject 
to these exemptions in relation to regulatory functions but the same cannot be said of 
sensitive personal data.
948
  However, as highlighted earlier, the Act does not expressly 
categorise personality information as sensitive personal data, a fact which places such 
information under the purview of personal data and subject to the exemptions.  In any 
case, even in relation to sensitive personal information, the Act provides in schedule 3 
that one of the conditions relevant for the fair and lawful processing of such data is 
that processing is necessary for the performance of any obligation conferred or 
imposed by law on the data controller in connection with employment.  Therefore, if 
there is a law that mandates the processing of such personal information for the 
purposes of employment as a company director, such as the suggested regulatory 
model, then the provisions of the Data Protection Act are not contravened in cases 
where the personality information relating to company directors is utilised for the 
purposes of their employment.  Schedule 3 also provides in para 3 that processing of 
sensitive personal data is fair and lawful if done in order to protect the vital interests 
of another person, in cases where the consent of the data subject has been 
unreasonably withheld.  Therefore, in this case, where one of the aims of processing 
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 The Act does not ascribe the exemptions to sensitive personal data because the wording of s 31 specifically 
refers to “personal data”. 
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the personality information of company directors is to protect the interests of society, 
it becomes fair and lawful to do so even when the directors have refused to give their 
consent unreasonably.  However, it is expected that directors would consent to the 
obtaining and utilisation of such data as it is done in the course of their employment 
prospects.  In any case, they can of course refuse to consent and thereby refuse to be 
considered for the directorship role.   
In terms of the suggested model, the personality information does not automatically 
preclude the employment of a director as that is ultimately for the shareholders to 
decide, but the information serves its own purpose for the regulatory framework.  
Therefore, as is indicated in the provisions of the Data Protection Act referring to the 
rights of data subjects in relation to decisions made as a result of processing personal 
data by automatic means, the personality information is not used as the sole 
determinant of an employment decision in this case, because the shareholders have 
the right and opportunity to take cognisance of other factors.   Schedule 3, para 7A (b) 
of the Act also provides that processing sensitive personal data is fair and lawful if 
done for the purpose of preventing fraud or a particular kind of fraud.  Therefore, 
processing personality information for the purposes of preventing persons who are 
capable of fraudulent activities from becoming company directors or managing the 
risks associated with them in order to help prevent fraud is fair and lawful.  As long as 
the processing of personality information is done in accordance with the principles of 
data protection and in compliance with the provisions of the Data Protection Act 
1998, there should be no negative issues raised as to the import of the provisions of 
the suggested model in relation to data protection. 
In January 2012, the EU published a Draft Regulation on data protection.
949
  This 
Regulation repeals Directive 95/46/EC which dealt with data protection and the 
guarantee of the free flow of personal data between Member States.
950
  Article 5 of 
the draft Regulation requires that personal data must be processed lawfully, and must 
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 See the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and of the free movement of such data [25:01:2012] 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/document/review2012/com_2012_11_en.pdf (accessed 15th 
June 2012). The right to protection of personal data is established by Article 8 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR) which deals with the right to respect for privacy and family life. 
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 See Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection 
of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, OJ L 
281/31. 
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be adequate, relevant and limited to the minimum necessary in relation to the 
purposes for which they are processed.  Article 6 provides that processing of personal 
data shall be lawful only if at least one of the conditions listed in sub-sections (a) to 
(f) apply.  These conditions include that the data subject has given consent, that the 
processing is necessary for the performance of a contract, and that the processing is 
necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest.  Article 7 
outlines the conditions requisite for a valid consent.  Under Article 14 and 15, the data 
subject is entitled to information relating to issues such as the recipients or categories 
of recipients of the personal data and the period for which the personal data will be 
held.  Of particular relevance in relation to the evaluation of the personality 
dimensions of directors and information relating thereto are the provisions of Article 
20 of the draft Regulation which deals with measures based on profiling and states as 
follows: 
Every natural person shall have the right not to be subject to a 
measure which produces legal effects concerning this natural 
person or significantly affects this natural person, and which is 
based solely on automated processing intended to evaluate 
certain personal aspects relating to this natural person or to 
analyse or predict in particular the natural person's 
performance at work, economic situation, location, health, 
personal preferences, reliability or behaviour.
951
   
             
 However, there are exceptions to this general provision under sub-section 2.  A 
person may be subjected to the measures prohibited under Article 20(1) if the 
processing is undertaken in the course of entering into, or the performance of, a 
contract and where suitable means have been adduced to safeguard the data subject’s 
legitimate interest such as the right to obtain human intervention; if the processing is 
expressly authorised by a Union or Member State law which also provides suitable 
measures to safeguard the data subject’s legitimate interests; or the processing is 
based on the data subject’s consent subject to the conditions laid down in Article 7 
and to suitable safeguards.  These provisions are similar to those in the Data 
Protection Act 1998.  Taking account of these provisions in relation to the model 
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suggested in the thesis, there will be no infringement of data protection laws if the 
directors consent to the processing of their personal data.  Again, particularly in 
relation to the provisions of Article 20, personal data can be processed in relation to a 
contract of employment or where State regulation mandates such processing of 
personal data.  The regulatory model in this thesis requires the processing of personal 
data in regard to the contract between directors and shareholders of companies and 
provides the opportunity for human intervention to the extent that the shareholders are 
still allowed to select directors irrespective of their personality dimensions.  In this 
way, the legitimate rights of the directors are protected because the model does not 
suggest an automatic exclusion of inappropriate directors.  Also, there are human 
interventions at every stage of the processes suggested by the model considering the 
external regulatory oversight.  The underlying aim of the suggested model is 
personality risk management and it does not foreclose the opportunity of employment 
as a company director.  In conclusion, if the principles and laws of data protection are 
adhered to, as is the case in the suggested model, personal data in relation to company 
directors can be processed and utilised without any liabilities.  One essential element 
in relation to data protection is obtaining the consent of the data subject, so in the 
event that a prospective director declines his consent as regards the personality risk 
management process, then the process does not have to be undertaken, and he or she 
will not become a director of a public listed company. 
 
The practical implications of the data protection laws as discussed above can be 
illustrated with an examination of the FSA Approved Persons’ Regime and the 
Protection of Vulnerable Groups (PVG) Scheme managed by Disclosure Scotland,
952
 
an executive agency of the Scottish Government.  Under the FSA’s regime, the 
candidate countersigns the application form as a confirmation of the authenticity of 
the information provided.
953
  This is interpreted as the candidate providing consent for 
the company to disclose the information contained in the application form to the FSA 
for the purposes of determining the fitness and propriety of that candidate for the role 
in question.  This provision is in accord with the requirements of the Data Protection 
Act 1998.  The Protection of Vulnerable Groups (Scotland) Act 2007 which is the 
                                                          
952
 This agency was established in 2002 to deliver the Scottish Ministers’ functions under Part V of the Police 
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legislation under which the PVG Scheme operates provides in section 68 (1) that the 
disclosure of disclosure information is lawful when undertaken by the individual to 
whom the information relates and by any other person with the consent of the 
individual to whom the information relates.
954
  Therefore, in relation to data 
protection and privacy issues, the consent of the data subject validates the processing 
and disclosure of personal data to specified recipients. 
 
It is recognised that even where personal data such as information on the personality 
of directors is processed in accordance with data protection and privacy rules, there 
might be cases in which individuals are reluctant to share their personal information 
with certain recipients and in certain circumstances in order to protect their privacy 
and reputation.  The regulatory model suggested in this thesis envisages the disclosure 
of information regarding the personality of company directors of public listed 
companies to its shareholders, boards of directors and regulators.  The prospective 
directors would be made aware of this group of recipients as persons who need to 
utilise the information on their personality as part of the proposed personality risk 
management process.  Even though in a public listed company any member of the 
public is a potential shareholder, the information regarding the personality of directors 
is disclosed only to actual shareholders, and this is considered necessary as part of 
ensuring the effective management of companies and prevention of corporate failures 
attributable to inappropriate behaviour.  The choice is between the prevention of 
disclosures relating to personality in order to safeguard the privacy of individuals and 
the disclosure of such information to necessary recipients in order to identify and 
manage personality risks and thereby enhance effective corporate governance in 
public listed companies.  It is granted that this scenario might result in some 
reluctance by persons applying or being approached to take up directorial roles.  
However, a balance has to be created between being conscious of the sensitivity 
surrounding such disclosures and the achievement of the positive aims of the 
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 See the Disclosure Scotland website 
http://www.disclosurescotland.co.uk/guidance/infofororg/chap5_sharingdisc/5_1_perm.html (accessed 15th 
June 2012).  A disclosure is a document containing impartial and confidential criminal history information held 
by the police and government departments which can be used by employers to make safer recruitment 
decisions, see http://www.disclosurescotland.co.uk/what-is-disclosure/ (accessed 15th June 2012). 
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model.
955
  The pool of potential directors might decrease, but, it is better to have 
fewer directors who are appropriate persons and are more capable of effective 
corporate governance than a larger pool with persons who have the potential to 
behave inappropriately, with no mechanisms in place to identify and manage the risks 
associated with their inappropriate personality and thereby exposing public listed 
companies to the possibility of corporate failure due to behavioural issues.              
            
         
7.5.3 REGULATORY IMPACT ASSESSMENT 
A key practical consideration in relation to the suggested model would be the 
undertaking of a regulatory impact assessment.  The UK Better Regulation Executive 
indicate that impact assessments enable an identification of the regulatory measures 
which will achieve the government’s policy objectives, while minimising costs and 
administrative burdens.
956
  It is also stated that impact assessments provide those 
interested in the process an opportunity to identify any potential consequences, 
minimising the risk of future problems.
957
  The EU better regulation initiative states 
that “impact assessment is designed to help in structuring and developing policies. It 
identifies and assesses the problem at stake and the objectives pursued. It helps to 
identify the main options for achieving the objectives and analyses their likely 
impacts in the economic, environmental and social fields. It outlines advantages and 
disadvantages of each option and examines possible synergies and trade-offs.”958  In 
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 The issue of balancing the necessary interests is also reflected in the FSA’s approach to disclosure.  In 
deciding whether to publish details of its prohibition orders in the FSA register, the FSA balances any possible 
prejudice to the individual concerned against the interest of consumer protection.  See s 6.19 of the FSA 
Enforcement Guide http://fsahandbook.info/FSA/html/handbook/EG/link/PDF (accessed 15th June 2012).  
Therefore, in relation to the suggested model, one prejudice which might arise out of disclosure is a taint on 
the reputation of the individual, but, this is ameliorated by the fact that the process does not aim to exclude 
persons automatically from company management, and a high risk director will still have the opportunity to 
prove that he/she is able to contribute towards effective corporate governance.  This is because as long as that 
director abides by corporate governance principles, established rules and regulations, and corporate failure 
does not occur as a result of his/her inappropriate behaviour, then the issue of his/her high risk personality will 
not appear detrimental in the long term.  Considering this, it is better to make the necessary disclosures and 
ensure that corporate failures are prevented, because even if the personality risk management process is not 
instituted and corporate failure occurs, the reputation of the company directors will still be compromised and 
more permanently in this case as the public might lose confidence in them as directors and they may in fact be 
disqualified.      
956 See the BIS website http://www.bis.gov.uk/policies/bre/assessing-impact (accessed 15th June 2012). 
957
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(accessed 15th June 2012). 
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the UK, impact assessments are undertaken by regulatory agencies such as the FSA.  
As was stated by the FSA in relation to the EU better regulation agenda, an impact 
assessment is designed to help policy makers and legislators make better choices and 
the assessment is aimed at explaining the problem being addressed and attempting to 
assess the costs and benefits of the proposed policy as well as that of other policy 
options.
959
  Regulatory impact assessments should consist of a balanced appraisal of 
all impacts and wide-ranging consultation with stakeholders as an integral part of the 
process.
960
  The UK Better Regulation Executive has a guideline for impact 
assessments,
961
 the European Commission has an impact assessment guideline, 
updated in 2009, and the FSA also works with its own guidelines.
962
  It is important to 
undertake an impact assessment in accordance with guidelines which are aimed at 
securing the desired outcome from the exercise.  Ultimately, the important issue is to 
develop a policy intervention which stands the best chance of achieving its purposes, 
and a regulatory impact assessment is one way of contributing towards this 
objective.
963
 In relation to the suggested model, it is the better of other options as 
discussed earlier.
964
  Nevertheless, it would still be useful to undertake a detailed 
regulatory impact assessment, taking into consideration all possible impacts, and 
particularly as a means of determining whether there are aspects of the model which 
need to be modified in order to conform to peculiar needs and circumstances.  For 
instance, as regards cost issues, the State could undertake to conduct the evaluation 
exercises if the results of a regulatory impact assessment indicate that it would be the 
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(accessed 15th June 2012). 
962
 See the EC website 
http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/commission_guidelines/commission_guidelines_en.htm  (accessed 
15th June 2012); see also the 2009 guidelines at 
http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/commission_guidelines/docs/iag_2009_en.pdf (accessed 15th June 
2012); see also the FSA guidelines http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/mfa_guide.pdf (accessed 15th June 
2012). The FSA undertake a Market Failure Analysis (MFA) and a Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) when proposing a 
policy initiative. 
963
 For an analysis of regulatory impact assessments and how they work, see C.A. Dunlop, M. Maggetti, C.M. 
Radaelli & D. Russel, ‘The Many Uses of Regulatory Impact Assessment: A Meta-Analysis of EU and UK Cases’ 
(2012) Regulation and Governance (online first publication doi: 10.1111/j.1748-5991.2011.01123.x); see also 
C.M. Radaelli, ‘Regulating Rule-Making via Impact Assessment’ (2010) 23(1) Governance 89-108. 
964
 See generally the discussions in chapter six. 
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cheaper option when compared with the cost of engaging private evaluators who 
might seek to generate the most profit from their endeavours.
965
  
 
7.6 A SKELETAL FRAMEWORK OF THE REGULATION 
An outline draft of the suggested model with some of its provisions might be as 
follows: 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ACT 
An Act to reform corporate governance and make provisions relating to the 
recruitment of company directors; make recommendations as to the most appropriate 
personality dimensions for corporate governance; make provisions for the risk 
management of company directors; and for connected purposes. 
 
BE IT ENACTED as follows: 
 
Chapter 1 
Definitional Issues: Companies and Directors 
1) A company under this Act refers to a public company formed according to the 
requirements of the Companies Act 2006. 
2) A company director under this Act refers to a person so called and so appointed in 
accordance with the provisions of the Companies Act 2006. 
                                                          
965
 For example, obtaining the NEO PI-R (UK edition) for administering personality evaluation tests would cost 
£148 for the starter set, £48 for the professional manual, £48 for the guide to interpretation, £44 for reusable 
item booklets and £62 for the online edition, see http://www.hogrefe.co.uk/business-
psychometrics/personality-and-behaviour-at-work/neo-personality-inventory-revised-uk-edition.html 
(accessed 15th June 2012).  Training is required for acquiring knowledge on the administration of the tests and 
these also attract costs starting from £950; see http://www.neopir.co.uk/ (accessed 15th June 2012); see also 
http://www.psysoft.com/psysoft_training_open_schedule.html (accessed 15th June 2012).  There will also be 
other costs in relation to the external authority in terms of providing personnel, administration and monitoring 
functions.  The State could undertake to subsidise the operational costs of the external authority in order to 
reduce the cost of the model to companies, because regulatory cost is a pertinent issue for businesses. See 
generally the discussions on cost and funding in section 7.1.3 and section 7.2.5. 
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Chapter 2 
Recruitment of Company Directors 
3) Every public listed company must evaluate the personality of its directors in 
accordance with the provisions of this Act: 
a) The evaluation process must be undertaken at the point of recruitment of every 
director; 
b) Public listed companies are encouraged to recruit directors who possess the most 
appropriate personality dimensions for the delivery of effective corporate governance; 
c) The documents with detailed information regarding personality dimensions and 
corporate governance are schedules to this Act; 
d) Companies must engage the services of personality evaluators who meet the 
requirements of this Act or are accredited by this Act; 
e) The evaluators must issue a report on the results of the evaluation process. 
4) Every public listed company must render a report to the approved external authority 
for the administration of this Act upon the recruitment of a director and the report 
must include the following information: 
a) That the evaluation process has been carried out in accordance with the provisions of 
the Act; 
b) That the company has taken cognisance of the recommendations as to the most 
appropriate personality dimensions as stated in the document annexed to this Act; 
c) That the company has made its selection of directors;  
d) A document detailing the personality risk dimensions of the directors selected; 
e) A document signed by the selected directors indicating their acceptance of the 
evaluation results and its disclosure to the shareholders, external authority and the 
stock exchange. 
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Chapter 3 
Personality Risk Management of Directors 
5) Every public listed company that recruits a director who is considered high risk as a 
result of his/her personality must undertake to place the high risk director/s under a 
risk management procedure: 
a) The Act mandates as a minimum the adoption of a standard personality risk 
management procedure as contained in a Schedule annexed to the Act;  
b) The company may adopt its own internally developed risk management procedure;  
c) The company may adopt any other externally developed risk management procedure; 
d) The risk management procedure adopted must conform to reasonable standards of risk 
management; 
e) The high risk directors must consent to the risk management procedure or otherwise 
lose their positions as directors.  
 
6) Every public listed company must render reports to the approved external authority 
for the administration of this Act, which report must include the following 
information: 
a) Whether the company has selected high risk directors; 
b) That the company has adopted the recommended personality risk management 
procedure scheduled to this Act; or  
c) That the company has elected to deploy an internally developed personality risk 
management procedure, details of which are to be attached to the report; or 
d) That the company has elected to adopt an externally developed personality risk 
management procedure, details of which are to be attached to the report, and 
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e) That the personality risk management procedure selected conforms to reasonable 
standards of risk management as recommended in this Act. 
 
Chapter 4 
Liability 
7) a) Every public listed company which contravenes the provisions of this Act is liable 
of an offence and to a fine of £500,000. 
b)Every director of the company who contributes to the contravention of the 
provisions of this Act is liable of an offence and upon conviction to a fine of 
£100,000.   
 
7.7 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has discussed approaches to managing personality risks, beginning with 
a review of existing mechanisms and their limitations, and proceeding to the 
presentation of arguments and discussions in support of a hybrid regulatory regime for 
personality risk management.  It suggests a regulatory model, and discusses 
provisions to be incorporated in the model.  The chapter also evaluates the model 
against present corporate governance mechanisms which are aimed at managing 
behavioural risks, such as the FSA Regime and Companies Act 2006, and highlights 
the areas in which the model differs.  The chapter also situates the model in the 
present UK corporate governance framework, presenting proposals as to how the 
provisions of the model could be incorporated into the regime in the event of an 
entirely new regulatory instrument not being sought.  Recommendations are also 
made as to the most appropriate personality traits for corporate governance, 
considering discussions in previous chapters.  There are also discussions on the 
import of the disclosure requirements of the model taking account of data protection 
laws, as well as regulatory impact assessment considerations.  The chapter also 
presents a skeletal draft of the suggested model if a new regulatory instrument is 
desired.  The model is essentially an attempt to identify and manage risks in corporate 
governance as a means of enhancing effective corporate governance and particularly 
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to help in the prevention of corporate failures occasioned by personality risks.  In the 
development of suggestions for this regulatory model, particular regard has been had 
to corporate theories, regulatory theories and principles of effective regulation, cost 
implications, current trends, current regulatory atmosphere, behavioural issues in 
examples of corporate failures, and the relationship between personality and 
behaviour.  
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  CHAPTER EIGHT 
  CONCLUSION 
 
Morality cannot be legislated, but behaviour can be 
regulated.  Judicial decrees may not change the heart, but 
they can restrain the heartless. 
                                      -Martin Luther King Jr. 
  
 
8.1 OVERVIEW OF THESIS ARGUMENTS AND ADVANCES 
This thesis identifies that behavioural issues can contribute to corporate failures, and seeks to 
ascertain how and why that is the case, and whether any mechanisms exist to check 
behavioural issues which impact on the effective delivery of corporate governance.  The 
knowledge that behavioural issues can constitute problems in respect of the delivery of 
effective corporate governance was obtained from analysing reports issued after 
investigations into corporate failures.  Recent reports such as the Walker Review, the Turner 
Review and the OECD Reports, as well as reports from previous years such as the HIH report 
all identified behavioural issues as a factor in corporate failures.
966
  The thesis examined 
these reports in order to ascertain how and why behavioural issues contributed to the 
corporate failures in question.  Also, an examination of investigations into some of the major 
corporate failures which occurred in the last two decades indicated that company directors 
behaved in specific ways that were considered inappropriate and which particularly 
contributed to the corporate failures.
967
  Some of the investigations alluded to the fact that 
their behaviour was reflective of their personality, as for instance in the Maxwell Group case, 
the HIH case, the WorldCom case and the RBS case in which the CEOs were said to be 
individuals with domineering personalities.  The thesis then seeks to ascertain what 
constitutes behaviour, and the linkage between personality and behaviour, in order to 
determine and understand how personality can influence behaviour.  Again, it was understood 
that corporate failures have negative consequences as is evident from the reports and 
                                                          
966
 See generally the discussions of these reports in chapter four. 
967
 These corporate failures are discussed in chapter four. 
271 
 
investigations illustrating the harm occasioned to individuals and society as a result of the 
failures.
968
  This means that factors which have the potential to result in corporate failure are 
risky, because an analysis of risk literature illustrates that risk is the potential for an unwanted 
negative consequence.
969
  For the reason that behavioural issues can lead to corporate 
failures, it means that behavioural issues are risk contributors to the corporate governance 
process.  It also means that the elements which constitute behaviour would also be risk 
elements.
970
  Therefore, risk management in relation to behavioural risks and its constituent 
elements becomes an important issue, if corporate failures attributable to behavioural issues 
are to be prevented.   
Risk management is a process which is undertaken in corporate governance mainly under the 
provisions of the Turnbull Guidance, and so an examination of the risk management 
processes was undertaken in order to ascertain how behavioural risks have been identified 
and managed in corporate governance.
971
  It was found that the Turnbull Guidance provided 
that internal control was the primary risk management tool in companies.
972
  An examination 
of internal control provisions as specified in the Turnbull guidance illustrated that 
behavioural risks were managed from the perspective of instituting structures and processes 
to safeguard varying situations.
973
  However, behavioural risks were not identified and 
managed from the perspective of personality issues and its attendant risks.  An analysis of 
other corporate governance mechanisms such as the UK Corporate Governance Code, 
Companies Act 2006, and EU Company Law Directives illustrated that there were equally no 
mechanisms aimed at identifying and managing personality risks.
974
  This situation evidenced 
a flaw in the system.  In any case, it was still important to understand exactly how personality 
impacted on behaviour in order to make adequate judgements as to how necessary and 
important it was to pay particular attention to the personality aspect of behavioural risks.  
Personality is a social and psychological phenomenon and so a journey was undertaken into 
the foray of psychology.  Relevant literature and reports of empirical research were analysed 
in detail, and it was understood that personality and situations are indeed significant aspects 
                                                          
968
 The impact and consequences of these corporate failures was discussed in chapter four. 
969
 The meaning and import of risk is discussed in chapter three, section 3.2. 
970
 Ibid. 
971
 See the discussions on the Turnbull Guidance in chapter three, section 3.4. 
972
 See The Revised Turnbull Guidance, (note 170) para 19. 
973
 Ibid. 
974
 See the discussions in chapter three, sections 3.5-3.7; see also chapter seven, section 7.1.1. 
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of behaviour.
975
  It was also ascertained that personality proved to be more significant in 
relation to behaviour as it was a concept which determined and influenced responses even in 
varying situations.
976
  This means that managing behavioural risks without managing 
personality risks can only prove ineffective.  It becomes necessary therefore to develop a 
personality risk management mechanism in corporate governance if corporate failures are to 
be prevented.  The thesis examines literature on corporate theories, regulatory theories, 
company boards, corporate failures, risk management etc. and formulates a conceptual 
framework for personality risk management.
977
  In so doing, there is an examination of 
possible approaches which can be adopted in regard to managing personality risks.  
Regulatory options such as adopting an exclusively hard law approach, an entirely soft law 
approach, or a mixture of both approaches is analysed.  Other options such as insurance and 
certification are also explored.  Each approach is discussed with its merits and demerits. 
Taking account of the negative impact of corporate failures as evident in the examples of 
failures analysed in chapter four, and considering the duty of the State to intervene in cases of 
market failure and in the interests of the public, the thesis argues that a regulatory approach is 
the better option in terms of personality risk management.   
The thesis recognises that in order to be effective, regulation must conform to certain 
principles and those are taken into consideration in the development of the regulatory model 
proposed.
978
  Considering the vital place of risk identification as understood from an 
examination of risk management literature,
979
 the thesis argues for mandatory provisions in 
relation to the identification of personality risks.  This is done for two main reasons. Firstly, it 
is to ensure that the provision is carried out as that is the initial step in any risk management 
process.  Secondly, it is to facilitate the availability of the information regarding the 
personality of directors to interested parties as that is a piece of information which is essential 
for the effective functioning of markets as it would enable shareholders to make a more 
informed judgment as to the level of risk they are willing to undertake in their decision to 
invest in a company.  In recognition of the advantages of soft law provisions particularly in 
circumstances where one size does not fit all companies, the thesis argues for a situation in 
which shareholders are still allowed to select their company directors, after they must have 
                                                          
975
 See the discussions in chapter five. 
976
 Ibid. 
977
 See the literature review in chapter two and the conceptual framework in chapter six. 
978
 See the discussion on regulatory theories and principles in chapter two, section 2.8. 
979
 Risk management is discussed in chapter three, section 3.3. 
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been provided information regarding the most appropriate personality dimensions for 
corporate governance.  However, in the event that inappropriate directors are selected, the 
company must then undertake to manage the personality risks accruing from these persons.  
The model provides suggestions on the provisions to be included in the personality risk 
management process, but the company is also allowed to develop its own personality risk 
management process subject to conformity with certain minimum standards.
980
   In 
consideration of cost issues and the burden of promulgating new legislation, the thesis 
suggests the inclusion of the provisions of the model in already existing mechanisms, and 
provides details regarding how this might be achieved in the event that the provisions are 
sought to be included in the existing UK Corporate Governance Code and Companies Act.  
However, if a new regulatory instrument is sought, for reasons such as to ensure that all the 
provisions are in one single regulatory instrument, the thesis also presents a skeletal 
framework of what the provisions of such an instrument might appear like in order to aid an 
understanding of the overall import of the model.
981
   
This thesis has answered its main research proposition which was to ascertain whether 
behavioural issues are risk contributors to the corporate governance process and whether 
behavioural risks and personality risks in particular are identified and managed effectively by 
corporate governance mechanisms.  It has done so by examining and analysing corporate 
failures and psychology literature to determine that personality contributes significantly to 
behaviour; and analysing existing corporate governance mechanisms and identifying that 
personality risks are not identified and managed effectively by any mechanism in corporate 
governance, and so it can be concluded that behavioural risks are not identified and managed 
effectively either because personality is an essential element of behaviour.  In order to 
ascertain the means of managing personality risks, an analysis of corporate and regulatory 
theories is undertaken, as well as an examination of risk management theories and current 
realities as it relates to corporate governance, and a hybrid regulatory model is proposed as an 
effective approach to personality risk management.  The sub-questions stated in the 
introductory chapter are also answered as follows: 
1) Corporate failures can be contributed to by the behaviour of company directors as 
is evident from an analysis of the reports of investigations into these failures and 
                                                          
980
 Details of the suggested model are discussed in chapter seven. 
981
 Ibid. 
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analysis of the actions undertaken by directors in the examples of corporate 
failures examined in chapter four. 
2) The behaviour of company directors can constitute risks to the effective delivery 
of corporate governance because from the definition and analysis of what risk 
entails as undertaken in chapter three, corporate failure is a negative outcome, a 
corrosion of the corporate objective and a peril to society, and so any issue that 
could potentially result in failure is a risk to the process. 
3) From an examination of the examples of corporate failures and an analysis of 
psychology literature, it was found that personality and situations are elements 
which constitute behaviour and in turn behavioural risks. 
4) Behavioural risk is not properly identified or addressed in corporate governance 
mechanisms because personality risk is not properly identified.  There is no 
recognition of personality risk and no provision for its identification.  Internal 
control mechanisms provide for varying situations, but there are no specific 
provisions targeted at identifying and managing personality risks. 
5) For the reason that behavioural risk is not properly identified, it cannot and has 
not been effectively managed.  Effectiveness in risk management entails an 
identification of all the elements that contribute to the risk issue in question as the 
starting point in the risk management process.  
6) Personality is a significant aspect of behaviour as is evidenced in psychology 
literature and the discussions in chapter five. 
7) Personality is the individual attributes which contribute to behaviour and 
personality risks are the risks which originate as a result of these attributes, 
whether appropriate or inappropriate.  In relation to corporate governance, the risk 
of corporate failure is increased in cases where these attributes are inappropriate. 
8) Personality risk is not effectively managed by corporate governance mechanisms 
because there is no established process aimed at identifying the risk in the first 
place.  Identifying the risk would mean conducting personality tests using models 
such as the five-factor model discussed in chapter five, and there is no mechanism 
in existing corporate governance regimes which clearly mandates those 
identification processes in relation to company directors of all public listed 
companies. 
9) It is important to manage personality risks, because they contribute to behavioural 
risks, and thereby, reduce the corporate failures which occur as a result of 
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behavioural issues.  These corporate failures have negative effects as discussed in 
chapter four.  Also, the identification of personality risks is essential in order to 
address the information deficit which is occasioned by shareholders not 
possessing adequate knowledge regarding the risks which they undertake when 
investing in a company.  
10) Personality risks can be managed effectively by developing a process which 
conforms to the tenets of effective risk management.  This would involve 
identifying the risk and then putting measures in place to manage it by adopting 
approaches such as avoidance or mitigation.  The conceptual framework in 
chapter six discusses how this can be achieved. 
11) Different approaches can be adopted to manage personality risks to varying 
degrees, but each approach has its merits and demerits and these are discussed in 
chapter six. 
12) A regulatory framework is a good option because personality risks are significant 
to the corporate governance process and should be managed with an approach 
which encompasses adequate provisions that will ensure effectiveness in 
outcomes.  Again, a regulatory framework is justifiable considering that there is a 
need for the State to intervene for the common good in order to enhance the 
functioning of markets and help prevent corporate failures.  It is also in the 
interests of the public to have a form of regulatory intervention which would be 
applicable to all the relevant public listed companies and embody acceptable 
minimum standards.  Chapter seven discusses in detail how such a regulatory 
framework would work.   
  
Essentially, this thesis has achieved the following advancements, thereby contributing to 
the literature in a manner that has not been previously achieved: 
1) Identified and analysed behavioural issues as a factor which contributes to 
corporate failures. 
2) Identified and analysed the constituent elements of behavioural issues as it 
particularly relates to corporate governance.     
3) Articulated that behavioural issues constitute significant risks to the corporate 
governance process. 
276 
 
4) Argued that the elements which constitute behaviour are distinct and significant 
risk elements in the corporate governance process. 
5) Identified that behavioural risks are mostly managed from the perspective of 
situations as far as internal control measures are concerned. 
6) Identified that other corporate governance mechanisms do not contain personality 
risk management processes. 
7) Analysed psychology literature and identified the linkage between personality and 
behaviour in relation to corporate governance failures. 
8) Argued that the conscientious personality and particularly the dutifulness trait is 
the most appropriate for corporate governance. 
9) Built on risk management, corporate and regulatory theories in the development of 
a conceptual framework for personality risk management.    
10) Argued for a hybrid regulatory model consisting of hard law and soft law 
provisions in the management of personality risks. 
11) Presented proposals on the recommended provisions of the hybrid regulatory 
model. 
12) Analysed the limitation in other existing mechanisms which seek to manage 
behavioural and personality risks to varying degrees. 
In conclusion, this thesis has adopted ideas on personality which were primarily established 
in the realm of psychology, and transported those ideas into the realm of corporate 
governance, as a means of establishing a solution to a problem which has been identified in 
respect of corporate governance.  Using the knowledge that certain personalities are better 
suited to delivering effective corporate governance, and certain others constitute higher 
degrees of risk to the governance process, as a tool for managing risks in corporate 
governance and preventing corporate failures is certainly an essential contribution to the 
corporate governance literature and would also be valuable in the development of policy 
aimed at reducing corporate failures. 
8.2 LIMITATIONS OF THESIS ARGUMENTS 
According to the tenets of the contractual theory, a company comes into being when two or 
more persons unite for the purposes of engaging in commercial activity.
982
 This means that 
the company should function under the sphere of private contract law and there is minimal 
                                                          
982
 See Bottomley, (note 42). 
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justification for State or public interference by way of regulation.
983
 Coase and Jensen & 
Meckling also argue that the company is merely a nexus for contracting relationships, with a 
view to reducing transactions costs within the market.
984
  In their view, therefore, corporate 
law exists simply to provide bottom line rules which the entrepreneurs would have had to 
contract upon separately with their agents.  State regulation under the contractual theory 
should serve simply to enhance the basic functioning of the markets.  In this thesis, it has 
been argued that regulation which aims to ensure that the personality risks associated with 
company directors are identified and managed is justifiable under the contractual theory 
because the appropriate behaviour of company directors is essential to the basic functioning 
of the markets. However, it can also be argued that State interference in that sphere is 
needless, as entrepreneurs reserve the right to select directors for their companies and should 
not be subjected to regulation in relation to the personalities of their agents.  Under the 
concession theory, State regulation is acceptable in the interests of the public.  But, there are 
also arguments which suggest that an important element as regards regulation under the 
concession theory is the consideration of the role of shareholders as owners and preserving 
their rights.
985
  Consequently, one important question is whether shareholders are able to 
regulate the operations which the State is seeking to regulate, and if the answer is in the 
affirmative, then there may be no need for State regulation.  So, in the final analysis, the 
important factor is whether shareholders as entrepreneurs are able to protect their interests as 
well as those of all other parties which include the public in matters relating to the effective 
governance of companies. 
In relation to the issue of identifying personality dimensions, it has been argued that the 
presence of specific personality traits implies only a tendency for certain attitudes and actions 
but does not predict it with absolute certainty.
986
  Also, there are arguments that actual 
behaviour is dependent on both the personality of an individual and the given situation.
987
  
Allport suggests that personality as a whole should be defined as a matter of degree of 
occurrence of particular traits.
988
  Again, the five-factor model, which is the most widely 
accepted framework for understanding personality, has been argued as not representing all 
the possible aspects of personality but rather deals with the important elements of 
                                                          
983
 See Sugarman & Rubin, (note 43). 
984
 See Coase, (note 25); see also Jensen & Meckling, (note 29). 
985
 See Dine, (note 57); see also Solomon, (note 57). 
986
 See Hartmann, (note 542) 153. 
987
 See Roberts, (note 555); see also Trevino, (note 134); see also Funder, (note 13). 
988
 See Allport, (note 549). 
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personality.
989
 There are two methods for identifying personality traits in psychology, the 
lexical and the non-lexical method, with both methods having certain disadvantages.  The 
lexical method is essentially descriptive and one disadvantage is that language is used as a 
medium of expression and varies between cultures and countries, and so does not meet strict 
scientific standards.
990
  A disadvantage of the non-lexical approach is the possibility that 
some personality traits are redundant.
991
  In regard to the NEO PI-R personality test, it has 
been argued that the results can be affected by reasons such as respondents not being self-
aware and careful/careless responses.
992
  Therefore, the identification and description of 
personality traits may not be absolutely accurate in all cases. 
In corporate governance, directors have traditionally been recruited through informal and 
self-governing methods.
993
  The nominations committee is simply required to evaluate the 
skills, knowledge and experience needed by the board and make recommendations regarding 
the recruitment of directors.
994
  There are no specifications that directors should conform to 
any specific personality dimensions.  Again, in relation to evaluating directors, it has been 
indicated that directors are generally reluctant to undergo evaluations because the directors 
feel uncomfortable at the prospect of being assessed and judged.
995
  It has also been argued 
that evaluation results may also be unreliable as the process may not have been carried out 
effectively, efficiently and objectively.
996
  Personality assessments would generate results 
which fall under the purview of personal information, and even though the directors may 
have consented to the assessments as part of the process of being recruited into company 
management, they may still have reservations regarding the disclosure of this piece of 
information to shareholders, fellow board members and regulators.  For reasons such as these, 
directors may not readily accept the idea of personality assessments and subsequent 
disclosures.  This situation might result in some individuals electing not to apply for 
directorships or to decline such an offer.  The pool of directors might in effect be shrunk, and 
this could influence the availability of individuals to undertake governance roles in 
companies. 
                                                          
989
 See Hartmann, (note 542) 168. 
990
 See John et al, (note 595). 
991
 See Hartmann, (note 542) 154-155. 
992
 See Hartmann, ibid, 159; see also oh et al, (note 612). 
993
 See Cadbury, (note 225); see also Dulewicz & Herbert, (note 224). 
994
 See the UK Corporate Governance Code 2010, B.2.1 and B.2.2 provisions. 
995
 See Kazanjian, (note 157). 
996
 Ibid. 
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Despite the above limitations, the thesis provides counter arguments and presents 
justifications for the approaches adopted.  However, it is important to recognise these 
limitations and take cognisance of the fact that the thesis conclusions which are that 
personality traits can be identified and therefore the risks associated with them can be 
managed and that regulatory intervention is necessary and justifiable, could be subject to the 
effect of these limitations.  One vital issue is that policy makers who are usually politicians 
and likely to engage with the business community in relation to regulatory intervention are 
bound to evaluate the balance between the arguments which support the thesis conclusions 
and those which present a concern.  It is argued in any case that regulatory intervention in the 
management of personality risks is essential and justified because the personality company 
directors influences their behaviour in the governance of companies, and therefore 
contributes risks which should be identified and managed in order to increase effectiveness in 
corporate governance and help prevent corporate failures.  The personality assessment 
framework adopted in this thesis are the most widely accepted models and despite their 
limitations, still remain the most empirically supported structure for identifying and 
explaining personality issues.  In the public interest, it is also argued that it is better to have a 
smaller pool of directors who are potentially more effective, than a larger pool of potentially 
ineffective directors who could contribute to corporate failure as a result of their personality.  
In conclusion, the personality risk assessment model suggested in this thesis is purely a risk 
management model which takes cognisance of the limitations in regard to personality 
identification and the impact of personality on behaviour, and so does not suggest that 
personality should be used as a sole criteria for determining eligibility for directorial roles, 
but instead suggests a recognition of the inherent risks in relation to personality issues and 
argues for the identification and management of such risks.      
 
8.3 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 
Considering the work that has gone into this thesis and the knowledge gained from it, some 
recommendations for future research are offered.  As there is an establishment of the linkage 
between personality and behaviour, it would be worthwhile to investigate the details of the 
dynamics between different types of personality traits and corporate governance, in order to 
have a clear and firm picture of how a combination of traits can contribute to more or less 
risks in the governance process, particularly as it relates to different roles.  It would also be 
important to investigate how different personality dimensions might fit the governance style 
in different types of companies, such as manufacturing companies, the service providers and 
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financial industry entities.  Again, this thesis has investigated individual personalities, but it 
would be vital to ascertain how this individual personality can affect group personality in 
different situations.  Some research has been done on this, with the result that individual 
personality influences group personality, but it would be necessary to ascertain how it does so 
in varying situations, particularly from a corporate governance perspective.  Ultimately, it 
would be essential to explore in greater detail the entirety of what personality can contribute 
to corporate governance as the issue of governance is one which entails the human persons 
constantly interacting with governance structures in order to produce results, desirable in 
some cases and undesirable in others.    
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